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Corporate Bond Issuers
What are the mechanisms behind corporate bond finance? Whereas a
lot of corporate finance research is focused on stocks, corporate bond
finance is relatively unknown territory. In this thesis, we present four
articles in which we study the costs and effects of financing with
bonds. We follow corporate bond issuers from market entry, through
subsequent issues to the stage where they repurchase their bonds. In
addition to the firms themselves, important players are bondholders,
shareholders, management and intermediaries (banks). In the first
paper, bond market entry is studied and related to agency costs of
equity. Central is the question whether shareholders benefit from the
presence of bonds in the firm’s capital structure. The second paper
investigates the costs of issuing bonds (in terms of yields to maturity
and fees paid to underwriters) in a bank-oriented system faced with
deregulation. Are bond issues by firms with strong bank ties affected
differently by regulation than those by independent firms? Whether
frequent bond issuers enjoy lower yields is the subject of the third
paper. Do firms benefit from enhanced reputations and better market
literacy when doing repeat issues? Finally, the fourth article studies
firms that repurchase their bonds, with a special focus on possible
wealth transfers between bondholders and shareholders. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Background on corporate bonds 
 
Corporate bond markets have experienced a spectacular growth over the past decade. In 
the Eurozone, the amount of straight corporate bonds outstanding has grown from just 
over € 300 billion in 1995 to 1050 billion in 20051. US bond markets are even larger. And 
even though stocks receive much more media attention, bond issues by far exceed equity 
issues2. Thus, the importance of bond finance to corporations can hardly be 
overestimated. 
 
In a financial sense, bonds are certificates of debt issued by a government or corporation 
that guarantee payment of the borrowed amount plus interest by a specified future date. In 
normal speech however, bonds can also refer to connections, restraints, ropes, chains, or 
legal agreements. As a verb, ‘to bond’ means to bring together, create ties, develop a 
relationship, or join firmly. Hence, bonds are associated with relationships, in both 
positive and negative senses. As we will see in Chapter 2, this dual connotation also holds 
for corporate bonds. 
 
Bonds are an important source of finance for corporations, but they are certainly not the 
only one. Firms usually finance their operations with a combination of securities. This 
mix is referred to as the firm’s capital structure. Debt versus equity is generally seen as 
the most important distinction here, but there are also various categories within and 
between these two archetypes. For example, convertible bonds and preferred equity have 
features of both debt and equity. Within debt, one can distinguish between private (or 
inside) debt (e.g., bank debt) and public (or outside) debt, of which corporate bonds are 
the most common version. Still, even bonds come in many guises, as they may or may 
not have covenants attached, have floating, fixed or zero rates, and all kinds of option 
features. See Fabozzi (2001) for an extensive overview.  
 
Surprisingly, bonds have received little research attention in comparison to stocks. This is 
slowly changing though, probably because some recent developments have put bonds in 
the spotlight. As mentioned above, bond markets have grown enormously, especially 
                                                 
1 Eurostat, Bond market statistics, March 2006. 
2 In 2005, global equity issuing amounted to US$ 513 billion, while total non-government bond issuance 
(including asset-backed, mortgage-backed and municipals) reached US$ 5733 billion. Source: Thomson 
ONE Banker Volume Analysis. 
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over the past decade. Back in the 1980s, bonds were used in a wave of leverage buy-outs 
(LBOs) instigated by Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert (see Bruck [1989] 
for a vivid account) and bond market traders temporarily reached star status, considering 
themselves ‘masters of the universe’ (Lewis, 1999; Wolfe, 1989). In the 1990s, 
speculation in bonds with option features resulted in multi-billion dollar losses for 
Orange County and other local government investors in the US (see for example Partnoy, 
1998). In recent years, the scandals at Enron and Parmalat and the downgradings of large 
firms such as GM and Ford have received quite some attention and raised questions about 
the functioning of the agencies that rate bonds and bond-issuing firms.  
 
In this thesis, we investigate the use of bond finance by corporations. Following the 
lifecycle of bond issuers, we study how the presence of bonds affects firm value and 
which factors influence the cost of bond finance. In four separate research projects, we 
investigate (i) the disciplinary power of bonds when the firm enters the bond market, (ii) 
the relation between issuing costs and bank ties, (iii) the way bond yields are affected 
when the firm issues more frequently, and (iv) the conflict of interest between 
stockholder and bondholders when firms buy back their own bonds. In the next 
subsection, we start with a literature review of research related to corporate bond finance. 
 
 
1.2 Literature review 
 
In this subsection we will first discuss capital structure in general and then focus on debt 
structure, i.e. the distinction between bonds and private debt (notably bank debt). 
Subsequently, we will review the various costs of bond finance: yields paid to 
bondholders, fees paid to underwriters, and, potentially, stock price reactions. 
 
Capital structure 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the firm’s capital structure is irrelevant for firm 
value in a perfect market because shareholders can mimic any capital structure. This is an 
important result, since it provides guidance to finding out when capital structure does 
matter, i.e. in the presence of market imperfections. These imperfections include taxes, 
costs of distress, information asymmetries, and agency costs. Due to the tax deduction of 
interest payments, debt provides a valuable tax shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
However, as Miller (1977) notes, this advantage also depends on the taxes that investors 
pay on the dividends, capital gains and interest they receive. As a result, investors may 
have varying preferences and firms can cater to different clienteles. More debt may save 
taxes, but it also increases the costs of financial distress. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
build a model where the cost of financial distress is traded off against the tax benefits of 
debt. Another imperfection stems from information asymmetry: managers are likely to 
have better information regarding the true value of the firm than investors have and this 
might affect the firm’s capital structure choices. Ross (1977) shows that managers of high 
quality firms may increase debt to make a credible signal about the value of the firm. The 
signal is credible because costs of distress make such a signal too expensive for low 
quality firms. Furthermore, Myers and Majluf (1984) identify a lemons problem (Akerlof, 
1970) in the equity issuance market: undervalued firms have incentives not to issue 
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equity, while it is very tempting for overvalued firms to do an equity issue. Investors 
anticipate this and will interpret an equity issue as bad news. In this pecking order, firms 
will prefer to finance their investments with internal cash or with debt issues and regard 
an equity issue as a last resort. Product market imperfections might also affect capital 
structure: Brander and Lewis (1986) show that in oligopolistic markets, firms with much 
debt have strong incentives to pursue an aggressive (high output) strategy, since 
shareholders are only interested in the states of the world in which debt is paid back in 
full. The fifth and final imperfection we discuss is the presence of agency costs, i.e. 
conflicts of interest between the stakeholders of the firm. Agency costs of debt concern 
the diverging interests between shareholders and debtholders. Two forms are identified. 
First, there is the risk of asset substitution or risk shifting: since debt is paid first, the 
presence of debt effectively turns equity into a call option and thus creates an incentive 
for risk seeking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Second, there is the underinvestment or 
debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977): projects might have a positive NPV from a firm’s 
perspective, but might not be beneficial to (and might thus be rejected by) shareholders if 
the cash inflows from the investment are used mainly to pay off debtholders. In Stulz 
(1990), both types of agency costs of debt are combined in one model to obtain an 
optimal capital structure. We note that the stockholder-bondholder conflict is often 
mitigated by including covenants in bonds, which impose restrictions on the actions that 
management can take to the detriment of bondholders (see for example Smith and 
Warner, 1979). Agency costs of equity refer to the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and the managers they hired to run the firm. Here, debtholders are not a 
direct party, but can affect the relation because the firm has the obligation to service the 
debt. Jensen (1986) argues that debt helps to discipline managers because the obligatory 
interest payments reduce the free cash flows that managers have at their discretion. 
Zwiebel (1996) formalizes this and shows that the disciplinary power of debt is largest 
when managers are not entrenched. However, Stulz (1988) argues that debt can also be 
used by insiders to keep a control lock, since it allows them to attract finance without 
diluting their ownership. However, this effect is mitigated since investors will value the 
firm accordingly. In the next chapter of this thesis, we will show that both these 
conflicting forces are at work in firms that enter the bond market. 
 
Public versus private debt 
Bonds are classified as public or arm’s-length debt since they are tradable and do not 
involve a close relationship between lender and borrower. In contrast, relations are much 
closer in case of private debt and especially bank debt, which is often accompanied by an 
array of services. As a result, there is more information exchange between the parties. 
The distinction between public and private debt (or outside and inside debt) has attracted 
quite some research attention. The advantages of inside/private debt, especially if 
provided by banks, are emphasized by Campbell and Kracaw (1980) and Fama (1985). 
According to Campbell and Kracaw (1980), banks have a comparative cost advantage 
due to their information production (access to information that is not publicly available) 
and are hence superior monitors. Fama (1985) stresses that for small firms, the 
contracting costs of bank (inside) debt are lower than for outside (public) debt. Bank 
loans are short-term and the renewal process triggers periodic evaluation of the firm's 
payment abilities. However, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that banks misuse 
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private information to extract rents from their customers. Morck and Nakamura (1999) 
indeed find evidence of rent-seeking behavior by Japanese banks. In the model of Berlin 
and Loeys (1988), the choice between public and private debt reflects a tradeoff between 
the inefficiencies of rigid bond covenants and the agency costs of hiring a delegated 
monitor. And in Bolton and Freixas (2000) there is a tradeoff between the financial 
flexibility (reorganizational skills) of banks and the lower intermediation cost of bonds. 
Datta et al. (2000) investigate the situation where firms go to the bond market for the first 
time (do a bond IPO) and partly shed their bank ties They find negative stock price 
reactions to bond IPOs, which are mitigated when bank monitoring is continued. Thus, it 
seems that bank loans result in better monitoring and disciplining than bonds. Still it is 
not clear whether there is disciplinary power in public debt. We will investigate this 
further in the next chapter by relating the stock reactions to bond IPO announcements to 
the bond’s potential for reducing agency costs. 
 
Bond yields 
In comparison to equity, the pricing of bonds seems straightforward. In principle, bond 
prices result from discounting a clear pattern of promised cash flows. However, the rates 
(yields) at which these cash flows need to be discounted vary, as interest rates fluctuate 
over time. In addition, interest rates also differ across maturities, which is referred to as 
the term structure of interest rates: the array of prices or yields on bonds with different 
terms to maturity. There is a large strand of literature concerned with modeling bond 
prices and price changes of bonds after issuing (see for example Marsh [1995] for an 
overview). However, in this thesis we will focus on pricing at issue, since this is most 
relevant for the firm. Cash flows may be promised, but they are not certain. Much more 
than most sovereign bonds, corporate bonds carry default risk. Fisher (1959) finds that 
default risk is the prime determinant of the risk premium on a firm's bonds. The 
marketability or liquidity or a bond is the second most important determinant. Cohan 
(1962) is probably the first to empirically examine the determinants of yield spreads on 
corporate bonds. He finds that for yields to be comparable across bonds, one at least has 
to control for rating, type of bond and maturity. Larger firms with more stable cash flows 
have lower yields. In subsequent research, additional factors were identified that affect 
the yield spread. The reputation of the bond’s underwriters is one such factor, as 
Livingston and Miller (2000) and Fang (2002) document that reputable banks obtain 
lower yields. Moreover, competition is important. Gande et al. (1999) and Takaoka and 
McKenzie (2005) find that yields have declined significantly with commercial bank entry 
to the underwriting market, in the US and Japan respectively. Corporate governance also 
seems to matter as Klock et al. (2005) find that antitakeover governance provisions lower 
the cost of debt financing. In addition, Miller (2002) reports that investors demand 
economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that do not have a prior 
history of on-going disclosure or are located in countries that do not protect investors' 
rights. Datta et al. (1999) document that the existence of bank debt lowers at-issue yield 
spreads for bond IPOs by about 68 basis points on average, thanks to valuable bank 
monitoring. Bae et al., (1997) and Crabbe (1991) find that event-risk covenants, which 
are aimed at preventing extreme risk shifting, significantly lower yields. Recent papers 
(Henderson et al., 2006; Miller, 2002; McBrady and Schill, 2005) show that firms also 
purposely issue bonds abroad or in different currencies to benefit from lower yields. 
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Moreover, firms issue more when interest rates are lower (Barry et al., 2004; Henderson 
et al., 2006) and use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost 
maturity at which to borrow (Baker et al., 2003). However, not all firms are equally likely 
to be able to exploit favorable market conditions. We expect that frequent bond issuers 
should have better market knowledge than infrequent issuers, which should allow them to 
obtain lower yields. We will investigate this relation between issue frequency and yields 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
Underwriting fees  
When issuing their bonds, firms are usually assisted by underwriters to bring their bonds 
to the market. The underwriter buys the bonds from the firm and subsequently sells them 
to investors at the risk of being stuck with bonds that are hard to sell. As a result, the 
underwriter is effectively short in a put option (Smith, 1977). In compensation for 
running this risk and for other services, the underwriter charges fees. Not surprisingly, 
these fees are found to increase in the risk of the issue. For example, Esho et al. (2004) 
find that fees on Eurobonds are higher for issues denominated in less liquid and higher 
risk currencies, with longer maturity, and with greater credit risk. Foster (1989) finds 
higher fees for issues with low ratings. Counter to the positive relation with risk, he finds 
lower fees for larger issues. However, Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) show that this effect 
is misleading because larger issues are generally done by larger firms, which tend to be 
safer. As in yields, underwriter reputation and competition also matter for fees. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) formally show that high reputation underwriters can 
charge higher fees because they are more effective in reducing info asymmetries. 
Empirically, Fang (2002) and Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find that high reputation 
underwriters indeed charge higher fees. Furthermore, fees are found to fall as competition 
among underwriters increases (e.g., Gande et al., 1999; Santos and Tsatsaronis, 2003; 
Takaoka and McKenzie, 2005). In addition, fees can be affected by bank ties. Yasuda 
(2005) finds a significant fee discount when there are relationships between firms and 
commercial banks. However, we suspect that bank ties might have a flip side: firms that 
are dependent on banks may see their risk increase as these banks become weaker, which 
should be visible in fees. In Chapter 3 we will explore this further.  
 
Stock price reactions 
In addition to the interest and fees that firms pay on their bonds, they might incur costs in 
the form of adverse stock price reactions. However, Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) find no significant stock price reaction to straight debt issues. Still, there 
seem to exceptions for specific types of bonds or firms. For example, Pilotte (1992) finds 
that mature firms have negative announcements effects to straight bond offerings, while 
growth firms experience no significant price changes. And Datta et al. (2000) find 
negative stock price reactions to bond IPOs, which they explain by reduced bank 
monitoring and increased maturity. In some cases, stock price reactions are actually 
positive, such as in Miller (2002) for Yankee bond offerings (bonds sold by foreign firms 
in the US) and in Johnson (1995) for bond issues by low-growth low-dividend firms, 
which supports arguments that debt and dividends are substitutes. The reverse of bond 
issues, i.e. bond tender offers, are found to result in positive stock price reactions for 
distressed firms (Chatterjee et al., 1995) but are non-significant for broader samples 
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(Kruse et al., 2005). In Chapter 5 we will also examine stock price reactions for bond 
tender offers. In contrast to the previous research, we will do so for a European sample of 
more mature firms where distress is less of a motive and tenders are likely to have 
different drivers. Moreover, we will relate stock returns to bond returns to see if there is 
stockholder-bondholder conflict in bond tenders. 
 
Stockholder-bondholder conflict 
As discussed above, stockholder-bondholder conflict refers to the possibility of wealth 
transfers between stockholders and bondholders. These may occur through dividends. 
However, Long et al. (1994) find no evidence of wealth transfers from bondholders to 
stockholders by manipulation of dividend policy following bond issues. Their evidence is 
consistent with firms being restrained by reputation, less so by covenants. Maxwell and 
Stephens (2003) do find bondholder losses in stock repurchases, which increase in the 
size of the repurchase and in the risk of the firm's debt. Levy and Sarnat (1970) argue that 
bondholders win in M&A since the cash flows of the combined firm become safer 
(coinsurance effect). However, bondholders might also loose when new debt is issued 
simultaneously (e.g., Chowdry and Nanda, 1993). Empirical evidence is mixed, though 
target firm bondholders seem to fare better than acquirer bondholders (e.g., Billett et al., 
2004). Constistent with the coinsurance argument, Maxwell and Rao (2003) find 
bondholder losses of 0.6-0.9% at spin-off announcements. Parrino and Weisbach (1999) 
measure the magnitude of the stockholder-bondholder conflict in specific projects, using 
Monte Carlo simulation. They find distortions both toward turning down positive NPV 
projects (underinvestment) and toward taking negative NPV projects (overinvestment). 
Underinvestment increases in leverage and the firm’s cash flow volatility, whereas 
overinvestment increases in project cash flow volatility and the correlation between 
project and firm cash flows. Mann and Powers (2005) find that bondholders receive 
significant premiums in bond tender offers but do not investigate returns to shareholders. 
We will fill this gap in Chapter 5. 
 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis is composed of four research projects, in which we follow the lifecycle of 
bonds and bond issuers. Firms that start to issue bonds are typically mature firms with 
limited need for bank support and financing needs that are large enough to warrant the 
higher fixed costs of borrowing at arm’s length. As firms start issuing more often, their 
reputation strengthens and their dependence on banks further diminishes, unless banks 
are also shareholders in the firm. Moreover, when firms issue even more frequently, they 
learn to spot opportunities in the market and obtain better pricing in the form of lower 
yields. At some stage however, the market may consider the firm to be over-issuing and 
will adapt pricing to reflect increased risk. Finally, the firm’s management might think 
for some reason that its mix of outstanding bonds is suboptimal and may therefore engage 
in buying back the firm’s bonds. 
  
In the first project (Chapter 2) we examine a sample of 225 firms from 37 countries that 
access the bond market for the first time during 1995-2003. By relating stock price 
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reactions to agency cost proxies, we test whether bonds discipline management. We find 
that bond market entry is received unfavorably when the debt issue is motivated by 
keeping a lock on control. In contrast, when free cash flow is high and dividends are low, 
discipline is expected to increase due to bond market entry, and stock price reactions are 
more positive. The strength of these relations is found to be affected by differences in 
shareholder protection across countries. The impact of free cash flow is larger when 
investor protection is stronger, whereas dividends and control locks play a more 
important role in countries with weaker shareholder protection. 
 
In Chapter 3, we focus on bond issuers that have to adapt to a changing environment in 
terms of bond market access and bank ties. We relate bank ties and fees on corporate 
bond issues. The sample consists of bonds issued by Japanese corporations in the years 
1994-2002, a period of deregulation beneficial to bond markets and detrimental to banks. 
Over time, we find that fees have increased for those firms that are related to bank-led 
(financial) keiretsu, even after controlling for risk factors. This is in sharp contrast to the 
simultaneous trend of falling fees for firms that do not belong to keiretsu. These firms 
benefited from increased underwriter competition due to deregulation. Moreover, we find 
that the higher fees for keiretsu firms were not offset by lower yields. It seems that, 
against the background of bond market deregulation and weaker banks, keiretsu 
membership had become a burden rather than an advantage. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates how the cost of bond finance changes when firms start issuing 
more often. We therefore document bond issue frequency for windows from one week to 
six years for the 592 US firms that issued at least once in US$ during 2001-2003. We find 
that frequent bond issuers obtain economically significant yield spread discounts vis à vis 
less frequent issuers. For large firms, issue frequency in windows up to one year matters 
most, which is consistent with benefits through increasing market literacy. That is, as 
they issue more often, they benefit from being better informed about market participants 
and market opportunities. For smaller firms, gaining a reputation seems more relevant 
than market literacy. For them, it is beneficial to be a recent issuer so as to avoid paying 
significant premiums. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the situation where firms want to reduce or even terminate the 
amount of bonds they have outstanding. We document the € 73 billion in bond tender 
offers by European firms over the period 1996 to 2005. In contrast to the US, European 
tenders seem aimed at active balance sheet management rather than distress relief. 
Bondholders receive on average a 3.9% premium over the bond’s market price. Still, we 
find no evidence of wealth transfers from stockholders, since the average shareholder 
wealth effect does not differ significantly from zero and is not affected by tender 
premiums. Moreover, wealth effects for both bondholders and shareholders increase in 
the remaining time to maturity. Tendering the bonds, rather than waiting for them to 
mature, appears to be a valuable option for both types of financiers of the firm.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes and provides directions for further research. 

 
 
 
Chapter 2 Bond market entry around the 
world: does public debt discipline 
managers?∗ 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Entering the public bond market marks an important change for a firm. By introducing a 
large amount of widely held debt, the firm effectively changes the nature of its agency 
problems. On the one hand, the nature of debt offers the potential of increased discipline. 
On the other hand, debt may be used to keep a lock on control. Strikingly few studies 
have examined bond IPOs, which is in sharp contrast to the large body of literature on 
equity IPOs (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 2002). The impact of bond IPOs on agency costs of 
equity has received even less attention. This is surprising, since the theoretical literature 
has given ample reason to expect that bond IPOs mark an important change in a firm’s 
capital and ownership structure. For example, bonds may increase the agency costs of 
equity when they raise capital with the motivation of keeping a lock on control (Stulz, 
1988, Bebchuk, 1999). Conversely, debt can mitigate agency costs of equity by reducing 
the free cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986). 
We find that the size of bond IPOs equals on average 22% of total assets prior to the 
offering. Hence, bond IPOs entail the introduction of a large amount of public debt where 
there was previously no public debt at all, while seasoned bond offers are usually plain 
refinancings. Bond IPOs therefore provide an excellent setting for studying the relation 
between public debt and agency problems of equity. So far, research on bond IPOs has 
almost exclusively focused on underpricing (e.g., Cai et al., 2005, Datta et al., 1997, 
Helwege and Kleiman, 1998). A notable exception is Datta et al. (2000) who examine 
stock price reactions for a sample of 143 US bond IPOs for the 1970-1994 period. They 
compare the monitoring role of bonds vis-à-vis bank debt. Datta et al. (2000) find 
negative stock price reactions to bond IPO announcements, which are in sharp contrast to 
                                                 
∗This chapter is based on Schramade (2006). I thank Abe de Jong, Linda van de Gucht, Peter Roosenboom 
and Bing Yu for their comments; as well as seminar participants at the Eastern Finance Association 2006 
Annual Meetings in Philadelphia, Erasmus School of Economics, Free University of Amsterdam, 
Maastricht University, Nijmegen School of Management, RSM Erasmus University, University of Exeter, 
University of Groningen, and University of Leuven; Gerard Mertens, Harriët van Veldhoven and NIB 
Capital for data access; and Gerard de Kool, Menzo Reinders and Margot Snieders for research assistance. 
Of course, all errors remain mine. 
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the zero announcement effects generally found for seasoned debt offers (e.g., Eckbo, 
1986). This finding confirms that bond IPOs are fundamentally different from seasoned 
bond offers.  
  
The contribution of this paper is that we investigate the impact of international bond 
market entry on the agency costs of equity. We relate the wealth effects of 225 bond IPO 
announcements to free cash flow, dividends, and control locks. Since high free cash flow 
and low dividends indicate a need for increased disciplining, a bond IPO should in those 
cases be good news for shareholders. Conversely, bond IPOs motivated by the desire to 
keep a lock on control should negatively affect shareholder wealth. The control lock 
motivation seems most appropriate at threshold levels of ownership, i.e. where insiders 
have just enough voting power to remain entrenched. The second contribution of this 
paper lies in its international sample of firms from 37 countries. This allows us to 
examine the role of shareholder protection, which is likely to affect the nature of the 
agency problem and the impact of the bond IPO. For example, Bebchuk (1999) and 
LaPorta et al. (1999) show that control locks are more important when private benefits 
are high and shareholder protection is weak.  
 
We find that there is indeed a disciplining role of new public debt and that it varies with 
international differences in shareholder protection. In contrast to Datta et al.’s (2000) 
findings, we fail to find a significantly negative stock price reaction to the announcement 
of the bond IPO. However, the variance in stock price reactions is very high, indicating 
that bond IPOs can have a major equity value impact for many firms. Free cash flow, 
dividends and control locks are found to be important drivers of announcement returns. 
That is, stock price reactions are more favorable for firms that appear to be in need of 
additional disciplining, as evidenced by high free cash flow or low dividends. 
Announcement returns are more negative for firms that seem to be motivated by keeping 
a lock on control. Moreover, the size of these effects is not uniform around the globe, but 
varies with shareholder rights. Free cash flows are more important in countries where 
investor protection is strong, such as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Where shareholder 
rights are weaker, dividends and keeping a lock on control tend to be more relevant.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of 
previous research and our hypothesis building. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
are given in Section 3. Section 4 describes the results of the event study, as well as 
univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
 
Bond IPOs have received limited research attention so far. Cai et al. (2005), Datta et al. 
(1997), and Helwege and Kleinman (1998) study bond IPO underpricing. Datta et al. 
(1999) find that the presence of bank debt lowers at-issue yield spread of bond IPOs. 
Closest in set-up to our paper are Datta et al. (2000), since they also study wealth effects 
and they consider agency costs by comparing the disciplining role of bank debt versus 
bonds. For a sample of 143 US bond IPOs in the 1970-1994 period, Datta et al. (2000) 
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find a negative announcement effect. Negative wealth effects are consistent both with 
debt maturity theories (e.g., Flannery, 1986) and with some debt ownership theories. 
According to some debt ownership theories, banks are superior monitors (e.g., Campbell 
and Kracaw, 1980, Fama, 1985), in which case a reduction in bank debt should be bad 
news for shareholders. Others argue that banks may misuse their private information 
(bank hold-up or bank monopoly power) to expropriate clients (e.g., Rajan, 1992, Sharpe, 
1990). A reduction in bank debt should then be bad news for shareholders. Datta et al.‘s 
(2000) findings are consistent with the view that banks are better monitors than 
bondholders. However, they do not test what determines the disciplining power in public 
bonds. To fill this gap in the literature, we will relate the wealth effects of bond IPO 
announcements to proxies for the need of additional discipline: free cash flow, dividends 
and control locks. 
 
The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) posits that debt reduces the agency costs of 
free cash flow or overinvestment by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the 
discretion of managers. Debt forces managers to disgorge cash rather than spend it on 
investments with negative net present values. This effect might be stronger for public 
debt than for private debt. First, defaults of public debt are more visible than those of 
private debt. Second, private debt holders such as banks may have dual roles as creditors 
and shareholders, which constrains their incentives to advance shareholders’ interests 
(Morck and Nakamura, 1999). Although dispersed public debt might yield coordination 
problems when renegotiating, Bolton and Scharfstein’s (1996) model suggests that these 
coordination problems might actually improve the disciplinary role of debt as it increases 
management’s incentives to deter default. Zwiebel (1996) shows that managers have an 
incentive to discipline themselves as they trade off empire building with ensuring 
sufficient efficiency to prevent control changes. The overinvestment problem particularly 
applies to firms with high free cash flow, as these are more likely to undertake value-
destroying mergers. Thus, the higher a firm’s free cash flow, the more in need it is of 
additional disciplining, and the more shareholders will appreciate a bond issue. We 
therefore expect a positive relation between free cash flow and abnormal stock reactions.  
 
Hypothesis 1: free cash flow has a positive effect on abnormal returns to bond IPO 
announcements. 
 
The trade-off in Zwiebel’s (1996) model predicts that managers’ incentives to discipline 
themselves increase as control changes become more likely. Empirical evidence indicates 
that this incentive is indeed absent when managers are entrenched. For example, De Jong 
and Veld (2001) find that entrenched Dutch managers avoid debt when it is most 
disciplining. Berger et al. (1997) document leverage increases in the aftermath of 
entrenchment reducing shocks. Therefore, we expect the role of free cash flow to be most 
effective at low levels of management entrenchment, i.e. when shareholder protection is 
high and concentrated is low. At high levels of shareholder protection, minority 
shareholders have better chances of effectively challenging management and large 
shareholders in court, for example over expropriation issues. As a result, the effectiveness 
of bond discipline should be higher (and the relation with stock price reaction more 
positive) when shareholder protection is strong.  
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Hypothesis  2A: the positive relation between free cash flow and abnormal announcement 
returns is stronger when shareholder protection is high. 
 
At low levels of ownership concentration, management is less likely to be entrenched. As 
the chance of losing control thus becomes more real, management will have more 
incentives to discipline itself and will be more likely to initiate the bond IPO for that 
reason. 
 
Hypothesis  2B: the positive relation between free cash flow and abnormal announcement 
returns is stronger when concentrated ownership is low. 
 
Dividends are another way to increase discipline. Jensen (1986) claims that debt is a 
better way for managers to bond themselves than dividends are, since dividends can be 
reduced in the future. However, there are good reasons to suspect that dividends can 
substitute for debt. First, dividend reductions are costly since they usually result in 
significant stock price declines (e.g., Aharony and Swary, 1980). Second, higher 
dividends will, ceteris paribus3, result in a higher dependence of the firm on capital 
markets. Dividends thus keep firms in the capital market, where monitoring of managers 
is available at low cost (Easterbrook, 1984). So, the more dividends a firm pays, the less 
likely it seems to need additional disciplining in the form of debt.  
 
Hypothesis 3: dividends and abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements are 
negatively related. 
 
Indeed, Johnson (1995) finds this negative relation between dividends and stock price 
reactions to seasoned debt offers, which supports the argument that debt and dividends 
are substitutes. The lower the level of dividends, the higher the need for additional 
discipline with bonds, ceteris paribus. We expect this substitution effect to be even 
stronger in countries where shareholder protection is weak. As LaPorta et al. (2000) 
argue, a reputation for good treatment of shareholders is worth most in countries with 
weak protection of minority shareholders, since those shareholders have little else to rely 
on. They lack the legal power to extract dividends, which also explains why LaPorta et 
al. (2000) find that dividends are lower in countries with weaker investor protection. 
Moreover, the dividend signal may be stronger there, since the cost of attracting new 
capital is higher (and the loss of private benefits is larger) when investor protection is 
weak.  
  
Hypothesis 4A: the negative relation between dividends and abnormal announcement 
returns is stronger when shareholder protection is poor. 
 
In a similar vein, the need for increased discipline with bonds is higher when 
concentrated ownership is high. A controlling position typically results in a discount of 
firm value because more expropriation is expected. Increased discipline (by either bonds 
                                                 
3 Of course, at very high levels of firm cash holdings, this relation will not hold. We therefore control for 
cash holdings. 
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or dividends) will then be of even more avail to minority shareholders. The substitution 
effect between bonds and dividends is thus likely to be stronger. 
 
Hypothesis 4B: the negative relation between dividends and abnormal announcement 
returns is stronger when concentrated ownership is high. 
 
A bond IPO might also be motivated by insiders’ desire to attract capital without losing 
control. Stulz (1988) argues that insiders may increase leverage only in order to have 
more voting power for a given investment in their firm. At higher levels of voting rights 
insiders may become entrenched, and their incentives to maximize shareholder value 
might give way to incentives to expropriate minority shareholders. Accordingly, Stulz 
(1988) predicts a curvilinear relationship between concentrated ownership and firm value, 
which has been confirmed by, among others, Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990). Bond IPOs motivated by keeping a lock on control are likely to result in 
negative wealth effects. Moreover, the control lock motive seems most relevant at 
threshold levels of concentrated ownership, at which insiders have just enough shares to 
remain entrenched, rather than at very high or very low levels. We therefore expect a 
curvilinear relationship between abnormal returns and concentrated ownership, which is 
initially negative and later becomes positive. 
 
Hypothesis 5A: For low levels of concentrated ownership, the relation between 
concentrated ownership and abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements is negative.  
 
Hypothesis 5B: For high levels of concentrated ownership, the relation between 
concentrated ownership and abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements is positive.  
 
Before testing these hypotheses, we will first outline our sample in Section 3. 
 
 
2.3 Sample and data description 
 
2.3.1 Sample formation 
As far as we know, there is no official database of initial public bond offers around the 
world. We therefore have to construct the database, going through a rigorous process of 
deleting issues that are not bona fide bond IPOs. Including issues that are not initial 
public bond offers would bias our data towards finding weaker results, since seasoned 
bond issues are less likely to be major events to the firm. To exclude seasoned bond 
issues, we check that no bonds have been issued by the firm or by companies directly 
related to the issuer, such as its parent, subsidiaries or merger partners. We start out by 
taking all corporate debt issues from the SDC new issues database, amounting to 145,940 
issues for the 1995-2003 period. We then list the first issue for each firm in that period, 
which results in 15,623 issues. Subsequently, we delete the 4,208 firms that have issues 
in SDC before 19954 under exactly the same name. The remaining set of 11,415 issuers 
                                                 
4 For domestic European issues, SDC has coverage back to 1991, but coverage goes back further for  
Japanese (1977), US (1970) and Eurobond (1963) issues. 
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still includes double counts, due to the same firm issuing under slightly differing names 
(for example, Abbey National Funding PLC, Abbey National Funding Jersey, Abbey 
National PLC, etc.). We first delete the double counts within our list of issuers, which 
reduces the number of potential bond IPOs by 45%. Then we check manually whether the 
remaining firms issued in earlier years under slightly different names. 29% of these issues 
now drops out. Our next step is to check DataStream for stock listing at the time of the 
issue (essential for the event study). Many state-owned firms and subsidiaries now drop 
out. We also exclude private bonds5. At both these stages about half of the then remaining 
sample drops out. We proceed by checking Bloomberg, Factiva, and LexisNexis for 
announcement dates, for simultaneous other news, and for the possibility that the issue is 
not a bona fide bond IPO. We therefore track name changes, takeovers, issues by 
subsidiaries, and earlier issues not covered in SDC. In the process, we delete 78% of the 
remaining issues and we are left with a sample of 236 bond IPOs. For these issues, 
Worldscope and Thomson One are consulted for financial statement data. However, for 
11 issues, we cannot find sufficient data. This results in a final sample of 225 bond IPOs, 
from 37 countries. Table 1 shows the number of issues per country, along with country 
data on investor protection and the size of public bond and stock markets. Countries with 
the largest number of issues are the G-7 countries along with major developing 
economies such as Brazil and Indonesia. The shareholder rights and creditor rights 
indices are from LaPorta et al. (1998). They will be used later on in this paper as proxies 
for investor protection. The distribution of issues over the years is relatively even, with 
the smallest number of issues in the first and final years (16 in 1995, 17 in 2003) and the 
highest number in the middle of the sample period (33 in 1999). This is consistent with 
the overall level of corporate bond issues over that period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 We exclude private issues because the distinction between private bonds and other types of private debt 
such as bank debt is not very clear and is even becoming increasingly blurred (Thomas and Wang, 2004). 
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Table 1. Country level descriptives 
 
Country 
Number 
of issues 
Shareholder 
rights 
Creditor 
rights 
Stock market as a 
percentage of GDP 
Public bond market as 
a percentage of GDP 
Argentina 1 4 1  10% 
Australia 3 4 1 86% 22% 
Austria 4 2 3 15% 39% 
Belgium 2 0 2 79% 100% 
Brazil 11 3 1 25% 50% 
Canada 5 5 1 95% 64% 
Chile 3 5 2 72% 28% 
Colombia 3 3 0 8% NA 
Czech Republic 1 3 3 17% 34% 
Denmark 1 2 3 54% 55% 
Finland 1 3 1 180% 38% 
France 15 3 0 79% 45% 
Germany 11 1 3 55% 30% 
Hong Kong 2 5 4 276% 8% 
India 4 5 4 25% 21% 
Indonesia 8 2 4 14% NA 
Ireland 2 4 1 66% 27% 
Italy 8 1 2 51% 96% 
Japan 9 4 2 72% 79% 
Luxemburg 1 0 2 79% 100% 
Mexico 1 1 0 13% 8% 
New Zealand 1 4 3 44% 30% 
Norway 1 4 2 36% 19% 
Peru 4 3 0 20% 2% 
Philippines 1 3 0 45% 29% 
Portugal 3 3 1 52% 34% 
Russia 4 2 3 22% 4% 
Singapore 3 4 4 163% 23% 
South Korea 5 2 3 56% 15% 
Spain 4 4 2 64% 51% 
Sweden 4 3 2 124% 53% 
Switzerland 5 2 1 246% 24% 
Taiwan 6 3 2 102% 14% 
Thailand 7 2 3 34% 11% 
The Netherlands 2 2 2 150% 48% 
United Kingdom 29 5 4 167% 32% 
United States 50 5 1 150% 48% 
Total 225     
Average 6.1 3.0 2.0 99% 41% 
 
Sample period is from 1995 to 2003. Number of issues is the number of bond IPOs in our sample. Shareholder rights and creditor 
rights are from LaPorta et al. (1998), except the data for Russia and Czech Republic, which are from Pistor et al. (2000). Stock and 
bond market size to GDP are from the Worldbank’s Financial Structure Database. 
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Table 2 shows firm and issue characteristics for the 225 bond IPOs in our sample.  
 
 
Table 2. Firm and issue characteristics 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Variable  Mean  Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Number of 
observations 
FCF 0.16 0.14 -2.85 1.38 0.29 179 
Dividend payout 0.33 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.32 225 
Concentrated ownership 0.36 0.34 0.00 0.94 0.26 192 
Sales 1512 527 0 21031 2515 225 
Total Assets 2236 920 20 34022 3646 225 
Debt-to-assets 0.30 0.25 0.00 2.06 0.25 225 
Years since equity IPO 10.6 6.7 0.6 38.4 10.0 225 
Market-to-book 1.93 1.49 -38.01 14.67 3.65 225 
 
Panel B: Issue characteristics 
Variable 
 
Mean  Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Number of 
observations 
Maturity 8.08 6.91 1.00 50.00 7.17 225 
Principal 232.7 143.5 0.2 3200.0 350.7 225 
Relative issue size 0.222 0.137 0.002 2.44 0.300 225 
Rated issues 0.46 0 0 1 0.500 225 
Domestic issues 0.88 1 0 1 0.326 225 
 
Sample period is from 1995 to 2003. Free cash flow is the average of the ratio of undistributed free cash flow and market value, for the 
three years before the bond IPO. Undistributed free cash flow equals operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest 
expenses, preferred dividends and common dividends.  Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends and net income, in the year before the 
bond IPO, and truncated at 1. Concentrated ownership is the ratio of closely held shares and total shares outstanding, in the year before 
the bond IPO. Sales and Total assets are in millions of US$ in the year preceding the bond IPO. Debt-to-assets is the ratio of the book 
value of debt and total assets, both in the year preceding the bond IPO. Years since equity IPO is the time in years between the equity 
IPO and the bond IPO of a firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of equity and the book value of equity, both in the 
year preceding the bond IPO. Maturity is time to maturity in years. Principal is in millions of US$. Relative issue size is the ratio of 
principal and pre-issue? total assets. Rated issues is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is rated by one of the major US rating 
agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P’s), and 0 otherwise. Domestic issues is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is issued in the 
home market and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
The same variables are split by region in Table 3. We show the UK and Continental 
Europe separately, partly because of the large number of UK issues, and partly because 
the UK has much stronger shareholder rights than Continental Europe. As Table 3 shows, 
the UK and Continental Europe also differ in their issue and firm characteristics.  
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Table 3. Firm and issue characteristics per region 
 
Panel A. Firm characteristics by region 
Variable   
North 
America UK 
Continental 
Europe Asia 
Latin 
America All 
Mean 0.137 0.137 0.216 0.163 0.097 0.163 Free cash flow to 
market value Median 0.120* 0.139 0.161* 0.129 0.201* 0.139 
  N 41 26 54 40 16 179 
Dividend payout Mean 0.308 0.423** 0.346 0.230** 0.409* 0.335 
 Median 0.154 0.382** 0.328 0.156** 0.391 0.286 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Mean 26.7*** 11.4*** 43.0*** 48.0*** 60.4*** 35.7 Percentage closely held 
shares Median 20.2*** 0.8*** 43.5*** 46.7*** 63.8*** 33.9 
  N 51 27 63 36 11 192 
Sales Mean 981.2* 2281.1 2556.7*** 535.0*** 634.5* 1512.4 
 Median 496.2 1611.0*** 954.8*** 231.6*** 168.1*** 527.4 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Total assets Mean 1700.7 2394.8 3478.7*** 1339.4* 1217.9 2236.3 
 Median 804.5 2320.2** 1625.5** 459.6*** 326.5*** 919.5 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Debt to total assets Mean 0.269 0.401** 0.269 0.335 0.280 0.298 
 Median 0.235 0.251 0.251 0.264 0.250 0.246 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Years since equity IPO Mean 8.8 19.3*** 10.9 8.4* 6.6** 10.6 
 Median 5.0** 17.4*** 8.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Market-to-book Mean 2.88** 0.70* 2.09 1.84 1.00 1.93 
 Median 1.87*** 1.61 1.57 1.31 0.95*** 1.49 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
 
Panel B. Issue characteristics by region 
Variable   
North 
America UK 
Continental 
Europe Asia 
Latin 
America All 
Maturity Mean 9.1 15.0*** 6.4*** 4.5*** 8.9 8.1 
 Median 10.0*** 10.1*** 5.1** 5.0*** 6.0 6.9 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Principal Mean 290.9 425.1*** 231.5 114.3** 91.1** 232.7 
 Median 150.0*** 323.8*** 158.6 52.6*** 36.6*** 143.5 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Principal to total assets Mean 0.345*** 0.235 0.173* 0.198 0.127 0.222 
 Median 0.248*** 0.151 0.103*** 0.097 0.123* 0.137 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Rated issues Mean 0.909*** 0.690*** 0.391 0.000*** 0.174*** 0.462 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
Domestic issues Mean 0.927 0.828 0.855 0.911 0.870 0.880 
  N 55 29 69 45 23 225 
 
Sample period is from 1995 to 2003. Free cash flow is the average of the ratio of undistributed free cash flow and market value, for the 
three years before the bond IPO. Undistributed free cash flow equals operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest 
expenses, preferred dividends and common dividends. Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends and net income, in the year before the 
bond IPO, and truncated at 1. Concentrated ownership is the ratio of closely held shares and total shares outstanding, in the year before 
the bond IPO. Sales and Total assets are in millions of US$ in the year preceding the bond IPO. Debt-to-assets is the ratio of the book 
value of debt and total assets, both in the year preceding the bond IPO. Years since equity IPO is the time in years between the equity 
IPO and the bond IPO of a firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of equity and the book value of equity, both in the 
year preceding the bond IPO. Maturity is time to maturity in years. Principal is in millions of US$. Relative issue size is the ratio of 
principal and total assets. Rated issues is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is rated by one of the major US rating agencies 
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(Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P’s), and 0 otherwise. Domestic issues is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is issued in the home 
market and 0 otherwise. Statistical differences from the rest of the sample are denoted by *(10% level), ** (5%), and ***(1%).  
 
 
We will first discuss firm characteristics and then issue descriptives. 
 
2.3.2 Firm characteristics 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) define free cash flow as the ratio of undistributed free cash flow 
and market value, where undistributed free cash flow equals operating income before 
depreciation minus taxes, interest expenses, preferred dividends and common dividends. 
As our measure of free cash flow, we take the average value of the Lehn and Poulsen 
ratio for the three years before the bond IPO, because this average is less likely to be 
imbalanced by outliers. Firm characteristics split by region are given in Panel A of Table 
3. Free cash flow is higher in Europe and Latin America (where market-to-book ratios are 
low) and lower in North-America (where market-to-book-ratios are high). European and 
UK firms are larger than the others. UK firms differ in that they are older, more levered, 
pay higher dividends, and have less growth options than the rest of the sample. They thus 
closely resemble the typical low growth firm as described by Jensen (1986). Apparently, 
UK dividends are on average high enough to keep median free cash flow (0.139) at the 
median of the entire sample (also 0.139).  
 
Dividend payout is the ratio of common cash dividends and net income, in the year 
before the bond IPO (see also Johnson, 1995, and LaPorta et al., 2000). We truncate 
dividend payout at unity 1 to avoid extreme outliers in cases where net income is close to 
zero. The median of 0.29 is very close to the 0.30 that LaPorta et al. (2000) find for a set 
of over 4,000 firms from roughly the same countries as our sample. Dividends are highest 
in the UK and lowest in Asia, which largely matches the results of LaPorta et al. (2000), 
who find that dividends are higher in countries with better investor protection. An 
exception is the high level of dividends in Latin America, which might be due to the 
mandatory dividend rules in Brazil, Chile and Colombia. The dividend picture is also 
consistent with Faccio et al. (2001) who find that firms in Europe pay higher dividends 
than in Asia, dampening insider expropriation in Europe and not in Asia. Dividends are 
relatively low for North-American firms. A potential explanation is that they have more 
growth options and thus need more cash to finance their investments. Likewise, Fama and 
French (2001) find that the proportion of US firms paying cash dividends has fallen from 
66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. They explain this shift by the changing nature of US 
listed firms, which increasingly tilts toward small firms with low profitability and strong 
growth opportunities, typical of firms that do not pay dividends. 
 
Concentrated ownership is measured as the ratio of shares held by the largest five 
shareholders and total shares outstanding, in the year before the bond IPO. This measure 
obviously has its limitations. For example, the measure does not account for the possible 
presence of pyramid structures or differential voting rights, and it is not necessarily so 
that the largest five are the only significant shareholders. We might therefore 
underestimate the actual level of ownership concentration. In addition, it is implicitly 
assumed that these large shareholders are in coalition with each other, which might not be 
the case. In this respect we are likely to overestimate the actual level of ownership 
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concentration. On balance, it is a crude measure, which makes it less likely to be found 
significant in our regressions, but it is the best measure we can consistently calculate. 
Previous research has shown that cash flow ownership is a good indicator of ownership 
concentration in countries with strong shareholder protection (e.g., LaPorta et al., 1999). 
In countries with weak ownership concentration the evidence is mixed: cash flow 
ownership does underestimate ownership concentration in many Asian countries 
(Claessens et al., 2000) but only in some European countries (Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
The values we find for ownership concentration in our sample range from completely 
dispersed, through intermediate forms of ownership concentration, to complete control. 
Ownership concentration is high in Asia, Continental Europe and Latin America, while it 
is much more dispersed in North-America. UK firms are even more dispersed than North-
American firms, which can be explained from the difference in size: smaller firms, such 
as those in North-America, are less likely to be dispersed. Overall, these regional 
differences in ownership are very similar to those reported in LaPorta et al. (1999), who 
measure the percentage of widely held companies in a sample of 27 countries. Firms are 
more likely to have concentrated ownership when private benefits are high and 
shareholder protection is weak.  
 
Firms differ greatly in size as measured by sales and total assets (as measured in millions 
of US$ in the year before the bond IPO)6. As said, European firms are typically the 
largest. Outside the UK, most firms have little debt in their financial structure before the 
bond IPO, which often follows within less than 10 years after the equity IPO. The 
dispersion in market-to-book ratios is high, with the standard deviation at twice the mean 
market-to-book.  
 
Graph 1 shows the evolution of debt levels for the 207 sample firms for which we had 
non-zero debt from the third book year before the bond IPO to the third book year since 
the bond IPO. 
 
T-1 denotes the last annual report before the bond IPO, T refers to the first annual report 
since the bond IPO. T-3 is the reference year for which the debt level is set at 100. As 
Graph 1 shows, debt levels start to increase in the last year before the bond IPO. Not 
surprisingly, they increase most in the year of the bond IPO, and then rise further in 
subsequent years. This pattern continues to apply when the sample is split by shareholder 
rights (not reported in graphs). The only difference between both groups is that firms 
from countries with the full score on shareholder rights experience steeper increases in 
debt levels in subsequent years. 
                                                 
6 Sales vary from zero for Norwegian drilling firm Ocean Rig to US$ 21 billion for German travel giant 
TUI. Total assets range from US$ 20 million for Korean Cybertek Holdings to US$ 34 billion for Russian 
Sberbank.  
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Graph 1. Evolution of debt levels around the bond IPO 
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The graph shows mean and median levels of total debt in the 207 sample firms with sufficient data points and non-zero debt levels 
before the bond IPO. The third book year before the bond IPO (T-3) is taken as a reference and set at 100. The measurement period 
runs until the third book year since the bond IPO (T+3). T-1 denotes the beginning of the year of the bond IPO (the end of the 
preceding year), T is the end of the year of the bond IPO.  
 
 
2.3.3 Issue characteristics 
Issue characteristics are given in Panel B of Table 2. Mean and median maturities are 
below 10 years and range from 1 to 50 years. Only four firms issue 50 year bonds, and 
three of them are from the UK. The smallest principal is for the Brazilian firm Tectoy, 
which issued a US$ 200,000 bond. But in general, issues are much larger than that, with 
the median principal at US$ 143.5 million and the mean principal at US$ 232.7 million. 
The largest issue is the US$ 3.2 billion megadeal by US giants Progress Energy (total 
assets at US$ 19.9 billion). In terms of relative issue size (16%), that deal is not even 
extraordinary. The relative size of the issues (measured as principal by total assets) is 
large in general, with sample firms issuing bonds of on average 22% of total assets7. 
When comparing debt levels in the year before and after the bond IPO, the amount of 
debt on average increases by 14%, while debt ratios increase by 6 percentage points, 
which implies that assets increase as well. 
 
Less than half of all issues are rated by one of the major US rating agencies (Fitch, 
Moody’s, S&P). The vast majority of issues are domestic, in the sense that they are sold 
and listed in their own currency and in their own country, or region in the case of the 
Eurozone8. The 27 firms that issue internationally (in the off-shore Eurobond9 market or 
                                                 
7 Outliers are the issues by Tectoy (0.2%) and Ocean Rig (244%).  
8 Galati and Tsataronis (2001) find that the Euro introduction resulted in lower barriers to cross-border 
financial transactions. Moreover, banks and investors in the Eurozone fixed income markets have become 
more focused on the characteristics of individual borrowers rather than the nationality of the issue. 
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in a foreign market) are mainly from countries that have small domestic bond markets, 
such as European countries that do not belong to the Eurozone.  
 
As stated in the previous section, we extensively searched for bond IPO announcements. 
In two thirds of those issue announcements, no mention is made of the purpose of the 
issue. Where motives are given, they range from very general, such as refinancing10 (i.e., 
replacing existing private debt; reported by 22% of the firms), expansion (16%), or 
“general corporate purposes”, to very specific. Often, a combination of these motives is 
found. For example, Indonesian firm Selamat Sempurna stated it would use 50% of the 
issue proceeds to buy machinery, 35% to repay debts and 15% as working capital (Dow 
Jones International News, 29 May 2000). Some also hint to more specific purposes, such 
as Brazilian firm Duratex SA: “We want to keep a bit of cash on the side, which can be a 
good idea in Brazil.” (Bloomberg, 8 November 2002). The issue by UK cable operator 
TeleWest involved low initial interest payments, allowing the firm some years to invest 
heavily in expanding its network. The company said the deal “was a real milestone” 
(Financial Times, 12 October 1995).  
 
Issue characteristics split by region are given in Panel B of Table 3. UK firms have much 
longer maturities than the overall sample average. Compared to North-American firms, 
this can be explained by the fact that they are much larger and have lower growth rates 
(lower market-to-book). This is consistent with Stohs and Mauer’s (1996) findings that 
long-term debt is issued by larger, less risky firms in low-growth industries. The longer 
maturities of both UK and North-American firms, given their size and growth rates, in 
comparison to the rest of the sample, are also as expected. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) find that in countries with active stock markets, large firms have 
more long-term debt. Principal amounts are smallest in Asia and Latin America, and 
largest in the UK, which is hardly surprising given the size of the firms from these 
respective regions. Latin American issues are very small, also relative to firm size. 
Relative issue size is by far the largest for American firms, which might be due to the 
well-developed US corporate bond market, where junk issues are not as uncommon as 
they are elsewhere (e.g., De Bondt and Marqués, 2004). The extent to which issues are 
rated varies greatly across regions. Whereas the vast majority of North-American and UK 
issues are rated by one of the three major (US) rating agencies, this is much less the case 
in Continental Europe (39%) and Latin America (17%). Strikingly, none of the Asian 
issues is rated by one of the major US agencies. Asia counts many local rating agencies 
that might have rated these issues, but we do not have systematic information on that. 
Finally, as to domestic issues, there are hardly any differences between regions. As 
pointed out before, the decision to issue abroad might be motivated by a small domestic 
bond market, which might be more country specific than region specific. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Eurobonds are not clearly distinguished in the SDC New Issues Database. We therefore checked 
currencies, issuer nation and place of listing (Luxemburg and London for Eurobonds). 
10 If the replaced debt is bank debt, discipline might be reduced. We therefore control for the refinancing 
motive in our regressions. 
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2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Event study results and univariate analysis 
Abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements are calculated using standard event study 
methodology. To estimate the market model parameters, we take a clean period from day 
-150 to day -50. Day 0 is the first announcement date. The market returns are DataStream 
market total return indices per country. Table 4 shows abnormal returns for the whole 
sample of 225 observations. Panel A shows descriptives for several windows. None of 
these differs significantly from zero. However, for most windows, there are significantly 
more negative than positive abnormal returns. 
 
 
Table 4. Abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements 
 
Panel A. CARs per window 
Event 
window Mean  Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Number of 
observations 
Fraction of 
positive 
CARs 
(-1,+1) 0.06% -0.44% -29.45% 26.51% 5.32% 225 0.427** 
(-30,-3) -0.89% -1.74% -46.60% 110.23% 15.79% 225 0.440* 
(-2) 0.01% -0.17% -9.85% 14.25% 2.71% 225 0.458 
(-1) -0.24% -0.20% -28.85% 23.18% 3.59% 225 0.409*** 
(0) 0.07% -0.11% -6.63% 11.28% 2.15% 225 0.444* 
(+1) 0.23% 0.03% -6.16% 16.65% 2.57% 225 0.529 
(+2) -0.13% -0.13% -10.88% 11.63% 2.49% 225 0.476 
(+3,+30) -0.67% -0.58% -54.10% 96.48% 15.64% 225 0.476 
 
Panel B. CARs per region for the (-1,+1) window 
Region Mean  Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Number of 
observations 
Fraction of 
positive 
CARs 
North-
America 0.60% -0.23% -8.79% 23.23% 5.57% 55 0.491 
UK 0.38% -0.38% -5.53% 12.61% 3.97% 29 0.483 
Continental 
Europe -0.44% -0.67% -9.88% 10.99% 3.54% 69 0.377** 
Asia 0.42% -0.67% -10.46% 26.51% 6.94% 45 0.422 
Latin 
America -0.56% -0.25% -29.45% 11.80% 7.35% 23 0.391 
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Table 4. Abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements (continued) 
 
Panel C. Mean CARs (-1,+1) per range of free cash flow, dividends, and ownership 
  Shareholder rights index (LLSV, 1998) 
  =5  <5 
FCF range  N CAR  N CAR 
<0  2 -4.04%  4 4.62% 
0-0.2  56 0.31%  63 -0.19% 
0.2-0.4  15 1.77%  28 -1.18% 
>0.4  2 0.92%  9 -0.81% 
       
Dividend payout range  N CAR  N CAR 
0-0.2  36 -0.13%  56 0.77% 
0.2-0.4  22 1.78%  36 -0.51% 
0.4-0.6  16 1.40%  14 -1.67% 
0.6-0.8  6 0.59%  11 -0.89% 
0.8-1.0  13 -0.63%  15 -2.01% 
       
Concentrated  ownership range  N CAR  N CAR 
0-0.2  46 1.09%  21 1.07% 
0.2-0.4  16 0.61%  30 -0.59% 
0.4-0.6  12 -0.43%  25 -2.06% 
0.6-0.8  7 2.83%  27 -0.85% 
0.8-1.0  2 -1.74%  6 0.92% 
 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal announcement return over the -1,+1 period. Sample period is from 1995 to 2003.  Free cash flow is 
the average of the ratio of undistributed free cash flow and market value, for the three years before the bond IPO. Undistributed free 
cash flow equals operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest expenses, preferred dividends and common dividends. 
Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends and net income, in the year before the bond IPO, and truncated at 1. Concentrated ownership 
is the ratio of closely held shares and total shares outstanding, in the year before the bond IPO. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
Although our results do point towards negative stock price reactions to bond IPOs, we do 
not find the significantly negative stock price reactions of Datta et al. (2000). The story is 
in the variance of returns. This is apparent from the low minimum values, and high 
maximum values and standard deviations. Our focus is on the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) from day -1 to day +1, or CAR (-1,+1). We will use this window in our 
subsequent regressions. As in the other windows, both the average (+0.06%) and the 
median excess returns (-0.44%) are insignificant. But the variation in abnormal returns is 
very high, ranging from -29.5% to +26.5%, with a standard deviation of 5.3%. Panel B 
shows that this variation is hardly attributable to differences between regions, although 
the fraction of positive returns is higher in North America and the UK than it is 
elsewhere. Mean abnormal returns differ slightly across regions, but, again, none of the 
means differs significantly from zero. Median abnormal returns are negative but not 
significant for all regions. 
 
For univariate tests of our hypotheses, we calculate the mean CARs per range of free cash 
flow, dividend payout and concentrated ownership (Panel C of Table 4). We also group 
them by shareholder rights index (LaPorta et al., 1998), since we hypothesize shareholder 
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rights to be important for insiders’ incentives, and thus to be related to the effects of free 
cash flow, dividends and control locks. We contrast firms from countries with a 
shareholder rights index of 5 (93 firms; 84 of these are from North America and the UK) 
with the rest. An alternative would be to differentiate between firms from Anglo-Saxon 
countries and the rest of the world. This yields almost identical results. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relation between CARs and free cash flow, and 
Hypothesis 2A predicts this relation to be stronger when investor protection is high. We 
do find this relation for the strong shareholder protection part of the sample (shareholder 
rights index of 5). However, for the rest of the sample, where we expected the relation to 
be nonexistent or weak, it is actually negative.  
 
According to Hypothesis 3, CARs and dividends should be negatively related. This 
relation should be even more negative when investor protection is weak (Hypothesis 4A). 
We indeed find this negative relation between CARs and dividends for the poor 
shareholder rights part of the sample. As expected, it applies to a lesser extent to firms 
with strong shareholder rights.  
 
The control lock hypothesis predicts a curvilinear relation between concentrated 
ownership and CARs, which is initially negative and later positive. That is, at threshold 
levels of concentrated ownership, where insiders have just enough votes to remain 
entrenched, CARs should be lower than at other levels of concentrated ownership. 
Indeed, for both sub-samples CARs are lowest in the 40-60% range of concentrated 
ownership. Moreover, and also as hypothesized (Hypothesis 6), the effect is stronger for 
the weaker shareholder rights part of the sample.  
 
Our results differ from those of Datta et al. (2000), who find a significantly negative 
stock reaction to bond IPO announcements. A potential explanation of the difference in 
results is the international composition of our sample versus the purely US sample that 
Datta et al. (2000) employ. In addition, the maturity of the issues in their sample is much 
longer than in ours, both in means (12 versus 8 years) and in medians (10 versus 7 years). 
This could explain the difference in CARs, since Datta et al. (2000) find maturity to be 
negatively related to CARs. Finally, the Datta et al. (2000) sample runs from 1970 to 
1994, while ours starts where their ends, running from 1995 to 2003. In the mean time, 
debt markets have continued to develop. Especially in the US high-yield market, the 
distinction between public bond markets and other debt markets has become rather 
blurred (Thomas and Wang, 2004). Datta et al. (2000) consider a long time window, but 
because they do not show CARs per year, we cannot see if there is a trend in their data. 
 
2.4.2 Regression results 
The univariate analyses indicate that free cash flow, dividends and ownership might 
explain wealth effects at bond IPO announcements. To see if these relations hold after 
controlling for other factors, multivariate analyses are required as well. As De Roon and 
Veld (1998) point out, OLS may not be very efficient when regressing on abnormal 
returns. Since the abnormal returns are residuals from the market model, they not only 
measure the announcement effect, but also capture the nonsystematic risk of the firm. To 
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correct for this, we follow De Roon and Veld (1998) in using the residuals from the clean 
period in a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) framework. See Thompson (1995) for a 
discussion. Table 5 shows the results of the WLS regressions. 
 
 
Table 5. Modeling abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Free cash flow -0.320 -0.0693***    -0.0708*** 
 (-1.50) (-3.95)    (-4.42) 
Free cash flow*Dummy  0.3325**    0.3809*** 
for shareholder rights=5  (2.41)    (3.24) 
Free cash flow*Dummy  0.1720***    0.1458** 
for <20% conc. ownership  (2.91)    (2.50) 
Dividend payout   -0.0374** -0.1290***  -0.1067** 
   (-2.20) (-2.81)  (-2.25) 
Dividend payout*    0.0279**  0.0142 
Shareholder rights score    (2.57)  (1.18) 
Shareholder rights score    -0.0125**  -0.0167** 
    (-2.00)  (-2.35) 
Concentrated ownership     -0.2470** -0.2819*** 
     (-2.34) (-2.70) 
Concentrated ownership     0.2814** 0.3387*** 
squared     (2.36) (3.13) 
Log Sales -0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0072 -0.0063 -0.0081* 0.0005 
 (-0.67) (-0.45) (-1.82) (-1.54) (-1.88) (0.08) 
Log Principal 0.0039 0.0038 0.0047 0.0052 0.0052 0.0027 
 (0.82) (1.00) (1.25) (1.28) (1.21) (0.66) 
Debt-assets 0.0147 0.0151 -0.0124 -0.0223 -0.0064 -0.0067 
 (0.60) (0.82) (-0.67) (-1.25) (-0.36) (-0.35) 
Log Age 0.0043 -0.0047 0.0096 0.0089 0.0054 0.0088 
 (0.18) (-0.25) (0.58) (0.56) (0.31) (0.55) 
Maturity 0.0013 0.0015 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0018 
 (1.37) (1.25) (1.17) (1.30) (0.99) (1.66) 
Market-to-book -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0011 
 (-1.04) (-0.88) (-0.68) (-0.98) (-0.81) (0.86) 
Constant -0.0143 -0.0115 0.0374 0.0695 0.0917* 0.0930 
 (-0.25) (-0.21) (0.85) (1.45) (1.83) (1.38) 
R-squared 0.36 0.56 0.38 0.41 0.48 0.63 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.51 
F-statistic 2.63 4.72 3.86 3.98 4.57 5.16 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 178 156 224 224 191 156 
 
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) over the -1,+1 period. Regression method is WLS, where 
the CAR is weighted by the estimated standard deviation of the market model residuals (σi) from the clean period. Sample period is 
from 1995 to 2003. Free cash flow (FCF) is the average of the ratio of undistributed free cash flow and market value, for the three 
years before the bond IPO. Undistributed free cash flow equals operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest expenses, 
preferred dividends and common dividends. Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends and net income, in the year before the bond IPO, 
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and truncated at 1. Concentrated ownership is the ratio of closely held shares and total shares outstanding, in the year before the bond 
IPO. Sales and Total assets are in millions of US$ in the year preceding the bond IPO. Debt-to-assets is the ratio of the book value of 
debt and total assets, both in the year preceding the bond IPO. Years since equity IPO is the time in years between the equity IPO and 
the bond IPO of a firm. Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of equity and the book value of equity, both in the year 
preceding the bond IPO. Maturity is time to maturity in years. Principal is in millions of US$. Relative issue size is the ratio of 
principal and total assets. Rated issues is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is rated by one of the major US rating agencies 
(Fitch, Mood’s, and S&P’s), and 0 otherwise. Domestic issues is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is issued in the home 
market and 0 otherwise. Dummies for regions, industries and years are included as well. 
 
 
We run the WLS regressions both with and without using White’s (1980) procedure for 
correcting t-statistics. Only the former are reported, but the latter yield almost identical 
results with only slightly differing standard errors for some variables. For our sample, 
OLS yields results that are weaker due to reduced efficiency, but qualitatively similar. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relation between free cash flow and abnormal returns. 
Model 1 of Table 5 indicates that free cash flow independently fails to have explanatory 
power when considered for the entire sample. This is hardly surprising given Panel D of 
Table 4, which shows that the correlation between free cash flow and CARs is exactly 
opposite for the two sub-samples we distinguish. These opposite correlations suggest that 
the effect of free cash flow differs for the two sub-samples. Likewise, hypotheses 2A and 
2B predict that free cash flow has a more positive relation when shareholder protection is 
high (2A) and when concentrated ownership is low (2B). Therefore, in Model 2 we 
interact free cash flow with a dummy that equals 1 if the score on shareholder rights is 5. 
In addition, we interact free cash flow with a dummy that equals 1 if concentrated 
ownership is below 20%, which is also the threshold level that LaPorta et al. (1999) 
apply. Both interactions have highly positive and significant coefficients. The coefficients 
can be interpreted as follows. If a firm scores 5 on shareholder protection, and has over 
20% concentrated ownership, then the impact of free cash flow is calculated by 
multiplying the free cash flow value (or its change) by the sum of the first two 
coefficients in Model 2. For example, a 10% higher free cash flow will yield a 0.1*(-
0.0693+0.3325)=0.0263 or 2.6% higher abnormal return. For a firm with concentrated 
ownership below 20%, a 10% higher free cash flow will yield a 1% higher abnormal 
return (0.1*[0.1720-0.0693]=0.0103), and 4.4% 1(0.1*[0.3325+0.1720-0.0693]=0.0435) 
higher if it also scores 5 on shareholder protection. So, the negative sign of free cash flow 
is more than offset by its interactions with low ownership and high shareholder rights.  
 
Of course, shareholder protection and ownership concentration are related, as shown in 
for example LaPorta et al. (1999). However, it is useful to separate these effects, since 
still 45% of firms with a shareholder rights score of 5 exceed the 20% ownership 
concentration threshold, while 20% of the firms with poorer shareholder protection do 
have ownership concentration below 20%. In Model 6, we add the other explanatory 
variables, and find the same results, with only slightly different coefficients. Thus, at low 
levels of concentrated ownership and strong shareholder protection, higher free cash flow 
results in more positive CARs to bond IPO announcements. At high levels of 
concentrated ownership and low shareholder rights, the relation between free cash flow 
and CARs is no longer positive. Perhaps no real disciplining is expected when insiders 
are entrenched. In such cases, a firm seems to be bringing bad news by attracting more 
capital rather than paying it out.  
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In comparison to Model 1, Model 2 has 24 observations less but considerably higher R2 
and adjusted R2. This might potentially be due to systematic biases. We therefore check 
this by running Model 1 with the observations from Model 2. We find that half of the rise 
in R2 and adjusted R2 is due to the missing observations and that the coefficient of free 
cash flow is now negative and significant.  The reason is that the missing observations are 
mainly from countries with poor investor protection, which is consistent with 
expectations and does not distort our results. 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relation between dividends and CARs, since lower 
dividends indicate a greater need for disciplining. Model 3 of Table 5 confirms this 
hypothesis. Firms that pay out all of their net income have 3.7% less favorable abnormal 
returns than firms that pay no dividends, ceteris paribus. To test the complementary 
hypothesis (4A) that the dividend effect is stronger when shareholder rights are weak, we 
add shareholder rights separately and in interaction with dividends. Model 4 shows that 
the coefficient of dividend payout then becomes even more negative, while the 
interaction term is positive and significant. Multiplying the interaction term by 5 gives 
0.1395, which offsets the -0.1290 coefficient of dividends independently. This suggests 
that the dividend effect disappears when shareholder rights are 5. Moreover, the 
shareholder rights index independently is negative and significant. Perhaps firms from 
countries with strong shareholder rights need less disciplining from bonds because they 
already are more disciplined. According to Hypothesis 4B, the negative relation between 
abnormal returns and dividends should be stronger when concentrated ownership is high. 
We test this hypothesis by running regressions with the interaction term of dividends and 
ownership (not reported in the tables). However, this term turns out to be insignificant, 
both when ownership is taken continuously and when it is included as a dummy. We can 
therefore reject Hypothesis 4B. In Model 6, we combine Model 4 with the other 
explanatory variables. Again, dividends are strongly negatively related to abnormal 
announcement returns. However, the interaction term of dividends and shareholder rights 
is now no longer significant, which suggests that there is in fact a dividend effect for 
firms with a shareholder rights score of 5. The results from Models 4 and 6 together 
suggest that dividends are indeed more important when shareholder rights are limited.  
 
The control lock hypothesis predicts a curvilinear relationship between concentrated 
ownership and CARs. We test this hypothesis in Model 5 by adding concentrated 
ownership and its square to the basic model. Both coefficients turn out to be large and 
highly significant. Of course, it is their combined effect that matters. Initially, 
concentrated ownership is negatively related to abnormal returns. The inflection point is 
at 43.9% concentrated ownership, after which the relation becomes positive. In Model 6, 
the inflection point is slightly lower at 41.6%. Both inflection points correspond with 
levels of concentrated ownership where insiders are usually entrenched. Moreover, they 
have meaning within the dataset since 74 out of 192 firms have ownership above both 
inflection points. At (and around) the inflection point, abnormal returns are 5.4% (Model 
5) and 5.9% (Model 6) lower than at zero concentrated ownership. Further from the 
inflection point the impact on CARs is less negative, which reflects the lower likelihood 
that the issue is motivated by keeping a lock on control.  
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2.4.3 Robustness checks 
To check for spurious relations, we conduct several robustness tests. For example, we run 
the interactions of free cash flow with alternative ownership cut-off points (not reported 
in the tables). As expected, higher cut-offs result in lower coefficients and lower 
significance. The other results are not affected. The interaction term remains significant 
for cut-off points of 25%, 30%, and 35%, and becomes insignificant at 40%. 
 
The negative sign we find for dividends could potentially be explained from the fear that 
dividends will go down after the bond IPO, for example due to the constraint debt puts on 
dividends (John and Kalay, 1982). If this were the case one would expect dividends to go 
down after the bond IPO. To test for this alternative explanation, we compare dividend 
levels in the year before the IPO and in the year of the bond IPO. We have data for 212 
firms and find that dividends rise slightly, both in mean (from 28.6% to 29.7%) and in 
median (from 33.5% to 35.5%). This is consistent with Long et al. (1994) who find that 
dividends do not fall after seasoned debt offers. For 186 firms we also have dividend 
levels in the year after the bond IPO. Graphs 2a and 2b show dividend levels for all three 
years, split by shareholder rights. 
 
 
Graph 2. Changes in dividend 
 
Panel A. For firms with shareholder rights equal to 5 
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The graph shows mean and median levels of dividend payout levels for the year before the bond IPO 
(T-1), the year in which the bond IPO is done (T) and the year following the bond IPO (T-1). Included 
are the 74 sample firms from countries with shareholder rights equal to 5 for which dividend data was 
available for all three years. 
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Panel B. For firms with shareholder rights below 5 
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The graph shows mean and median levels of dividend payout levels for the year before the bond IPO 
(T-1), the year in which the bond IPO is done (T) and the year following the bond IPO (T-1). Included 
are the 112 sample firms from countries with shareholder rights below 5 for which dividend data was 
available for all three years. 
 
 
Only in the sub-sample with full shareholder rights do we find declining median 
dividends. For firms with shareholder rights below 5, the group where dividends take a 
more negative sign in our regressions and the suspicion of fear of lower dividends is thus 
likely to be higher, dividends do not decline after the bond IPO, neither in means, nor in 
medians. We therefore conclude that fear of dividends is unlikely to explain the negative 
sign of dividends in our regressions 
 
Since shareholder rights are important in our analysis, we also run separate regressions 
for firms with a shareholder rights index of 5, and for those with a lower score (Table 6). 
Model 1 of Table 6 shows regression results for the poor shareholder protection sub-
sample. In spite of the smaller sample size (89 observations), the results are remarkably 
strong and similar to those for the whole sample, apart from the negative sign for free 
cash flow. Dividends again take a strongly negative sign, even more so than for the whole 
sample. The same applies to ownership concentration, where the gap in abnormal returns 
between the inflection point (at 50.6%) and zero concentrated ownership almost doubles 
from a 5.9% discount (Model 6, Table 5) to a 12.3% discount. This is consistent with the 
notion that concentrated ownership is more important (valuable to insiders) when 
shareholder rights are weak and private benefits are larger (e.g., Bebchuk, 1999, Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004, Nenova, 2003). For the strong shareholder part of the sample we 
have even less observations (68), but we still find a strongly positive sign for free cash 
flow. Dividends and ownership are no longer significant, but do have the expected signs. 
This difference in significance confirms that in countries with strong shareholder 
protection, free cash flow is important, while dividends and ownership are less so. 
 
To exclude country level effects, and rule out the possibility that the results for the strong 
shareholder part are driven by US observations, we further reduce the sample by running 
regressions for US bond IPOs only (Model 3 of Table 6). In spite of the low number of 
observations (35), we find the same results as in Model 2 of Table 6, with positive and 
significant coefficients for free cash flow. 
Graph 2. Changes in dividend (continued) 
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Table 6. Modeling abnormal returns to bond IPO announcements for sub-samples 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Subset Shareholder 
rights below 5 
only 
Shareholder 
rights equal 5 
only 
US only 
    
Free cash flow -0.0501*** 0.3131* 0.3864* 
 (-3.48) (1.85) (1.90) 
Dividend payout -0.0711** -0.0030 -0.0163 
 (-2.40) (-0.07) (-0.22) 
Concentrated ownership -0.4858** -0.1509 -0.2614 
 (-2.46) (-0.99) (-0.91) 
Concentrated ownership squared 0.4797** 0.1682 0.1772 
 (2.29) (1.13) (0.69) 
Constant 0.1098** -0.0363 -0.0081 
 (2.12) (-0.83) (-0.10) 
R-squared 0.52 0.33 0.40 
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.19 0.08 
F-statistic 6.76 2.27 1.23 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No 
Continent dummies No No No 
N 89 68 35 
 
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) over the -1,+1 period. Regression method is WLS, where 
the CAR is weighted by the estimated standard deviation of the market model residuals (σi) from the clean period. Sample period is 
from 1995 to 2003. Free cash flow (FCF) is the average of the ratio of undistributed free cash flow and market value, for the three 
years before the bond IPO. Undistributed free cash flow equals operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interest expenses, 
preferred dividends and common dividends. Dividend payout is the ratio of dividends and net income, in the year before the bond IPO, 
and truncated at 1. Concentrated ownership is the ratio of closely held shares and total shares outstanding, in the year before the bond 
IPO. Dummies for years are included as well.  
 
 
Not just shareholder rights, but creditor rights too could play a role in the disciplining 
power of new public debt. Creditor rights refer to the legal means that creditors have to 
take over control in the case of distress. The mere threat of a control change could 
discipline management. To test for this we replace the shareholder right dummies with 
creditor rights dummies11. While the other results stay the same, creditor rights turn out to 
be insignificant. This could be attributable to the fact that better creditor rights are not 
necessarily beneficial to shareholders. Notably in distress, shareholders and creditors 
might have conflicting interests regarding the distribution of cash flows. 
 
In addition to testing the hypotheses put forward in Section 2, we control for other 
potential explanatory variables from for example Datta et al. (2000). Age is included to 
                                                 
11 We do not use both dummies together in one regression, since they are both country level dummies, 
which are highly correlated. For example, each US firm has a shareholder rights score of 5 and a creditor 
rights of 1. 
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control for Diamond’s (1991) reputation building argument. Older firms that are 
associated with less information asymmetry might be received more favorably by the 
market. Similar arguments might hold for firm size, as measured by the log of sales. 
Other variables that might be of influence are the size of the issue (log principal) and the 
firm’s financial structure before the bond IPO (debt-assets ratio). Harvey et al. (2004) 
argue that it is important to measure leverage relative to assets in place because the 
benefits of debt are greater when a firm has a large base of assets in place. Datta et al. 
(2000) include market-to-book and maturity to test several conflicting debt maturity and 
debt ownership theories, which predict conflicting signs for the coefficients of both 
variables. None of the aforementioned variables is systematically significant in our 
regressions. In other regressions (not shown in the tables) we also control for other 
variables that might be of importance, such as the change in leverage, underwriter 
reputation, issuing motives, etc., but these all turn out to be insignificant. Perhaps most 
surprising is the insignificance of the change in leverage. Whether measured as the 
change in debt, the change in debt ratio or simply the relative size of the issue, the change 
in leverage does not affect announcement returns. This suggests that the size of the new 
debt is not as important as the fact that there is new debt and a new class of debt. Whether 
the former (new debt) or the latter (new class of debt) is more important, cannot be 
ascertained in this analysis, but requires a comparison with seasoned equity offers. 
 
 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
Bond issues have the potential to fundamentally affect agency costs of equity, both for 
the better and for the worse. This applies even more to bond IPOs. While seasoned bond 
offers are often no more than renewals, bond IPOs introduce a new class of public 
debtholders. Furthermore, they are typically very large (22% of total assets). And in 
contrast to private debt, renegotiation of bonds is difficult while hold-up problems and 
coalitions with management are unlikely.  
 
In contrast to Datta et al. (2000) we do not find uniformly negative stock price reactions 
to bond IPOs. Rather, we find the stock reaction to depend on the bond’s impact on 
agency costs of equity. This is the first paper that relates shareholder wealth effects of 
bond IPOs to free cash flow, dividends and control locks. Moreover, we investigate an 
international sample, which allows us to examine the role of investor protection. Since 
the nature of agency problems varies across countries, the impact of bond IPOs on agency 
costs is likely to differ as well. When insiders are entrenched and shareholder protection 
is poor, they might be motivated by the desire to keep a lock on control. 
 
We find that free cash flow is positively related to CARs when investor protection is 
high, but negatively when insiders are entrenched and investor protection is poor. This is 
consistent with the implication of Zwiebel’s (1996) model that insiders only have 
incentives to discipline themselves when they can potentially loose control. The 
disciplining role of bond IPOs is found to be more important when dividends are low, 
because debt and dividends are substitutes. We also confirm the hypothesis that the role 
of debt versus dividends is stronger in countries with poor investor protection, since 
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shareholders lack the means to extract dividends. Bond IPOs may also be motivated by 
the desire to keep a lock on control. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that CARs 
are significantly more negative at threshold levels of concentrated ownership. That 
relation is even stronger when shareholder rights are weak. This reflects the higher value 
of control locks to insiders when private benefits are high and investor protection is poor. 
Overall, our results confirm that bonds can provide valuable disciplining, both where 
strong shareholder rights make disciplining most effective, and where poor shareholder 
protection makes disciplining most needed.  
 
The results of this paper add to those of Harvey et al. (2004), who examine a class of debt 
issues that is also likely to be associated with changes in agency costs of equity: emerging 
market syndicated loans. They show that debt can mitigate agency costs of equity (due to 
separation of voting and cash flow rights) for issuers from countries with weak investor 
protection. Our analysis is complementary in that we consider different agency 
mechanisms and for a wider range of investor protection. Our results indicate that debt 
can also affect agency costs of equity when shareholder rights are strong. We suspect 
similar results would be found for some types of seasoned debt offers, especially when 
they are associated with extreme levels of free cash flow, dividends, and ownership. 
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Chapter 3 Bond underwriting fees and 
keiretsu affiliation in Japan ∗ 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s Japanese corporate bond markets were increasingly 
deregulated, opening up the markets to both more issuers and more underwriters. Notable 
events were the admission of foreign and commercial banks to the bond underwriting 
market in 1993, and the deregulation of underwriting fees and relaxation of eligibility 
guidelines for issuers in 1994.12 As a result, there was a sharp decline in underwriting 
fees from 1.5% of proceeds in 1991 to 0.35-0.55% in 1995.13 Takaoka and McKenzie 
(2005) document that commercial bank entry led to reductions in both fees and yield 
spreads. Another consequence of the reforms was increased access to public finance, 
which was especially useful for those firms not belonging to financial keiretsu. Until then 
keiretsu membership had meant better access to finance and insurance against failure 
(Sheard, 1989, Hoshi et al., 1991). But in the 1990s, the banks at the core of these 
financial keiretsu increasingly got into trouble and could no longer guarantee bail-out to 
its member firms.  
 
Against the background of bond market deregulation and the weakening position of 
banks, we examine fees on bond issues by Japanese corporations during the 1994-2002 
period, to investigate the effects of keiretsu affiliation. Our focus is on bonds, because 
they are closely linked to the bankruptcy costs that are supposed to be lower for keiretsu 
firms (e.g. Hoshi et al., 1990). Moreover, bonds were the most important source of public 
finance for Japanese firms in the 1990s. Over the 1993-1999 period, Japanese firms 
issued Yen 70.6 trillion in bonds against Yen 15.4 trillion in equity.14 To our knowledge, 
the relation between fees and keiretsu affiliation has not been investigated in earlier 
studies.  
 
                                                 
∗This chapter is based on De Jong, Roosenboom and Schramade (2006a), which is forthcoming in the 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. We thank Marc Deloof, Mathijs van Dijk, Mark Flannery, Marieke van der 
Poel, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Yishay Yafeh, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the 
Aarhus School of Business, Ghent University, Hitotsubashi University, and Osaka University for their 
comments. Of course, all errors remain ours. 
12 Financial Institution Reform Act, passed in June 1992, effective in April 1993. 
13 Finance and Fiscal Affairs (Kinyu Zaisei Jijyou), December 1995. 
14 Japan Securities Dealers Association, Factbook 2003. 
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As in previous research on fees (e.g. Kim et al., 2003), we find that fees, also referred to 
as spreads, increase in issue risk at the individual issue level. More importantly, we find 
that fees have risen over time for members of financial keiretsu, while fees have fallen for 
non-affiliated firms. This relation holds after controlling for risk factors. Moreover, these 
higher  fees for keiretsu firms are not offset by lower yields. We see these rising fees as 
evidence that the costs of keiretsu membership have come to outweigh the benefits. 
Bank-lead corporate groups may have been an efficient solution to missing markets for 
public finance. But their success declined as the banks at their core suffered from the 
combined effects of deregulation and the 1990 burst of the financial bubble. Because 
banks could no longer guarantee bail-out to their member firms, the advantage of reduced 
bankruptcy costs diminished. Moreover, the disadvantages of being affiliated increased as 
the problems of keiretsu banks spilled over to affiliated firms. For example, Horiuchi and 
Shimizu (1998) report substantial placements of subordinated debt with affiliated firms, 
and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) find higher costs of capital for keiretsu firms. Our 
results suggest that these spillovers also included higher fees on corporate bonds. 
 
The next section first discusses the features of financial keiretsu, then continues with the 
parallel developments of financial market deregulation and the weakening of banks, and 
finally discusses the literature on underwriting fees. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data 
and methodology. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
3.2 Literature and hypotheses 
 
We start this section with a description of financial keiretsu and their advantages and 
disadvantages. Subsequently, we discuss how two simultaneous developments, namely 
bond market deregulation and feeble banks, have weakened the keiretsu system. Finally, 
we will explain how keiretsu affiliation relates to fees on bond issues. 
 
3.2.1 Keiretsu 
The Japanese versions of corporate groups are called keiretsu, and they come in two 
types. Vertical keiretsu are centered around a manufacturing firm and have an industry 
focus, whereas financial or horizontal keiretsu are centered around a large bank, and are 
active in many industries. These financial keiretsu will be the focus of our analysis. In the 
remainder of the paper we refer to financial keiretsu simply as keiretsu. Banks, although 
not allowed to own more than 5% of shares in a firm, are the most powerful players in the 
keiretsu. They yield their influence through cross-shareholdings, interlocking 
directorships and a Presidents’ council where the keiretsu’s most important firms meet. 
Moreover, the banks use their creditor rights to take full control in distressed group firms. 
Keiretsu advantages and disadvantages have been well documented in the literature.  
 
A major advantage of the keiretsu system is its ability to solve information problems. For 
example, the keiretsu's main bank is argued to be both a superior monitor and a potential 
intervention agent (e.g., Sheard, 1989). Aoki (1990) emphasizes that the very threat of a 
bank takeover also plays an important monitoring role. In a similar vein, Berglöf and 
Perotti (1994) claim that the cross-holdings of debt and equity within keiretsu act as a 
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coalition-enforced threat of removal from control. Moreover, Hoshi et al. (1990) argue 
that keiretsu reduce bankruptcy costs by easier renegotiation and better access to capital. 
They find that after the onset of distress, affiliated firms invest more and sell more than 
non-affiliated firms. Main banks implicitly guarantee the loans made to their affiliated 
firms by other banks and voluntarily take more than their share of the losses in the case of 
distress (Aoki, 1988, and Hoshi et al., 1990). Furthermore, since the main bank implicitly 
guarantees to bail out distressed members, affiliation can be seen as a form of insurance 
against bankruptcy (Sheard, 1989). 
 
A flaw of the system is the potential for rent-seeking behavior, consistent with Rajan's 
(1992) hold-up model. Rent-seeking includes demanding too high interest rates and 
distorting investment decisions toward projects with low risk, high collateral and high 
leverage. Morck and Nakamura (1999), and Morck et al. (2000) find evidence of such 
rent-seeking behavior by banks. The distortion of investment decisions is also noted by 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) who find that keiretsu firms are both larger and more 
levered. Under bank influence, they produce more than optimal for value maximization. 
As a result, they are larger than their efficient size. Moreover, Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1998) find that affiliated firms are less profitable and have higher costs of capital. The 
lower profitability of keiretsu firms has also been found by Prowse (1992) and Kang and 
Shivdasani (1999). Nakatani (1984) argues that this lower profitability is offset by lower 
risk and more stable cash flows, but Beason (1998) does not find any support for this 
argument: although affiliated firms indeed perform worse, they do not have lower share 
price volatility. 
 
Several observations indicate that the costs of keiretsu membership began to outweigh the 
benefits by the 1990s. First, over the past decade there has been a continuous dissolution 
of cross-holdings (‘Cross-shareholdings decline for the 11th straight year’, NLI Research 
Institute, January 2002). Second, as previously mentioned, keiretsu members perform 
worse than non-affiliated firms. Third, as we will argue in the next subsection, since the 
banks are in a state of crisis themselves, they can no longer perform their intervention 
function properly. Fourth, as we will show in section 2.3, bond market access has 
improved, thus reducing the need to be a keiretsu member to have access to public 
finance.  
 
3.2.2 Weaker banks 
With the burst of the stock market and real estate bubble in 1990, Japanese banks were 
left with a vast portfolio of non-performing corporate and property loans. Moreover, bank 
reserves declined due to the depressed equity prices. Profits fell, the bad loans grew 
worse and the first banks began to fall. There had not been a single bank failure since 
World War II, but from late 1994 to mid 1996, eight banks failed (Financial Times, 19 
July 1996). The banking crisis was highlighted in late 1997, when Japanese banks were 
paying up to half a percentage point above the LIBOR, the so-called “Japanese 
premium”. The convoy policy, in which the government ordered strong banks to help 
their weaker competitors, only worsened the problems (see e.g. Bremer and Pettway, 
2002). In 1999 there was a wave of merger announcements among banks, most of them 
becoming effective in 2001. Seven out of eight core keiretsu banks were involved in 
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mergers among themselves, leaving eight keiretsu with only four main banks15. In the 
meantime, the banks’ problems spilled over to firms with close banking ties. For 
example, banks managed to substantially mitigate the shortfall in equity capital by issuing 
subordinated debt which was largely placed with affiliated firms (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 
1998). In addition, Kang and Stulz (2000) report that exogenous shocks to banks during 
Basle negotiations resulted in negative spillovers to bank clients, as they find that 
Japanese firms with more bank loans in 1989 performed worse in the 1990-1993 period. 
Thus, the close banking ties inherent to keiretsu affiliation have become much less 
appealing. An interesting example is the Fuyo keiretsu, where bad performance and a 
weak financial core resulted in the failure or sale of several important group members in 
late 1997 and early 1998, including Showa Line, Nihon Cement, Toa Steel, and the 
broker Yamaichi (‘Inside the Fuyo keiretsu’, Financial Times, 28 October 1998). 
 
3.2.3 Bond market development 
The Japanese bond markets were heavily regulated until the end of the 1970s, with 
limited access for both potential underwriters and firms wanting to issue bonds. For 
issuers, very strict eligibility prevailed, which ensured that only three firms could issue 
unsecured bonds in 1979. In addition, until 1993 there were caps to the amount that could 
be issued. Moreover, issuance required the involvement of a bond issuance committee 
('kisaikai') dominated by banks, which resulted in a strong bargaining position for banks 
and high issuance costs, as the principal management bank charged fees that totaled 2-3% 
of the bond’s principal (Yasuda, 2001). However, in 1988 the kisaikai was abolished. As 
to the eligibility guidelines, they were gradually loosened so that by 1989 they were met 
by over 300 firms (Hoshi et al., 1993) and by approximately 500 firms in April 1993. 
Later, the lowest credit rating of companies eligible to issue unsecured bonds was 
lowered from A to BBB and the number of firms eligible to issue uncollateralized bonds 
increased to approximately 800 (Financial Times, 1 June 1995). Eventually, speculative 
grade firms were allowed to issue as well. Hoshi et al., 1993 show that this resulted in a 
shift from bank to public debt. Many firms that used to issue in the Eurobond market and 
many more firms that previously did not issue at all, began to issue in the domestic bond 
market during the late eighties and nineties. The amount of corporate bonds outstanding 
almost doubled from 1993 to 200216, in spite of the deterioration in the financial 
condition of both issuers and banks by 1996 (Schena, 2002). As access to finance was 
one of the main advantages of the keiretsu system, the increased issuer access is likely to 
have made keiretsu affiliation less attractive. 
 
Entry into the market for underwriter services was limited too. During the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, the Japanese Big Four investment banks (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko, and 
                                                 
15 In 1999 Fuji Bank (Fuyo), Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (DKB), and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) 
announced to form the Mizuho financial group. In the same year, Sakura Bank (Mitsui) and Sumitomo 
Bank decided to become the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, while Sanwa Bank and Tokai Bank 
teamed up to be United Financial of Japan (UFJ). Finally, in 2005, UFJ was taken over by Mitsubishi 
Tokyo Financial. As a result, now only three main banks remain for eight keiretsu.  
 
16 Japan Securities Dealers Association, Fact Book 2003. 
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Daiwa) dominated the market with over 95% market share17. But in April 1993 the 
Financial System Reform Law became effective, which gradually allowed foreign and 
commercial banks to underwrite bond issues. The result was that Japanese commercial 
banks took a large part of the bond underwriting market: the market share in corporate 
bond underwriting of the Big Four fell from 89% in 1994 to 62% in 1996 (The Nikkei 
Weekly, 14 April 1997). Nomura eventually recovered, but Nikko was sold to Citigroup 
and Yamaichi even failed in November 1997. Another result was that both fees and yields 
fell significantly (Takaoka and McKenzie, 2005). In the next section we will discuss the 
determinants of fees and the relation with keiretsu affiliation. 
 
3.2.4 Fees 
When investment banks underwrite securities, they charge substantial fees to the issuer. 
Fees are usually defined as a percentage of proceeds. On a US$ 1 billion bond issue, 
underwriters can easily charge 1% or US$ 10 million in fees. In spite of their economic 
significance, fees have received limited attention in the literature. Fees partly reflect the 
amount of effort investment bankers put into the underwriting process. In addition, fees 
are a compensation for the risk the underwriter is exposed to. That is, the underwriter's 
position can be described as a short position in a put option (Smith, 1977). The risk exists 
both in terms of direct cash flow consequences and in terms of potential loss of reputation 
and future market share. Accordingly, Kim et al. (2003) find issue and firm 
characteristics, such as leverage, rating and maturity to be the main explanatory variables 
for fees on US bond issues.  
 
In other studies, fees have mainly been related to competition among underwriters, with 
underwriting fees found to decrease as competition increases. For example, Carow (1999) 
finds for various US securities markets that fees fall as innovative securities become 
mainstream. And for corporate debt markets specifically, fees have diminished with 
commercial bank entry in the US (Gande, et al., 1999) and in Japan (Takaoka and 
McKenzie, 2005), and with the Euro introduction for Eurobond markets (Santos and 
Tsatsaronis, 2003). When competition is frustrated by collusion of underwriters, fees 
remain high, as found for the US equity IPO market (Chen and Ritter, 2000).  
 
Fees also depend on underwriter characteristics. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show 
that high reputation investment banks can charge higher fees than their less reputable 
competitors. But empirical evidence is mixed for US and Eurobond corporate debt 
markets. Esho et al. (2002) and Fang (2002) confirm Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) 
predictions, whereas Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) and Livingston and Miller (2000) 
find that high reputation investment banks charge lower fees. In addition to underwriter 
reputation, the type of underwriter may also matter. In Puri’s (1999) model, commercial 
banks, as lenders to firms, are better certifiers than investment banks. Therefore, 
commercial banks should charge higher fees than investment banks. However, for a 
sample of US corporate debt issues, Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find that commercial 
banks charge lower fees than investment banks. This may be explained by the fact that in 
their sample commercial banks have only just entered the market. For a US sample, Fang 
                                                 
17 SDC league tables. 
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(2002) finds that high reputation underwriters charge higher fees but also obtain better 
prices (lower yields) for their clients. To control for this potential trade-off, we will also 
consider yield spreads. 
  
There is some controversy in the literature regarding the competition on fees on Japanese 
corporate bonds. Hamao and Hoshi (2000) cite a newspaper article (Nikkei Financial, 3 
February 1998) to claim that fees for corporate bonds of the same maturity were fixed 
across underwriters until the beginning of 1998. In contrast, Takaoka and McKenzie 
(2005) mention examples of changes in fees setting during this period. In addition, these 
authors document variation in fees for bonds with the same maturity within their sample. 
We will investigate this controversy in Section 5. 
 
Since keiretsu affiliation seems to have become disadvantageous, this might be reflected 
in affiliated firms paying higher fees. This result should hold even after controlling for 
underwriter identity, issue risk, firm risk and yield spreads. In the next section we will 
discuss how we obtain our data and how we try to establish the link between keiretsu 
affiliation and fees.  
 
 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.3.1 Data 
From the SDC New Issues Database Data we select all domestic non-convertible fixed-
rate corporate bond issues in the April 1994-2002 period, which are 3248 issues in total. 
We start in April 1994 because SDC does not have earlier coverage of fees on Japanese 
domestic bond issues. We focus on domestic issues because foreign issues are not 
comparable in terms of fees, due to different market conditions such as regulation and 
investment banking competition. The same applies to bonds with option-like features. 
Furthermore, we exclude financial firms as they are in the same industry as the 
underwriters and could potentially underwrite themselves. After exclusion of financials, 
2924 issues are left. Fees data are available for 2899 of these issues. Other issue data, 
such as coupon, maturity, and syndicate composition are also taken from the SDC New 
Issues Database. Additional issuer data, e.g. sales and capital structure ratios are obtained 
from Worldscope/Thomson One. For 2519 issues we have all variables to be included in 
our regressions on fees. 
 
To calculate the yield spread over benchmark, we follow the same procedure as Hamao 
and Hoshi (2000);  we match every corporate bond issue with the two Japanese 
government bonds that are closest in remaining maturity. We then take the weighted 
average of these two yields as the benchmark yield. Since we do not have matching 
government bonds for all issues (in particular those with high maturities), the sample size 
is reduced by 20.5%, to 2003 issues. 
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For identifying keiretsu firms, Brown & Company's (formerly Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants) 'Industrial Groupings in Japan' is the most widely used source18. It is used 
by for example Kang and Shivdasani (1999) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). We 
employ both the 1995 and 2001 editions of Industrial Groupings in Japan, roughly 
corresponding with the beginning and end of our sample period, to establish whether 
issuers belonged to a financial keiretsu. In the next section, we discuss descriptive 
statistics for both keiretsu firms and non-affiliated firms. 
 
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Keiretsu 
Table 1 gives an impression of the vastness of the keiretsu. It shows the eight financial 
keiretsu and their sizes, both in number of firms and in sales. 
 
 
Table 1. Financial keiretsu 
 
Keiretsu 
Issue 
amount 
(US$ 
billion) 
Number 
of issues 
Number 
of firms 
in 
Sample 
Group 
firms in 
1990** 
Group 
firms in 
2001** 
1992 Sales 
(Yen 
billion)** 
1999 Sales 
(Yen 
billion)** 
Mitsubishi 29.8 204 30 178 271 43279 41732 
Mitsui 15.5 161 28 140 207 30865 27869 
Sumitomo 33.0 275 31 143 248 45300 39699 
Fuyo 24.6 231 23 140 221 37677 29811 
DKB 29.1 211 36 114 208 48055 34875 
IBJ 1.8 18 6 28 47 3196 3076 
Sanwa 15.7 174 29 112 193 35502 27633 
Tokai 1.1 14 8 38 60 11583 6886 
Double count* 1.5 15 2 3 2     
Sub-total 149.1 1273 189 890 1453 255457 211581 
Non-affiliated 266.7 1246 203         
Total 415.8 2519 392         
 
The table shows the eight corporate groups as identified by Brown & Co’s (formerly Dodwell Marketing Consultants) Industrial 
Groupings in Japan. Issue amount refers to the total proceeds from straight corporate bond issues by the groups’ firms in billions of 
US$. Number of firms in sample is the number of firms that were involved in these issues. *Taiheiyo Cement belongs to both Mitsui 
and Fuyo; Mitsui OSK lines to both Mitsui and Sumitomo. **Source: Industrial Groupings In Japan, Brown & Company (1995, 
2001). 
 
 
The number of keiretsu affiliated firms grew during the 1990s, which suggests an 
increasing economic significance. But that impression is only superficial and due to a 
trend of both starting new ventures and spinning off parts of firms that remain within the 
keiretsu. The sales figures show a different picture. Due to the previously mentioned 
                                                 
18 Other sources are Keizai Chosa Kyokai's 'Keiretsu no Kenkyu', and Toyo Keizai's 'Kigyyo Keiretsu 
Soran', but these have not been published recently. According to Yafeh (2002), the cessation of their 
publication is another indication of the keiretsu’s demise. 
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disappointing operating performance, sales declined for all groups, in spite of the new 
ventures.  
 
The 189 keiretsu firms in our sample issued US$ 149 billion in straight corporate bonds 
in the Japanese domestic market, which is 36% of the total issue amount in the sample. 
Keiretsu firms account for 47% of the 392 issuing firms and for just over half of the 
issues, which means that, on average, they issued slightly more bonds per firm than non-
affiliated firms. An additional 13% of the firms belonged to a vertical keiretsu, making 
the percentage of firms belonging to either type of keiretsu 60%. This is more than the 
about 40 to 50% of listed manufacturing firms as reported by Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1995), but less than the 84% reported by Nakatani (1984). Our classification is 
corroborated by Morck et al.’s (2000) more recent sample, where 51% of firms belong to 
a financial keiretsu, which is close to the 47% we find. 
 
Keiretsu affiliation is relatively stable among our sample firms. Out of the 189 issuers 
that were members in at least one period, 175 were so in both periods. Eight firms are not 
listed as members in the 1995 edition of Industrial Groupings in Japan, but do appear in 
the 2001 edition. Three of them issued both before and during membership. Six firms 
appeared in the 1995 edition of Industrial Groupings in Japan, but do not return in the 
2001 edition. None of these firms issued after 1998. For the other 378 firms in the sample 
(both members and nonmembers) affiliation did not change. This membership stability 
seems inconsistent with the dissolution of cross-holdings that has been going on over the 
past decade19. We note however, that bond issuers are generally large firms, even 
compared to other keiretsu firms. Average keiretsu firm sales were around US$ 1.5 
billion in 1999 (Industrial Groupings in Japan, 2001), versus US$ 13.8 billion for the 
average affiliated firm that issued in 1999. Given their importance to the keiretsu, it is 
hardly surprising that membership among large firms is very stable. A mere 11% of all 
keiretsu firms are classified 4-star by Industrial Groupings in Japan, but 4-star firms 
account for 79% of all issues by keiretsu firms in our sample. This 4-star classification 
means that group members have a majority of the voting rights in the firm, and that the 
firm is a member of the presidents’ council. Only the largest firms in the keiretsu are 
typically admitted to the Presidents’ council. 
 
Fees 
Mean fees over the sample period are stable at just over 0.4% of proceeds, with the 
median at exactly 0.4%, and a standard deviation of 0.0085%. Given the sample mean 
issue size of US$ 165 million, the mean amount of fees is US$ 680,000. The 0.4% 
average is lower than previous studies find for Eurobond and US corporate debt markets 
(e.g. Kim et al., 2003 and Esho et al., 2002). The stability at just over 0.4% is misleading 
however, because when comparing fees for issues by affiliated with those by non-
affiliated firms, a very different picture emerges, as Graph 1 shows. 
 
                                                 
19 NLI Research Institute, 2002, Cross-shareholdings decline for the 11th straight year. 
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Graph 1. Mean fees for affiliated and non-affiliated firms’ bond issues 
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The graph shows fees on 2519 Japanese domestic bond issues included in our regressions, over the 1994-2002 period, both for firms 
belonging to one of the eight financial keiretsu groups identified in table 2 (affiliated firms) and for non-group (non-affiliated) firms. 
Fees are gross fees paid to the underwriters as a percentage of the total proceeds of the issue. 
 
 
During the first half of the sample period keiretsu firms enjoyed a slight discount in fees, 
but after 1998, this discount turned into a premium. Median fees for both affiliated and 
non-affiliated fees are at the same level as mean fees. 
 
Issue characteristics 
Means of fees and of other issue characteristics are given in Table 2, for affiliated and 
non-affiliated firm separately, and for each year of the sample period. 
 
 
Table 2. Issue characteristics 
 
Panel A: Number of issues and issue amounts 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1994-
2002 
Affiliated 22 122 150 187 342 170 111 93 76 1273 
Non-affiliated 46 86 136 159 306 131 130 114 138 1246 
Number of 
issues 
Total 68 208 286 346 648 301 241 207 214 2519 
Affiliated 6610 20826 19711 19582 33966 16958 10687 12769 8165 149272 
Non-affiliated 15575 27546 30238 27895 49358 28124 26215 29877 31878 266706 
Issue 
amount 
Total 22185 48372 49948 47476 83325 45082 36902 42645 40043 415978 
  N 68 208 286 346 648 301 241 207 214 2519 
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Panel A shows the number of issues and the amount issued by affiliated and non-
affiliated firms respectively. Issues by non-affiliated firm were typically larger, with a 
mean (median) value of US$ 214 million (US$ 151 million). The average mean (median) 
issue size of affiliated firms equals US$ 117 million (US$ 86 million). The total sample 
average is at US$ 163 million. Affiliates and non-affiliates placed approximately the 
same amount of issues, with affiliated firm doing slightly more issues up until 1999, and 
non-affiliated firms slightly more issues in the last few years. In general their numbers 
went up and down within the same proportions for most of the sample period, although 
the fall in issues by affiliated firms after 1998 is somewhat sharper than the fall in issues 
by non-affiliated firms.  
 
Similar to Graph 1, Panel B of Table 2 distinguishes fees and other issue descriptives for 
issues of both types of firms. Initially, fees are lower for affiliated firms, but then they 
become increasingly higher than fees for non-affiliated firms. Yield spreads20 and 
coupons follow a similar pattern, also with an initial advantage/equality turning into a 
later disadvantage. Only the principal amount as a percentage of total assets lacks a clear 
pattern. For the other variables, the differences between affiliated and non-affiliated firms 
are stable over the sample period. That is, affiliated firms place smaller issues, with 
shorter maturities, and they hire less managers in their underwriting syndicate over the 
whole sample period. It seems that both types of firms do different kinds of issues, but 
these differences existed over the whole period, so they do not provide an explanation for 
the change from a discount to a premium. 
 
Firm characteristics 
Next, we investigate firm characteristics. When looking at the industry distribution, we 
find that keiretsu firms are more often active in materials and consumer products, 
whereas non-affiliated firms dominate in the retail and energy sectors. Table 3 gives 
means of (previous year's) financial statement items for those firms that issued in that 
particular year, again split by both types of firms. 
 
As to size, affiliated firms are smaller in terms of total assets for each sample year, but in 
terms of sales the picture is not very clear, with large swings in average sales. Affiliated 
firms have less fixed assets as a percentage of total assets, which is probably due to more 
non-affiliated firms being in capital intensive industries, which also explains their 
consistently higher mean total assets. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) find that keiretsu firms 
are both larger and more levered. However, they compare affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms among listed manufacturing firms, not specifically among bond issuers, which are 
likely to be larger and more levered than the average listed firm. Therefore, in our sample 
affiliated and non-affiliated firms are probably more comparable in terms of size and 
                                                 
20 Strikingly, average yield spreads over Japanese government bonds are negative in 1994 and 1995. This is 
due to anomalies in the Japanese government bond (JGB) market. As Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991, 
1993) point out, the JGB market was known for 1) illiquidity of the majority of traded bonds and 2) a 
coupon effect, whereby bonds were priced differently from the present value of their cash flows, depending 
on their coupon rates. In subsequent years, i.e. the period we are most interested in, liquidity has improved 
(Eom et al., 1998) and we find positive yield spreads. 
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leverage. For most of the sample period both types of firms have similar debt ratios at 
around 65%. However, at similar total debt ratios, affiliated firms have lower long-term 
debt ratios than non-affiliated firms, indicating that affiliated firms have more short-term 
debt, which might reflect more bank debt or more trade credit from other affiliated firms.  
 
As found in previous research (e.g., Prowse, 1992, Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998, Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1999), affiliated firms are less profitable than non-affiliated firms. We find 
significantly lower ROA and ROE, and also lower market-to-book ratios for most sample 
years. At the same time, keiretsu firms have higher earnings volatility during the whole 
sample period, which seems inconsistent with the idea of more stable cash flows (e.g. 
Nakatani, 1984, Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). But it is consistent with Beason (1998), who 
finds that the lower profitability of keiretsu firms is not offset by lower stock volatility. In 
spite of lower profitability, keiretsu firms in our sample are more liquid than non-
affiliated firms, with significantly higher mean current ratios (and quick ratios) for each 
sample year. Overall levels of current ratios are low, with those of non-affiliated firms 
even on average below one. This is in line with Hoshi et al.’s (1989, 1991) findings for 
the 1980s that non-affiliated firms are more liquidity constrained. Morck and Nakamura 
(1999) argue that affiliated firms have higher liquidity so as to avoid disciplining from 
banks. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
To establish the relationship between keiretsu, risk, and fees, we run OLS regressions on 
fees. The basic model takes the following form: 
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Underwriting fees are defined as a percentage of issue size, as in for example Gande et al. 
(1999) and Kim et al. (2003). Table 4 gives an overview of the independent variables to 
be used in the regressions, and the predicted signs of their coefficients.  
 
 
Table 4. Variable descriptions 
 
Variable Label Variable description 
Predicted 
relation 
with fees 
    
Log of principal amount LOG(PRINC) Logarithm of issue proceeds in millions of US$ + 
Log of sales LOG(SALES) Logarithm of the firm's previous year's sales in 
millions of US$ - 
Log of total assets LOG(TA) Logarithm of the firm's previous year's total 
assets in millions of US$ - 
Coupon COUP Promised annual coupon payments as a 
percentage of the principal amount + 
Maturity MAT The bond's time to maturity in years + 
Debt ratio DR Book value of debt as a percentage of the book 
value of total assets + 
Standard deviation of 
EBIT by total assets 
SDEBTA5 5-year standard deviation of EBIT divided by 
total assets + 
Fixed assets as a % of 
total assets 
FA Book value of fixed assets as a percentage of the 
book value of total assets - 
Current ratio CR Current assets divided by current liabilities - 
Return on assets ROA EBIT as a percentage of total assets - 
Market-to-book MB Market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity ? 
Lead belongs to same 
keiretsu 
BK Dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager of the 
underwriting syndicate belongs to the same 
keiretsu as the issuer 
? 
Big Four lead B4 Dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager of the 
underwriting syndicate is a Big Four firm + 
Japanese commercial 
bank lead  
JCB Dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager of the 
underwriting syndicate is a Japanese commercial 
bank 
- 
Affiliated FK Dummy that equals 1 if the issuing firm belongs 
to a financial keiretsu + 
 
The table shows the variables to be used in the regressions on fees and the predicted signs of their coefficients. The log of principal 
amount, coupon, maturity, debt ratio, standard deviation of EBIT by total assets, and the affiliated dummy are all associated with 
higher risk and expected to be positively related to fees. Big Four lead is a proxy for underwriter reputation, which is also associated 
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with higher fees. The market-to-book ratio and the dummy for a lead manager belonging to the same keiretsu are variables that can go 
either way. The log of sales, fixed assets ratio, and current ratio are associated with lower risk, and thus have a negative sign. In 
addition to the variables mentioned in this table, year dummies and industry dummies will be employed too. 
 
 
The affiliated dummy (FK) equals one if the firm belongs to a financial keiretsu 
according to the Industrial Groupings in Japan classification. This dummy is used to 
establish the relation between keiretsu and fees. We interact FK with the time period 
dummies to account for changes in the influence of affiliation over time. Most other 
variables are meant to establish the link between fees and risk. Consistent with Altinkiliç 
and Hansen (2000), we take both the size of the issue, LOG(PRINC), and the size of the 
issuing firm, LOG(SALES), into account. At a fixed firm size, larger issues are riskier 
than smaller ones. At a fixed issue size, issues by large firms are less risky than those by 
smaller firms. Therefore, we expect fees to relate positively to issue size (measured as the 
log of the principal amount) and negatively to firm size (as measured by the log of sales 
or the log of total assets). An obvious proxy for risk would be the bond’s credit rating. 
We do not use it here because in our sample only 14% of the issues are rated by either 
S&P or Moody’s, and we do not have the ratings by Japanese agencies such as Mikuni, 
JCR, JBRI or NIS. We believe this is not problematic given that issue and firm 
characteristics are good predictors of rating in our sample21. Issue characteristics to be 
used as regressors on fees include issue size, but also the bond’s coupon (COUP), its 
maturity (MAT), and the type of underwriter (B4, JCB, BK). MAT, or maturity is the 
number of years between the issue date and the planned redemption of the issue. Coupon 
(COUP) is the promised annual payment to be made to the bondholders, as a percentage 
of the issue size. Both are expected to be positively related to issue risk (see e.g. Kim et 
al., 2003).  
 
We employ three dummies to control for the type of underwriter. First, there is a dummy 
(B4) that equals one if the lead manager of the underwriting syndicate is one of the Big 
Four firms (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko and Daiwa). These firms have traditionally been 
the most reputable underwriters in Japan. Since Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) 
model predicts that high reputation underwriters charge higher fees than their less 
reputable counterparts, we expect to find a positive sign for this dummy. Likewise, we 
expect to find a negative sign for the second underwriter dummy, JCB, which takes a 
value of 1 if the lead underwriter is a Japanese commercial bank and 0 otherwise. Third, 
we use a dummy (BK) that equals one if the lead manager belongs to the same keiretsu as 
the issuer. It is difficult to attach a predicted sign to this dummy. On the one hand, a 
positive sign will result if keiretsu banks have a strong bargaining position via-à-vis their 
member firms and charge them higher fees. On the other hand, a negative sign will result 
if keiretsu firms benefit from their close banking relationships to obtain better deals and 
pay lower fees. However, such a negative sign could also result from keiretsu banks 
misusing their private information to underwrite less risky issues, as Hori and Osano 
(2002) suggest.  
                                                 
21 To test if firm and issue characteristics are good predictors of rating, we run ordered logit regressions on 
the 266 rated issues in our sample. The results show that ratings increase significantly in firm size and fixed 
assets and decrease significantly in financial and operating risk. Results are available upon request from the 
corresponding author. 
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Firm characteristics include firm size and the aforementioned dummy for affiliation, but 
also the firm’s debt ratio (DR), variability in operating profits (SDEBTA5), fixed assets 
ratio (FA), current ratio (CR), return on assets (ROA), and market-to-book ratio (MB). 
These are all measured in the year preceding the issue. Financial risk, in the form of the 
debt ratio, is measured as the book value of assets as a percentage of total assets. For the 
variability of operating profits (SDEBTA5), or operational risk, we take the 5-year 
standard deviation of the ratio of EBIT and total assets. For both financial and operating 
risk we expect a positive relation with fees. The fixed assets ratio (book value of fixed 
assets as a percentage of total assets), current ratio (current assets by current liabilities), 
and return on assets (EBIT by beginning of year total assets), are all expected to be 
negatively associated with risk, and thus take a negative sign. The sign of the market-to-
book ratio (market value of equity by book value of equity) is not clear upfront, as it is 
both associated with value (low risk) and growth options (high risk). 
 
Given the effects of competition on fees reported in several studies (e.g., Carow, 1999, 
Gande et al., 1999, and Santos and Tsatsaronis, 2003), and the reported fall in fees in the 
Japanese corporate bond (Takaoka and McKenzie, 2005), it seems advisable to look at 
the change over time and include year dummies (Y95 for 1995, Y96 for 1996, etc.). As 
risk may also differ across industries, for example due to varying degrees of regulation, 
we also include industry dummies (IND1 through IND10). 
 
 
3.5 Results 
 
We run OLS regressions on fees using the independent variables discussed in section 4. 
To explicitly account for the possibility that the effect of keiretsu affiliation changes over 
time, we not only use year dummies, but also interact the affiliation dummy with the year 
dummies (not reported in the tables) and with the time period dummies (before 1999 and 
since 1999). Table 5 reports the results of the regressions. Model 1 is the basic model that 
includes all the likely explanatory variables discussed previously. Models 2, 3 and 4 are 
robustness tests to model 1, where non-significant variables are left out (Model 2), the log 
of sales is replaced by the log of total assets (Model 3), and the Big Four dummy is 
replaced by commercial bank dummy (Model 4). 
 
Table 5 indicates that fees indeed increase in risk, as reported by Kim et al. (2003) for the 
US. Fees increase in coupon, maturity, debt ratio, and earnings volatility, while they 
decrease in firm size (sales or total assets), liquidity, and, not significantly in a statistical 
sense, in fixed assets and profitability. The log of the issue amount is the only variable 
that does not take the expected sign, nor is it statistically significant. Comparing models 
2, 3 and 4 with the basic model shows that the results are robust to model changes, also 
when replacing sales by total assets. Significance levels do not differ, and the coefficients 
and R2 hardly change across the models. This is surprising since sales and total assets 
differ so markedly for the sample firms (see Table 3). We note however, that the 
economic role of size is not very substantial. The -0.005 coefficient of log sales implies 
that even the largest firm (US$ 200 billion in sales) enjoys merely a 0.02% discount (5% 
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of average fees) vis à vis the smallest firm (US$ 120 million in sales). The same discount 
results for firms that have a 1.3 percentage point (or 1.6 standard deviation) lower coupon 
than the sample mean coupon. Most other variables are in the same range of limited 
economic significance.  
 
 
Table 5. Modeling fees on bond issues 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Before 1999*Keiretsu  -0.0046 -0.0039 -0.0046 -0.0053 
               affiliated (-1.27) (-1.10) (-1.26) (-1.47) 
Since 1999*Keiretsu  0.0637*** 0.0649*** 0.0633*** 0.0627*** 
affiliated (7.42) (7.61) (7.37) (7.33) 
Lead belongs to same  -0.0139*** -0.0152*** -0.0138*** -0.0111** 
keiretsu as the issuer (-2.93) (-3.53) (-2.90) (-2.37) 
Big four lead  0.0043  0.0045  
underwriter (1.35)  (1.39)  
Commercial bank lead    -0.0117*** 
underwriter    (-3.73) 
Log of principal amount 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) 
Log of sales -0.0056*** -0.0054***  -0.0055*** 
  (-3.99) (-3.94)  (-3.90) 
Log of total assets   -0.0060***  
    (-3.76)  
Coupon 0.0147*** 0.0150*** 0.0145*** 0.0148*** 
  (3.22) (3.31) (3.16) (3.27) 
Maturity 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0069*** 0.0069*** 
  (10.57) (10.50) (10.49) (10.60) 
Debt ratio 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
  (3.30) (4.09) (3.61) (3.42) 
Standard deviation of  0.5570** 0.5671** 0.5444** 0.5437*** 
EBIT by total assets (2.49) (2.33) (2.44) (2.46) 
Fixed assets as a  -0.0173 -0.0200* -0.0130 -0.0169 
% of total assets (-1.55) (-1.78) (-1.18) (-1.52) 
Current ratio -0.0113*** -0.0113*** -0.0106*** -0.0118*** 
  (-3.92) (-3.83) (-3.76) (-4.06) 
Return on assets -0.0017  -0.0018 -0.0018 
  -(1.12)  (-1.18) -(1.20) 
Market-to-book -0.0008  -0.0007 -0.0005 
  (-0.57)  (-0.53) (-0.39) 
Constant 0.3587*** 0.3530*** 0.3617*** 0.3643*** 
  (11.22) (11.91) (10.72) (11.58) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
R-squared 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Observations 2519 2519 2519 2519 
 
OLS regressions with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. Dependent variable is fees paid to the underwriters as a 
percentage of proceeds. Principal amount equals total proceeds in millions of US$. Sales are reported sales in the year preceding the 
issue. The same applies to total assets, current ratio, return on assets, and market-to-book. Coupon is the promised annual payment to 
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bondholders as a percentage of the bond’s face value. Maturity signifies the number of years between the issue date and the promised 
redemption of the issue. Debt ratio is the ratio of book debt to total assets at the end of year preceding the issue. Standard deviation of 
EBIT by total assets is over a 5 year period. Lead belongs to same keiretsu as the issuer is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer and the 
lead manager of the underwriter syndicate belong to the same keiretsu. Big Four lead is a dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager is 
one of the Big Four Japanese investment banks (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko, or Daiwa). Keiretsu affiliated is a dummy that equals 1 if 
the issuer belongs to a horizontal keiretsu and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Much more significant in an economic sense, are the interaction terms of keiretsu 
affiliation with the period dummies. Before 1999, keiretsu firms have slightly lower fees, 
but the difference is not significant. Since 1999, fees have been significantly higher (6.3-
6.4 percentage points, or 15% of mean fees) for keiretsu firms than for non-affiliated 
firms. In other regressions (not shown in the tables), we interact keiretsu affiliation with 
separate year dummies. Those regressions show that keiretsu firms pay a premium over 
non-affiliated firms growing from 0.04% of proceeds (10% of average fees) in 1999 to 
0.15% of proceeds (35% of average fees) in 2002. In 1998 the premium is already visible, 
but is statistically not significant. Apparently this effect grows stronger over the sample 
period as the consequences of the banking crisis become clear.  
 
The table also shows that Big Four investment bankers charge slightly higher fees, but in 
neither a statistically nor economically significant way. We also find that they typically 
underwrite larger issues, by larger firms with lower debt ratios and more fixed assets (not 
reported in tables). This is consistent with the model by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) 
and with empirical findings by Esho et al. (2002) for US firms in the Eurobond market.  
 
As Takaoka and McKenzie (2005) report, commercial bank entry to the underwriting 
business resulted in lower fees. During their sample period (1992-2002), commercial 
banks charged lower fees than investment banks. To see if this also applies to our sample, 
we replace the Big Four dummy with a commercial bank dummy in Model 4. In contrast 
to the Big Four dummy, the commercial bank dummy is highly significant and negative, 
indicating that commercial banks indeed charged lower fees. We do not include both 
dummies in one regression, because we would run into a multicollinearity problem due to 
their significantly negative correlation (-0.89 at the 0.01 level). While the other variables 
are not affected, both the Big Four and the commercial bank dummy are highly 
significant. To see whether the commercial bank discount affected fees for keiretsu firms 
differently than those of non-affiliated firms, we also run regressions (not reported in the 
tables) with the interactions of keiretsu affiliation, commercial bank, and year dummies. 
These regressions indicate that the commercial bank discount applies to both types of 
firms, but more strongly to non-affiliated firms. The other results remain the same. 
 
There is a 0.015 percentage point (4% of average fees) discount for keiretsu firms that 
hire an underwriter from their own keiretsu. Potentially, this could be due to bankers 
giving discounts to their keiretsu peers, or to banks using private information to select the 
better issues. The latter explanation would be consistent with the suggestion by Hori and 
Osano (2002) that banks misuse their private information for their self-interest at the 
expense of other banks in bond underwriting. Upon closer inspection, we find that in 
close to half of the issues by keiretsu firms, they hire a bank from their own keiretsu as 
their lead manager (not in the tables). The firms that do so are much smaller (average 
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sales significantly smaller at the 5% level and median sales at the 10% level) than those 
that do not, which suggests they might be more likely to be subjected to bank hold-up. 
Moreover, these firms are more profitable than keiretsu firms that do not hire their 
keiretsu bank as underwriter (average ROA significantly larger at the 10% level, median 
ROA larger at the 5% level), and have a higher standard deviation of profitability 
(significant at the 1% level), suggesting there might indeed be some selection by banks 
going on.  
 
Since fee discounts apply both to Japanese commercial bank underwriting (JCB) and to 
underwriting by a bank from the firm’s own keiretsu (BK), this raises the question to 
what extent these two variables are related. Figure 1 gives an overview of keiretsu 
affiliation, underwriter choice, and mean fees for each of the resulting categories in our 
sample. 
 
Figure 1 shows that underwriters from the firm’s own keiretsu tend to be commercial 
banks. Still, in one out of three times, the keiretsu underwriter is an investment bank. This 
is in spite of the fact that not all keiretsu have active investment banks. In those cases 
where the keiretsu firm does not hire an underwriter from its own group (BK=0), we find 
the reverse effect: a Japanese commercial bank is hired in 215 cases (JCB=1) and 434 
times an investment bank or foreign bank is chosen (JCB=0). The correlation between 
commercial bank underwriting (JCB) and hiring within the firm’s own keiretsu (BK) is 
0.27 and significant at the 1% level. Conditional upon keiretsu affiliation (FK=1), the 
correlation is 0.33, at the same level of significance. Thus, Japanese firms seem more 
inclined to hire an investment bank than a commercial bank as underwriter, except when 
the underwriter is from the firm’s own keiretsu. Within each category (values of FK and 
BK), fees paid to commercial bank underwriters are lower than those paid to investment 
banks22. This indicates that the commercial bank effect does not coincide with the effect 
of hiring within the firm’s own keiretsu. Rather, the effects seem complementary.  
 
 
                                                 
22 The difference is significant in all cases, except when comparing within the FK=1 and BK=0 category. 
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Figure 1. Keiretsu affiliation and underwriter choice 
 
 
 
FK is a dummy that equals one for firms affiliated to a financial keiretsu, and zero otherwise. BK is a dummy that states whether a 
keiretsu firm hires an underwriter from its own keiretsu (BK=1) or not (BK=0). JCB is a dummy that equals one if the underwriter is a 
Japanese commercial bank, and zero otherwise. N is the number of issues that meet the stated condition. Fees are mean fees for the 
specified issues.  
 
 
In Graph 1 we show fees over time for affiliated and non-affiliated firms. Using the 
regression coefficients from Table 5, we now construct risk-corrected fees for both types 
of firms. Graph 2 shows that the same pattern appears: at first slightly lower fees for 
affiliated firms, but later higher and rising fees for affiliated firms. 
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Graph 2. Risk-corrected fees for affiliated and non-affiliated firms’ bond issues 
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The graph shows risk-corrected fees on 2519 Japanese domestic bond issues included in our regressions, over the 1994-2002 period, 
both for firms belonging to one of the eight financial keiretsu groups identified in table 2 (affiliated firms) and for nongroup (non-
affiliated) firms. Risk-corrected fees are calculated adding the coefficients for year dummies, keiretsu dummies and their interaction 
terms to the constant. 
 
 
Since affiliated firms pay increasingly higher fees over the years, keiretsu firms could be 
subject to a different regime than affiliated firms. To test this, we run regressions on fees 
for affiliated and non-affiliated firms separately. Of course, the interaction terms of 
affiliation dummies with time period and year dummies now disappear, and instead year 
dummies are reported independently. Table 6 shows the results of these regressions. 
 
Table 6 yields results similar to Table 5 in that it shows again that fees increase in issue 
and firm risk. Not all the issue and firm characteristics that proxy for risk have equally 
strong results as in Table 5, suggesting that both types of firms are indeed subject to 
different dynamics. Still, most significant variables have the same sign as in the 
regressions of Table 5. The signs for the sizes of issue and issuer do differ however, due 
to the problem noted by Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) that larger issues are usually done 
by larger firms. Another deviation from Table 5 is the market-to-book ratio, which takes 
a significantly positive sign for non-affiliated firms, and a significantly negative sign for 
keiretsu firms. We note however, that non-affiliated firms generally have higher market-
to-book ratios than affiliated ones. For non-affiliated firms, overvaluation may thus be an 
issue, whereas a lack of growth options may be more of a concern with respect to keiretsu 
firms.  
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Table 6. Modeling fees separately for affiliated and non-affiliated firms 
 
Model Non-affiliated Affiliated Difference 
1995 -0.0251* 0.0220** -0.0471*** 
  (-1.93) (2.04) (-2.79) 
1996 -0.0360*** 0.017 -0.0529*** 
  (-2.69) (1.44) (-2.98) 
1997 -0.0303* 0.0348*** -0.0651*** 
  (-1.69) (2.64) (-2.93) 
1998 -0.0494** 0.0326** -0.0820*** 
  (-2.48) (2.40) (-3.40) 
1999 -0.0595*** 0.0609*** -0.1204*** 
  (-2.77) (3.77) (-4.48) 
2000 -0.0513* 0.0793*** -0.1306*** 
  (-1.83) (4.42) (-3.93) 
2001 -0.0745*** 0.0960*** -0.1705*** 
  (-2.80) (5.27) (-5.29) 
2002 -0.0735*** 0.1587*** -0.2323*** 
  (-2.79) (5.47) (-5.92) 
Lead belongs to same keiretsu as    -0.0154*** -0.0154*** 
the  issuer   (-3.10) (-3.10) 
Big Four lead underwriter 0.0124*** -0.0027 0.0151** 
  (4.21) (-0.51) (2.53) 
Log of principal amount -0.0104** 0.0133*** -0.0237*** 
  (-2.03) (3.50) (-3.71) 
Log of sales -0.0066*** -0.0032 -0.0034 
  (-4.05) (-1.37) (-1.19) 
Coupon -0.0014 0.0264*** -0.0279*** 
  (-0.18) (4.97) (-2.95) 
Maturity 0.0093*** 0.0058*** 0.0036** 
  (10.69) (5.20) (2.53) 
Debt ratio 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0000 
  (2.02) (1.51) (0.09) 
Standard deviation of EBIT by  0.6282* 0.2058 0.4224 
total assets (1.75) (1.16) (1.06) 
Fixed assets as a percentage of  -0.0533** 0.0026 -0.0559** 
total assets (-2.24) (0.20) (-2.06) 
Current ratio -0.0083** -0.0149*** 0.0066 
  (-2.23) (-2.68) (0.99) 
Return on assets -0.0047** -0.0043 -0.0090*** 
  (-2.15) (2.46) (-3.22) 
Market-to-book 0.0035** -0.0060*** 0.0095*** 
  (2.52) (-2.51) (3.44) 
Constant 0.4972*** 0.2328*** -0.2643*** 
  (10.66)  (7.47) (-4.71) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes   Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
R-squared 0.46 0.43 0.44 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.41 0.42 
Observations 1246 1273 2519 
 
OLS regressions with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. Dependent variable is fees paid to the underwriters as a 
percentage of proceeds. Principal amount equals total proceeds in millions of US$. Sales are reported sales in the year preceding the 
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issue. The same applies to current ratio, return on assets, and market-to-book. Coupon is the promised annual payment to bondholders 
as a percentage of the bond’s face value. Maturity signifies the number of years between the issue date and the promised redemption 
of the issue. Debt ratio is the ratio of book debt to total assets at the end of year preceding the issue. Standard deviation of EBIT by 
total assets is over a 5 year period. Lead belongs to same keiretsu as the issuer is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer and the lead 
manager of the underwriter syndicate belong to the same keiretsu. Big Four lead is a dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager is one of 
the Big Four Japanese investment banks (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko, or Daiwa). 1995, 1996, etc. are year dummies that equal 1 if the 
issue is done in that particular year. Keiretsu affiliated is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer belongs to a horizontal keiretsu and 0 
otherwise. Industry dummies are included but not reported. 
 
 
More importantly, Table 6 confirms that the fee differentials from Graph 1 also hold after 
controlling for risk. All year dummies in the affiliated regression have a positive sign, 
while all year dummies in the non-affiliated regression have a negative sign. Surprisingly, 
the coefficients are significant in 15 out of 16 cases. Thus, fees for issues by affiliated 
firms keep rising during the sample period, while those for issues by non-affiliated firms 
keep falling. As Graph 1 showed earlier, nominal fees on affiliated issues rose from 
0.400% in 1994 to 0.525% in 2002, a rise of 0.125% (31% of 1994 fees). However, from 
Table 6 can be seen that, after correcting for risk, the rise amounts to 0.159%, or 40% of 
1994 fees. In contrast to Table 5, Table 6 shows that a difference between both types of 
issuers has existed at least from the start of the sample period, and not just since 1998 or 
1999, although an acceleration from then on can be discerned. This acceleration coincides 
with the substantial divestment of shares by keiretsu firms noted earlier. The results stay 
the same if we replace the Big Four dummy by a commercial bank dummy (not reported 
in the tables). The commercial bank dummy is small and negative for keiretsu firms (-
0.0052, t-statistic is -1.06) and significantly negative for non-affiliated firms (-0.0168, t-
statistic is -4.93). As noted earlier, the commercial bank discount applies more strongly to 
non-affiliated firms. We also run regressions on fees for the 917 issues by those firms 
with the strongest keiretsu ties, that is, the ones with a 4-star affiliation. These regressions 
(not reported in the tables) are similar to the one reported in table 6 for all affiliated firms, 
but with even larger coefficients for the year dummies. Thus the pattern stays intact but it 
shows that the effect increases with the intensity of affiliation. 
 
Since we claim keiretsu membership has become a burden due to weak banks, it is 
informative to show how badly the banks performed. Graph 3 shows the performance of 
the eight main keiretsu banks versus the Tokyo Stock Exchange index.  
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Graph 3. Stock price performance of the eight keiretsu main banks versus the TSE 
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Source: DataStream. Relative stock prices versus 1990, with the 1990 price set at 100. Equal weights are assigned to the eight main 
banks. After the mergers, the new firm’s stock price is taken, with the combined weight of the merger partners. 
 
As said, we find that keiretsu membership results in higher fees, ceteris paribus, from 
1999 on. Graph 3 shows that this follows shortly after the keiretsu banks began to 
perform worse than the Tokyo Stock Exchange index. To see whether our results are 
driven by any single keiretsu, we run regressions with additional dummies per individual 
keiretsu, again interacted with year dummies (not reported in the tables). We find the 
same pattern as in Table 5: insignificant results until 1998, and almost exclusively 
positive and significant coefficients from 1999 on. For the Fuyo keiretsu, the results are 
even stronger, which might reflect the large number of failing firms in that keiretsu (see 
Section 2.2 on this). 
 
In 1999 the wave of merger announcements led to the formation of UFJ, SMBC and 
Mizuho. Given the strong ties between keiretsu firms and their banks, this might have 
triggered the higher fees for keiretsu firms. The only keiretsu not directly affected was 
Mitsubishi. If the higher fees for keiretsu firms were directly related to merger troubles, 
then Mitsubishi should be an exception. However, when including dummies for 
individual keiretsu in our regressions (not reported in the tables) we find that the 
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Mitsubishi keiretsu firms were no exception in paying higher fees. Neither do we find 
different patterns in financing between non-affiliated firms, Mitsubishi firms, and the 
other keiretsu firms. These three types of firms all have their bond issuing peak in 1998, 
and a sharp decline in 1999 (see also Table 2). Therefore, the higher fees of keiretsu firms 
do not seem to be related to merger troubles, although they might be triggered by the 
merger wave.  
 
In Section 2 we mentioned the controversy regarding the competition on fees on Japanese 
corporate bonds. Hamao and Hoshi (2000) argue that fees were fixed by maturity across 
underwriters until early 1998, while Takaoka and McKenzie (2005) dismiss this claim. 
To investigate this further, we run separate regressions for both periods (1994-1997 and 
1998-2002). For the analysis in this paper it is important that our results still hold in the 
two periods. With respect to the view points of Hamao and Hoshi (2000) and Takaoka 
and McKenzie (2005), we have two important findings. First, the explanatory power of 
maturity is much higher in the 1994-1997 period (t-statistic of 50.6) than in the 1998-
2002 period (t-statistic of 4.9). Second, we compare the variation in fees for the two most 
common maturities, 5 year bonds (601 observations) and 10 year bonds (443 
observations). In both cases, variation is significantly (at 1% level) lower in the period 
before 1998; 0.025 versus 0.093 for 5 year bonds, 0.007 versus 0.051 for 10 year bonds. 
Although the presence of variation in all samples indicates that fees were not totally fixed 
by maturity before 1998, the difference is striking. The results suggest that underwriters 
have used a narrow bandwidth per maturity class. Concluding, both our observations are 
in line with Hamao and Hoshi’s (2000) arguments and maturity certainly was a more 
important determinant of fees before 1998 than later on. 
 
In addition to the issue and firm characteristics included in our regressions, market-based 
risk factors could also have explanatory value. To test this hypothesis, we re-run the 
regressions (not reported in the tables) from Table 5 and add the firms’ standard deviation 
of daily stock returns and beta’s (measured over the year preceding the issue). The 
inclusion of these variables does not affect the keiretsu effect, but does reduce the sample 
by 50% to 1214 observations. 
 
Fang (2002) finds that high reputation underwriters charge higher fees, but that this cost 
disadvantage for the issuer is offset by lower yields (better prices). The same trade-off 
could potentially apply for the keiretsu firms in our sample. Perhaps their higher costs in 
terms of fees are offset by lower yields. However, Panel B of Table 2 shows that yield 
spreads for keiretsu firms are higher rather than lower for all years since 1997. Still, 
corrected for risk this might not be so. To test this hypothesis, we run regressions on the 
yield spread over benchmark, for which we use nearly the same explanatory variables as 
in the earlier regressions on fees. We only exclude the coupon, because it is too closely 
related to the yield. Other studies that regress on the yield over benchmark use similar 
explanatory variables (e.g., Gande et al., 1999). In Model 2 we add the fees themselves as 
explanatory variable. Table 7 shows the results of the regressions on yield spreads over 
benchmark. 
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Table 7. Modeling yield spreads over benchmark 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Before 1999*Keiretsu affiliated -1.5 -1.1 -1.6 
  (-0.59) (-0.44) (-0.61) 
Since 1999*Keiretsu affiliated 12.7*** 8.4*** 12.6*** 
  (3.31) (2.14) (3.27) 
Lead belongs to same keiretsu  -3.2 -2.3 -3.3 
as the issuer (-1.31) (-0.95) (-1.31) 
Big four lead underwriter -4.6** -4.9***  
  (-2.54) (-2.71)  
Commercial bank lead underwriter   3.9** 
    (2.16) 
Fees  74.6***  
   (5.08)  
Log of principal amount -4.5*** -4.1*** -4.7*** 
  (-2.91) (-2.71) (-3.10) 
Log of sales -7.6*** -7.1*** -7.6*** 
  (-8.17) (-7.75) (-8.18) 
Maturity -2.9*** -3.4*** -2.9*** 
  (-10.37) (-11.95) (-10.33) 
Debt ratio 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 
  (9.31) (8.57) (9.41) 
Standard deviation of EBIT  344.4*** 297.5*** 345.8*** 
by total sales (3.59) (2.97) (3.63) 
Fixed assets as a  percentage -37.8*** -35.7*** -37.8*** 
of total assets (-6.08) (-5.82) (-6.08) 
Current ratio 2.2 3.0 2.3 
  (0.94) (1.26) (0.96) 
Return on assets 0.0 0.2 0.10000 
  (0.07) (0.28) (0.11) 
Market-to-book -2.7*** -2.7*** -2.8*** 
  (-3.07) (-3.06) (-3.11) 
Constant 56.2*** 23.4* 53.7 
  (-4.84) (-1.88) (4.58) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Observations 2003 2003 2003 
 
OLS regressions with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. Dependent variable is yield spread over benchmark. Keiretsu 
affiliated is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer belongs to a horizontal keiretsu and 0 otherwise. Fees is the fees paid to the 
underwriters as a percentage of proceeds. Lead belongs to same keiretsu as the issuer is a dummy that equals 1 if the issuer and the 
lead manager of the underwriter syndicate belong to the same keiretsu. Big Four lead is a dummy that equals 1 if the lead manager is 
one of the Big Four Japanese investment banks (Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko, or Daiwa). Principal amount equals total proceeds in 
millions of US$. Sales are reported sales in the year preceding the issue. The same applies to current ratio, return on assets, and 
market-to-book. Coupon is the promised annual payment to bondholders as a percentage of the bond’s face value. Maturity signifies 
the number of years between the issue date and the promised redemption of the issue. Debt ratio is the ratio of book debt to total assets 
at the end of year preceding the issue. Standard deviation of EBIT by total assets is over a 5 year period. Year and industry dummies 
are included but not reported. 
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Table 7 shows that the higher fees for keiretsu issues are not offset by lower yields. In 
fact, keiretsu firms experience both higher fees and higher yields in the since-1999 
period. In additional regressions with yearly keiretsu interaction terms (not reported) we 
find that only in 1995 do keiretsu firms obtain significantly lower yields on their bond 
issues. From 1997 on, affiliated firms have higher yields than non-affiliated firms. In 
1999 (the year of the bank merger wave), yields are even significantly higher for keiretsu 
issues. This again indicates that 1999 was a particularly difficult year for keiretsu firms. 
Model 2 also includes fees and shows that fees and yield spreads are positively related. 
The other results stay the same. In both models, Big Four investment banks achieve 
significantly lower yields (better pricing) for their clients, with yield spreads over 4 basis 
points lower. For our Japanese sample, we confirm Fang’s (2002) US findings, in that 
here too, high reputation underwriters achieve lower yields for their customers. In Model 
3 we again replace the Big Four dummy with a commercial bank dummy. This dummy is 
positive and significant at 3.9 basis points. So, firms that hire commercial banks benefit 
from lower fees, but have to pay higher yield spreads. This trade-off between yields and 
fees seems unique for underwriter choice. In general there is no trade-off between fees 
and yield spreads: firms with higher fees also have higher yields, ceteris paribus. This 
also applies to keiretsu firms. 
 
 
3.6 Summary and conclusions 
 
Over the past two decades, Japan has witnessed deregulation, increased access to public 
finance, and weaker banks. These events have weakened the keiretsu. In this paper we 
relate underwriting fees to keiretsu affiliation, while controlling for risk. As in previous 
US research on fees (e.g. Kim et al., 2003), we find that fees increase in issue risk at the 
individual issue level. Increased competition among underwriters resulted in fees 
remaining stable over the sample period, in spite of rising issue risk. Thus, fees relatively 
declined, from which independent firms benefited. Affiliated firms however, had to pay 
an increasing premium, which was not compensated by lower yields. We interpret this 
finding as an indication that keiretsu membership turned from a benefit into a 
disadvantage. Bank-lead corporate groups may have been an efficient solution to missing 
markets for public finance, but they suffered when markets were deregulated. When the 
real estate and stock market bubble burst, the banks ran into trouble and they could no 
longer guarantee bail-out to its member firms. Moreover, their problems spilled over to 
the firms in their keiretsu. This happened in several ways, such as the substantial 
placements of subordinated debt with affiliated firms (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 1998), and 
higher costs of capital (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). Our results show that these 
spillovers also included higher fees on bond issues. 
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Chapter 4 Issue frequency and corporate 
bond yields∗ 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Bond issuing activity widely exceeds equity issuing23 and many large corporations tap the 
public debt markets several times per year. According to common wisdom, it is important 
for firms’ reputations to regularly go to the bond market24. Some very large players, such 
as General Electric, even issue bonds each month and are known for obtaining favorable 
pricing thanks to their market literacy. In this paper, we hypothesize that market literacy 
and reputation acquisition should help frequent bond issuers in obtaining yield spread 
discounts vis à vis infrequent issuers. Given the large amounts of debt issued, even small 
discounts in yields can have immense economic impact.  
 
A rapidly evolving literature has examined bond issues and issuing behavior. Recent 
findings include that firms time their debt issues to get the best deals in terms of interests 
rates (Barry et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2006) and maturity (Baker et al., 2003); that 
they alter the currency composition of their bonds to exploit differences across currencies 
(McBrady and Schill, 2005; Henderson et al., 2006); that firms and underwriters choose 
each other (Fernando et al., 2005); and that underwriter loyalty is not as valuable in bond 
issues as it is in equity issues (Burch et al., 2005). Yet, we know of no paper that 
investigates bond issue frequency, while only two papers use plain measures of issue 
frequency. Cai et al. (2005) use dummies for issues in the past 3, 6, 12 and 24 months 
and find these to be negatively related to underpricing in US corporate bond markets.  
Santos (2006) employs two proxies for rating agencies’ familiarity with firms: the 
number of bond issues by the firm since 1970, and the length of time since the firm’s last 
issue. In explaining yield spreads, the latter is insignificant, but the number of issues 
since 1970 has a significantly negative impact on yields. This result suggests issue 
frequency is worthwhile to explore further. However, we will need more refined proxies 
to capture reputation and market literacy effects. The number of issues since 1970 goes 
                                                 
∗This paper is based on Schramade, De Jong and Roosenboom (2006). We thank seminar participants at 
RSM Erasmus University for their comments. Of course, all errors remain ours. 
23 In 2003, worldwide equity issuance amounted to US$ 268 billion versus US$ 2460 billion in bonds 
(Thomson ONE Banker Volume Analysis). 
24 When British firm Diageo placed a US$ issue in 2002, Euromoney magazine (15 November 2002) wrote: 
“Diageo does not have an inordinate need for debt, but felt that being out of the market for so long was not 
in its best interests.” 
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back too far to measure recent experience (which is likely to be most relevant) and does 
not distinguish between windows. The length of time since the previous issue does not 
capture the issues before the previous one and is meaningless if there are no previous 
issues at all. We circumvent this problem by measuring issue frequency over various 
windows. A priori, it seems quite likely that frequent issuers are better at timing their 
issues and at picking currencies and underwriters. However, to our knowledge, there is no 
study that provides systematic evidence on how often firms of various sizes issue bonds 
over several windows. Another gap in the literature relates to the nature and magnitude of 
potential cost advantages and disadvantages of issue frequency. This paper fills these 
gaps. 
 
Frequent issuers are by definition in frequent contact with the market, which should be 
valuable in two ways. First, frequent issuers will have better knowledge of bankers, bond 
buyers, and market conditions, which might allow them to become better at timing and 
placing their issues. For example, General Electric (GE) is known for creating a scarcity 
value for its debt in spite of borrowing needs in excess of US$ 50 billion a year. GE has 
achieved this, says one debt capital market banker “by being very disciplined in its 
approach. They’re not saturating any one market with paper. Instead they have spread it 
out across currencies, markets, and even within them” (Euromoney, 1 June 2004). 
General Motors is praised for its “skill at spotting an issuance window and immediately 
acting upon it.” (Euroweek, 27 September 2002). Thus, we expect frequent issuers to 
obtain yield discounts through superior market knowledge. We call this the market 
literacy hypothesis. 
 
Second, as the firm issues more frequently, it will be better known in the market. 
Information asymmetries will decrease and the firm acquires a reputation (Diamond, 
1989), from which it might benefit in the form of lower yields in comparison to firms 
without a reputation. We call this the reputation acquisition hypothesis. We note that it is 
in advance not clear whether reputation should in this context be regarded in a continuous 
way (i.e., a better reputation will result in a lower yield, even if the initial reputation was 
already good), in a discrete way (i.e.,  you either have it or you do not have it), or a 
combination of both. This has important implications for modeling the relation between 
issue frequency and yields, which could be monotonic or non-monotonic in the 
continuous interpretation of reputation. In the discrete case however, having a certain 
threshold of issue frequency would be decisive for obtaining a yield discount. 
Furthermore, if this threshold were one, it would simply distinguish active issuers from 
first-time-ever bond issuers, who are known for incurring significant premiums (Fenn, 
2000; Santos, 2006). 
 
Both the market literacy and the reputation acquisition hypothesis predict a negative 
relation between issue frequency and bond yield spreads. However, the impact of issue 
frequency is probably not uniform across all firms, nor is the relevance of both 
hypotheses. Size is likely to matter. Very large firms generally have higher financing 
needs and will thus issue more often. Moreover, very large firms have the added 
advantage that they already have a reputation. Thus, the market literacy hypothesis seems 
more relevant for very large firms than the reputation acquisition hypothesis.  
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Regular firms might benefit both from reputation acquisition and from increasing market 
literacy as they issue more often. If reputation acquisition works in a continuous way25, 
we should find a negative relation between issue frequency and yields across all levels of 
issue frequency. If, however, reputation works in a discrete way and the effect of 
increased market knowledge is weak, then the frequent issuer effect will be reduced to a 
bond IPO effect for smaller firms. 
 
For a sample of 1569 straight domestic US bond issues by 592 firms in the 2001-2003 
period, we explore past issuing frequency and estimate its impact on yield spreads. We 
start out by asking how often firms issue bonds over various windows. It turns out that 
the median bond issuing firm issues bonds once every three years and that one in five 
firms issue every six months. Subsequently, we investigate whether firms with a high 
issue frequency enjoy cost advantages or disadvantages. An obvious subsequent question 
is: at which number of issues and for what windows do cost (dis)advantages appear? In 
our analysis, we split the sample by firm size, since we expect the frequent issuer effect 
to be different for larger firms and because larger firms are more likely to be frequent 
issuers. We find that there is indeed an economically significant yield spread discount for 
frequent issuers, which can amount to over half of the average yield spread. Thus, a firm 
generally enjoys yield spread discounts from issuing several smaller issues rather than 
one very large one26. The effect is not monotonic, however. First, more is not always 
better. When a firm issues bonds too often, it looses its yield spread discount and might 
actually start paying a premium. Second, there is indeed a difference between regular 
(sales below US$ 15 billion) and very large firms. For very large firms, only issues 
during the last year really matter, consistent with the idea that (transitory) market literacy 
yields discounts to frequent issuers. That is, market literacy relates to knowledge of 
market conditions in a specific period and is thus likely to evaporate quickly. The 
frequency effect lasts much longer for regular firms, exactly because they do not do that 
many issues. For them reputation acquisition weighs more heavily and it is important not 
to be a bond IPO over the past three years, since that saves them at least 20 basis points. 
Previous research (Fenn, 2000; Santos, 2006) finds that first-time-ever issuers incur 
higher yield spreads. Our results suggest that it is more useful to distinguish between 
issuers and non-issuers over a certain time period rather than between first-time-ever 
issuers and all others, which wrongly classifies many non-active firms as bond issuers. 
 
In the next section we will discuss data and methodology. The third section describes 
results. Section four concludes and summarizes. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Or in a discrete way but complemented by increased market knowledge. 
26 This will probably not hold if the total sum borrowed is very small. Moreover, the lower yield spreads of 
the multiple issues do not necessarily mean that they are cheaper than a single issue of their combined size: 
the yield cost advantage might be offset by higher fees, since there are economies of scale in fees (e.g., 
Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2000). 
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4.2 Data and methodology 
 
4.2.1 Sample formation 
We start out by taking all non-convertible corporate debt issues from the SDC new issues 
database, amounting to 145,940 issues for the 1995-2003 period. For all the issuing firms 
we search their Thomson ONE Entity Keys, to be able to identify issues by the same firm 
under different names (e.g., issues by Ford Motor Credit Australia and by Ford Credit 
Canada Ltd are considered issues by Ford). With these data we construct two datasets: 
one for which we measure yields and issue frequency; and an auxiliary one in which we 
measure issue frequency. Our first dataset consists of all straight fixed rate bonds by US 
firms in the US domestic market in US$ in the 2001-2003 period. Floating rate bonds are 
excluded because they cannot be reliably compared in terms of yield spreads. The same 
applies to bonds with special features such as warrants attached. We focus on the US 
market since it is the largest bond market in the world and we consider domestic firms 
only because of comparability of financial statements. Even though sample firms issue in 
other currencies as well, we only consider US$ issues because yield spreads are hard to 
compare across currencies in a meaningful way. To construct our second dataset, we take 
all firms from the first dataset and track all their issues in all markets (except 
convertibles), back until 1995, to measure issue frequency up to six years back. In 
measuring issue frequency, it is important to distinguish between issues and tranches. 
Issues are often composed of several tranches with different characteristics, such as 
variation in maturities and currencies. SDC reports tranches, not issues. In our regressions 
we cannot pool the tranches, since yield spreads also vary across tranches, exactly 
because of these varying characteristics. However, when calculating the number of 
issues, we do pool all tranches of one issue to count the number of issues. This is possible 
since we do not measure yield spreads there and thus do not have to consider differences 
in characteristics. In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to both issues and tranches 
as issues. The resulting auxiliary sample consists of 6074 issues by 592 firms over 1995-
2003, while the primary sample consists of 1569 straight domestic US$ issues by those 
same 592 firms over 2001-2003; along with, per issue, information on the amount of 
issues done by that same firm up until the day before the particular issue. 
 
4.2.2 Methodology 
For all 1569 issues, we measure the firm’s past issuing activity by taking the number of 
straight bond issues by the same firm in all bond markets (including foreign markets and 
foreign currencies) for 12 windows ending the day before the present issue. These 
windows are: one week, two weeks, one month, two months, three months, six months, 
one year, two years, three years, four years, five years and six years. Whereas an issue in 
the past week might indicate either a firm that issues extremely often or a firm that has 
temporarily high financing needs, the absence of an issue in the past six years almost 
pertains to being a bond IPO. The interpretation of issue frequency numbers will vary per 
window and probably also with firm characteristics, notably size. That is, a certain 
number of issues in a certain window might be too few for a large firm, just right for a 
median firm, and too many for a small firm. In the latter case, the firm might be 
considered to be over-issuing and end up paying yield spread premiums. Increased 
financing needs are a plausible explanation for such over-issuing. Alternatively, low 
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yields might tempt firms to over-issue. However, we do not consider this potential 
endogeneity to be problematic for our analysis. Since the market is likely to recognize 
over-issuing behavior, the culprit would see its yield discount disappear or even turn into 
a premium. Still, it seems very hard to measure over-issuing, since it is firm-specific and 
we do not have a benchmark ‘normal issuing amount’. The fact that over-issuing is hard 
to measure is illustrated by the fact that firms can even be considered to be over-issuing 
in a certain maturity segment: “Lafarge was another casualty in the sterling market, 
blaming market conditions as it postponed plans for a L200m 15 year bond. With 
outstanding 2012 and 2013 sterling issues, the company was criticized for targeting the 
same part of the yield curve too heavily.” (Euroweek, 27 September 2002). 
 
Our hypotheses suggest that the impact of issue frequency is probably different for very 
large firms than for regular firms. We therefore split the sample by the firms’ sales. 
Splitting by sales allows us to test the hypotheses for both groups separately while 
controlling for the probably high correlation between issue frequency and firm size27.  
 
Yield spreads are calculated by matching the bonds on maturity with US Treasury bond 
indices which we obtained from Bloomberg. In case no exact match can be found, a 
weighted average of the two nearest maturities is taken (as in Hamao and Hoshi, 2000). 
For example, where the bond has a maturity of 4.1 years, we take the weighted average of 
the yields on the 4 and 5 year Treasury bond indices. In all our regressions on yield 
spreads we use the same basic model, combined with discrete or continuous frequent 
issuer variables. The model is as follows: 
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Other studies that regress on the yield over benchmark use similar explanatory variables 
(e.g., Fang, 2002; Fenn, 2000; Gande et al., 1999; Livingston and Miller, 2000; Santos, 
2006) and find that yield spreads tend to increase in the risk of the issue. That is, a 
positive relation is generally found between yields and issue size (log of principal 
amount), the debt ratio (debt-to-assets), and operating risk (standard deviation of 
EBIT/Sales), while a negative relation is expected with firm size (log of sales), fixed 
assets, current ratio, rating, underwriter reputation and seniority. For rating, we construct 
an ordinal variable that reflects the major ratings agencies’ classification28. For 
underwriter reputation, we use a dummy that equals one if the underwriter is a so-called 
Bulge bracket29 underwriter, and zero otherwise. In addition, there are some variables that 
                                                 
27 Moreover, by not splitting by issue frequency itself, firms stay within the same group regardless of the 
issue or window considered. In addition, we keep low and high values for issue frequency in both groups. 
28 These rating agencies are: Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s. We assign a rating score according to 
the rankings of these agencies: 1 if the rating is C or D, 2 if B or BB, 3 if BBB, 4 if A and 5 if AA or AAA. 
We also use a stricter classification, resulting in 15 categories, but this does not change our results. 
29 Bulge bracket underwriters include Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley (the traditional 
top three) and Bear Stearns, Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, 
JP Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, and UBS Warburg, as well these firms’ legal predecessors. 
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should be controlled for, although their impact is hard to predict a priori since they have 
multiple interpretations. These include profitability (ROA), and market-to-book ratios. 
Table 1 gives variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
 
Variable   Definition 
Number of issues in the past 
week, 2 weeks, 1 month, etc.   
Number of bond issues in all markets (except convertibles) 
by the same firm over the specified window up to and 
including the day before the current issue. Source is the 
auxiliary dataset with all the 1995-2003 issues. 
Yield spread over benchmark  The difference between the bond's yield and the yield on a Treasury bond of the same maturity. 
Log of principal amount  The log of the bond's issue size in US$ millions. 
Log of sales  The log of the firm's sales in US$ millions, measured in the book year prior to the issue. 
Maturity  The bond's time to maturity in years 
Debt-to-assets  The ratio of the firm's debt value and total assets, both measured in the previous book year. 
Standard deviation of EBIT/sales  Standard deviation of the firm's EBIT divided by sales, measured over the 5 book years prior to the issue. 
Fixed assets as a percentage of 
assets  
The ratio of the firm's fixed assets and total assets, 
measured over the book year prior to the issue. 
Current ratio  The ratio of the firm's current assets and current debt, both measured in the previous book year. 
Return on assets  The ratio of the firm's operating income and sales, both measured in the previous book year. 
Market-to-book  The ratio of the firm's equity market value and book market equity, both measured in the previous book year. 
Bulge bracket underwriter  
A dummy that equals 1 if one of the lead managers belongs 
to the club of Bulge bracket underwriters: Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, 
Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse First 
Boston, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Lehman 
Brothers, and UBS Warburg, as well these firms’ legal 
predecessors. 
Private issue  A dummy that equals 1 if the bond is placed privately. 
Rule 144A  A dummy that equals 1 if the bond is issued under Rule 144A 
Subordinated issue  A dummy that equals 1 if the bond is assigned a lower priority than existing debt. 
Senior issue  A dummy that equals 1 if the bond is assigned priority over existing debt. 
Rating  
A rating score that follows the bond's at-issue ratings by the 
major agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s) on 
a scale of 1 to 5; the score is 1 if the rating is C or D, 2 if B 
or BB, 3 if BBB, 4 if A and 5 if AA or AAA. 
Split rating   
A dummy that equals 1 if the bond's rating differs at least 
one notch (e.g., BBB versus BBB-) among the three 
aforementioned rating agencies. 
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4.3 Results 
 
In this section we start by describing the characteristics of the firms in our sample and 
answer the question of how often firms actually issue over various windows. In 3.2 we 
proceed with univariate and multivariate analyses to explore the nature and magnitude of 
the cost (dis)advantages of issue frequency. Robustness tests are discussed in 3.3. 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows firm characteristics per year for the 592 firms in our sample.  
 
 
Table 2. Firm characteristics 
 
 Period  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.
 
Minimum
 
Maximum Observations
Total  2001-2003 14244 3505 42644 107 575244 867 
assets 2001 14193 4090 38767 107 437006 311 
 2002 15016 3725 44687 137 495023 262 
  2003 13606 3068 44664 128 575244 294 
Sales 2001-2003 9628 2761 21920 19 217799 867 
 2001 10215 2919 22365 83 191329 311 
 2002 10771 3364 24473 77 217799 262 
 2003 7975 2498 18681 19 186163 294 
Debt/ 2001-2003 39.8% 39.2% 17.7% 0.0% 174.3% 867 
Total  2001 39.1% 38.8% 16.9% 0.0% 88.8% 311 
assets 2002 39.4% 40.1% 16.1% 0.0% 96.9% 262 
  2003 41.0% 39.0% 19.8% 0.3% 174.3% 294 
Current  2001-2003 1.45 1.19 1.07 0.08 14.22 867 
ratio 2001 1.39 1.13 0.99 0.08 9.04 311 
 2002 1.41 1.17 1.08 0.15 13.05 262 
 2003 1.55 1.29 1.13 0.09 14.22 294 
Standard  2001-2003 0.084 0.036 0.194 0.001 2.857 867 
deviation  2001 0.082 0.034 0.184 0.002 1.911 311 
of 2002 0.076 0.036 0.143 0.002 1.193 262 
 EBIT/Sales 2003 0.094 0.037 0.240 0.001 2.857 294 
Fixed  2001-2003 41% 38% 25% 0% 96% 867 
assets/ 2001 40% 39% 23% 0% 96% 311 
Total  2002 42% 39% 25% 0% 94% 262 
 assets 2003 41% 38% 26% 0% 91% 294 
Market- 2001-2003 2.7 1.9 4.2 -29.4 37.8 867 
to-book 2001 3.1 2.2 4.3 -16.9 30.0 311 
 2002 2.9 1.9 4.3 -14.2 34.7 262 
 2003 2.3 1.7 4.3 -29.4 41.0 294 
Return  2001-2003 5.6 5.8 9.4 -67.6 106.6 867 
on assets 2001 7.3 6.7 8.3 -60.5 61.0 311 
 2002 6.4 5.9 8.9 -37.0 106.6 262 
  2003 3.0 4.7 10.3 -67.6 40.5 294 
 
Figures are for the firms that issued in that particular year. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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The total number of firm years is 867, since the majority of firms issued only once in 
those three years. The median issuer had US$ 3.5 billion in total assets and US$ 2.8 
billion in sales. Average values for total assets (US$ 14.2 billion) and sales (US$ 9.6 
billion) are much higher, reflecting the skewed nature of the sample, ranging from a large 
number of relatively small firms to some very large firms that have sales and total assets 
in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Both mean and median book debt ratios are around 
40%, and current ratios are generally well over one. Still, the outliers show that some 
issuers had problematic financials with very low current ratios; one firm even had a 
negative book value of debt. The fact that this kind of risky firm can also issue, illustrates 
the depth of the US bond market with its large junk bond segment. 
 
Issue frequency per firm is shown in Table 3 (next two pages). Panel A gives the number 
of issues that firms placed over several windows and Panel B shows the number of issues 
per firm in the primary sample.  
 
Reported numbers are firm level descriptive statistics, which are in turn based on the 
1569 issue level observations. This implies that, if a firm placed six issues in the 2001-
2003 period, the number of previous issues is measured at six points in time and the firm 
level frequency is the average of those six observations. Hence, the number of previous 
issues by the firm is not a discrete number. We choose to measure these rolling windows 
for comparability with the issue level statistics (see Table 5), where a rolling window is a 
necessity to capture the frequent issuer effect, especially for the shorter windows. 
 
The first rows of Panel A show that the average firm placed one issue in the past year and 
6.6 issues in the past six years, while the median firm made one issue in the past three 
years and two issues in the past six years. Perhaps more interestingly, the bottom part of 
the table shows how many firms fell within a certain range, again for each window. 
Starting from the northwestern part of the table, one can read that 568 firms had no issues 
in the week before the current issue. Moving to the right of the table along the same row, 
the number of firms that had no preceding issue diminishes as the window widens. 117 
firms had no issues over the preceding six years. The other firms had more than zero 
preceding issues on average30, and these observations move down the rows rather than 
only to the right. Numbers generally increase smoothly from the southwestern to the 
northeastern part of the table, indicating that more firms record more previous issues as 
windows widen. Some 1 in 50 firms issue every month, about 1 in 5 firms issue every six 
months and about half the firms issue every one or two years. The pattern is illustrated 
graphically in Graph 1. 
 
 
                                                 
30 For the shorter windows, more than zero can still be well under one, since the firm average is measured 
over all of the firm’s issues; thus, if a firm has four issues in the sample period, and only one of those four 
has an issue in the past six months, then the firm’s average is 0.25 for the six month window. 
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Table 3. Number of previous issues measured per firm (continued) 
 
Panel B. Firm averages of issues in the sample period 
  Number of USD issues 2001-2003 
Mean 2.7 
Median 2 
Maximum 60 
Minimum 1 
Std. Dev. 4.1 
Total 1569 
0 issues NA 
1 issue 291 
2 issues 133 
3 issues 55 
4 issues 35 
5 issues 24 
6 issues 15 
7 issues 14 
8 issues 2 
9 issues 6 
10 issues 4 
11-20 issues 10 
21-30 issues 0 
31-40 issues 1 
41-50 issues 1 
51-100 issues 1 
>100 issues 0 
 
Number of domestic, US$ issues by sample firms in the 2001-2003 sample period. 
 
 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the number of issues per firm in the sample. By definition, each 
firm issued at least once during the sample period. Since the sample spans only three 
years and is restricted to domestic fixed rate US$ issues, amounts per firm are lower than 
in Panel A. We note that no firm issued more than 60 issues and that only 13 firms 
(2.2%) issued more than 10 times in 2001-2003. Hence, the presence of very frequent 
issuers does not disturb our findings. 
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Graph 1. Number of issues per firm over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each line shows the number of firms that exceed the specified threshold (more than 0 issues, more than 1 issue, etc.) for the specified 
window (past week, past 2 weeks, etc.). 
 
The features of the 1569 issues themselves are given in Table 4. Mean and median issue 
sizes are at US$ 377 million and US$ 250 million respectively (Panel A), which is 
slightly higher than what Barry et al. (2004) find for domestic US issues in 2000 and 
2001. The average spread over benchmark is 144 basis points, which is much lower than 
in Santos (2006), who finds average spreads of over 200 basis points in his 1982-2002 
sample. Panel B shows that a third of the bonds are private placements. In the vast 
majority of issues, a Bulge bracket underwriter is involved.  
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Table 4. Issue characteristics 
 
Panel A. Main issue characteristics 
  Spread over benchmark 
Principal 
amount Maturity 
 Mean 1.442 377 9.7 
 Median 1.082 250 10.0 
 Maximum 7.505 5000 48.4 
 Minimum 0.002 1 1.0 
 Std. Dev. 1.204 438 6.9 
Observations 1569 1569 1569 
 
Panel B. Dummy values 
  Percentage of bonds 
Senior bonds 43.3% 
Subordinated bonds 10.8% 
Rule 144A 3.4% 
Private bonds 35.7% 
Bulge bracket underwriter 79.2% 
 
Panel C. Maturity distribution Panel D. Rating distribution 
Maturity class 
Percentage 
of bonds  
S&P's/Fitch 
equivalent 
Moody's 
equivalent 
Percentage 
of bonds   
<1.5 years 0.2%  AAA Aaa 2.9%  
1.5-2.5 years 3.9%  AA+ Aa1 0.3%  
2.5-3.5 years 5.7%  AA Aa2 1.6%  
3.5-4.5 years 1.0%  AA- Aa3 2.8%  
4.5-5.5 years 17.0%  A+ A1 9.3%  
5.5-6.5 years 1.1%  A A2 12.2%  
6.5-7.5 years 11.2%  A- A3 8.2%  
7.5-8.5 years 5.2%  BBB+ Baa1 12.2%  
8.5-9.5 years 1.9%  BBB Baa2 13.0%  
9.5-10.5 years 39.7%  BBB- Baa3 7.6%  
Investment 
grade 
10.5-12.5 years 3.2%  BB+ Ba1 3.0%  
12.5-17.5 years 1.2%  BB Ba2 4.5%  
17.5-22.5 years 0.7%  BB- Ba3 6.0%  
22.5-27.5 years 0.1%  B+. B. B- B1. B2. B3 15.3%  
>27.5 years 8.0%  <=CCC <=Caa1 0.5%  
Speculative 
grade 
        
   No rating 0.6%    
   Split rating 46.7%    
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Panel C splits bonds by rating and maturity. Maturities vary widely, but some maturities 
are particularly popular, such as 5 years (17%), 7 years (17%) and notably 10 years 
(40%). Ratings are concentrated in the A (30%) and BBB (32%) categories. Ranging 
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from CCC to BB, speculative grade bonds still account for 29% of issues. In almost half 
of the issues, the Moody’s, Fitch and S&P ratings differ at least one notch from each 
other. 
 
Table 5 has the same structure as Panel A of Table 3, but now shows the numbers of past 
issues as measured at issue level rather than at firm level. As a consequence, firms that 
issued more often in the 2001-2003 period weigh more heavily. The upper part of the 
table shows that the average issue was preceded by one issue in the past two months, 6.6 
issues in the past year and 43.7 issues in the past six years. Medians are markedly lower 
at one issue in the past year and five in the past six years. The bottom part follows the 
same pattern as its equivalent in Table 3. Again the numbers generally increase smoothly 
from the southwestern to the northeastern part of the table. However, the numbers are 
higher here, both because the number of observations is higher (1569 versus 592) and 
because frequent issuers weigh more heavily. 
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4.3.2 Does issue frequency affect yield spreads? 
This subsection explores both in a univariate and in a multivariate way whether frequent 
issuers enjoy yield spread discounts. Table 6 shows univariate analyses for the variables 
to be used in the regressions. Panel A compares spreads for issues that were and that were 
not preceded by another issue in the past period, for several windows. For each window, 
spreads are significantly lower for those issues that did have a previous issue in that 
particular period. Cost advantages range from 62 basis points in the one week window to 
90 basis points (i.e, 63% of the average spread) in the 5 year window. The former gap 
indicates a cost advantage for very frequent issuers over all other, whereas the latter gap 
(5 year window) suggests a cost disadvantage for bond IPOs versus all others. These gaps 
are not only statistically, but also economically significant. Even at the median issue size, 
a seasoned issuer enjoys an annual cost saving of US$ 2.25 million31 versus a bond IPO 
(5 year window). Absolute gains are even higher for larger bond issues. 
 
 
Table 6. Univariate analyses 
 
Panel A. Spread differences per window between issuers and non-issuers 
  0 issues  at least 1 issue  Difference 
Window  
Average 
spread 
over 
benchmark  N  
Average 
spread 
over 
benchmark  N  
In average 
spread 
over 
benchmark  t-values 
Past week  1.500  1421  0.885  148  0.615  5.98*** 
Past 2 weeks  1.506  1404  0.900  165  0.606  6.19*** 
Past month  1.537  1311  0.960  258  0.578  7.16*** 
Past 2 months  1.583  1217  0.956  352  0.628  8.82*** 
Past 3 months  1.627  1122  0.979  447  0.648  9.91*** 
Past 6 months  1.747  906  1.026  663  0.722  12.28*** 
Past year  1.873  664  1.126  905  0.747  12.75*** 
Past 2 years  1.983  436  1.234  1133  0.749  11.49*** 
Past 3 years  2.075  327  1.276  1242  0.799  11.08*** 
Past 4 years  2.159  244  1.311  1325  0.848  10.45*** 
Past 5 years  2.227  196  1.330  1373  0.897  10.07*** 
Past 6 years  2.195  170  1.351  1399  0.844  8.84*** 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Since our research questions suggest the impact of issue frequency to be distinct for 
regular and large firms, we split the sample by sales. Univariate analyses of sales split by 
issue frequency (not reported in the tables) show that firms that do issue in a particular 
window are much larger than firms that do not. They have significantly higher median 
sales over all windows: US$ 20.5 billion versus US$ 4.1 billion over the 1 month 
window, 12.5 versus 2.6 (6 months), 10.5 versus 2.1 (1 year), etc. We choose sales of 
US$ 15 billion as a cut-off point. This leaves 407 issues and 76 firms above the cut-off 
                                                 
31 At the median issue size of US$ 250 million, a 90 basis points yield reduction entails an annual cost 
saving of 0.9% over US$ 250 million, which is US$ 2.25 million.  
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point and 1162 issues and 516 firms below the cut-off. We note that the US$ 2.1 billion 
in median sales of the regular firms is still considerably higher than median sales for 
NYSE firms32. It therefore seems inappropriate to refer to these firms as ‘small’. 
 
Panel B shows the split by sales for the variables that are to be used in the regressions. 
Apart from the return on assets, all variables are significantly different for both groups. 
Regular firms pay on average 61 basis points higher spreads over benchmark than large 
firms. They also issue smaller amounts and they have higher operating risk and lower 
ratings. In addition, their bonds are more often private and senior. These significant 
differences suggest that regression coefficients and even signs might also differ for both 
groups. 
 
 
Table 6. Univariate analyses (continued) 
 
Panel B. Means of regression variables split by sales 
Variable 
Sales below 
US$ 15 billion 
Sales over US$ 
15 billion difference t-values 
Spread over benchmark 1.60 0.99 -0.61 -9.04*** 
Sales  4655 69396 64741 NA 
Number of issues in the past year 1.4 21.5 20.0 23.08*** 
Principal amount 296 609 313.5 13.07*** 
Maturity 9.9 9.3 -0.7 -1.65* 
Debt-to-assets 0.41 0.39 -0.02 -1.88* 
Standard deviation of EBIT/Sales 0.086 0.032 -0.054 -5.33*** 
Fixed assets as a percentage of assets 0.44 0.30 -0.14 -10.55*** 
Current ratio 1.35 1.04 -0.31 -6.02*** 
Return on assets 5.6 5.0 -0.6 -1.22 
Market-to-book 2.9 3.59 0.7 2.76*** 
Bulge bracket underwriter 0.78 0.83 0.05 1.93* 
Private issue 0.43 0.16 -0.27 -10.08*** 
Senior issue 0.53 0.15 -0.38 -13.97*** 
Rating (scale 1-5) 2.7 3.8 1.1 16.58*** 
Observations 1162 407     
0 issues in the past year 609 55     
1 issue in the past year 269 58   
2-5 issues in the past year 213 109   
6-10 issues in the past year 36 28   
More than 10 issues in the past year 35 157     
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. N is the number of observations within that category. 
 
 
In Table 7 we present the basic model as described in the methodology section, which we 
combine with either continuous or discrete proxies for issue frequency.  
 
                                                 
32 Authors’ calculations: 2005 median sales of NYSE firms amount to US$ 1.38 billion. 
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Table 7. Modeling yield spreads 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Subset All 
Sales below 
US$ 15 
billion 
Sales below 
US$ 15 
billion 
Sales over 
US$ 15 
billion 
Sales over 
US$ 15 
billion 
Number of issues in the  0.001 0.006  -0.001***  
past year (0.44) (0.71)  (-4.50)  
Exactly 1 issue in the    -0.190**  -0.354** 
past year   (-2.34)  (-2.27) 
2-5 issues in the past    -0.263***  -0.379*** 
year   (-3.48)  (-2.87) 
6-10 issues in the past    -0.148  -0.501*** 
year   (-1.30)  (-3.07) 
more than 10 issues in    0.115  -0.738*** 
the past year   (0.78)  (-3.21) 
Log of principal amount 0.037* 0.050** 0.038 -0.016 -0.035 
 (1.88) (2.08) (1.59) (-0.53) (-1.12) 
Log of sales -0.028 -0.111*** -0.082** 0.249*** 0.268*** 
 (-1.24) (-3.47) (-2.45) (4.10) (4.39) 
Maturity -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.04) (-1.05) (-0.87) 
Debt-to-assets 0.367* 0.108 0.214 1.168*** 1.275** 
 (1.78) (0.48) (0.94) (2.89) (2.29) 
Standard deviation of  -0.099 -0.190 -0.152 1.360 2.629** 
EBIT/sales (-0.74) (-1.42) (-1.13) (1.09) (2.17) 
Fixed assets as a  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009*** -0.005 
percentage of assets (-1.60) (-1.14) (-0.51) (-2.64) (-1.55) 
Current ratio 0.024 0.028 0.028 -0.316* -0.282* 
 (0.75) (0.84) (0.84) (-1.79) (-1.77) 
Return on assets -0.009** -0.008** -0.008** -0.001 0.007 
 (-2.46) (-2.07) (-1.99) (-0.08) (0.58) 
Market-to-book 0.0004*** 0.0004* 0.0004* -0.019 -0.033** 
 (3.48) (3.34) (3.23) (-1.25) (-2.16) 
Bulge bracket  -0.145** -0.184** -0.180** 0.115 0.153 
underwriter (-2.15) (-2.31) (-2.28) (1.05) (1.36) 
Private issue 0.239*** 0.225*** 0.202*** 0.216 0.113 
 (3.59) (2.92) (2.59) (1.48) (0.77) 
Senior issue 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.170 0.183 
 (3.36) (3.11) (3.07) (1.28) (1.37) 
Rating -0.481*** -0.475*** -0.467*** -0.418*** -0.434*** 
 (-14.12) (-12.14) (-12.05) (-5.96) (-6.64) 
R-squared 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.41 
N 1569 1162 1162 407 407 
 
Dependent variable is spread over benchmark Method is OLS corrected for White (1980) standard errors. Quarter dummies are 
included but not reported. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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In the first model we pool all observations and include the number of issues in the past 
year as a continuous variable. We choose the one year window since it had the highest t-
value in the univariate analyses (Table 5). However, the coefficient turns out to be 
insignificant. The other coefficients are generally as expected, with for example larger 
issues and private issues resulting in higher yields, while high reputation underwriters 
reduce yields (e.g., Fang, 2002). The only counterintuitive sign is for seniority which 
turns out to be positively related to yields. Given the univariate analysis from Table 6, 
this is probably due to the high proportion of senior bonds among firms below the US$ 
15 billion sales threshold.  
 
We also run this regression for alternative frequency windows (not in the tables) and 
obtain similar results. We therefore reject the combined hypothesis that yield spreads 
both 1) have the same determinants for regular and very large firms, and 2) decrease 
linearly in issue frequency along all issues. Subsequently, we split the sample in large and 
regular firms and rerun the model for both subsets, first with the same continuous 
measure for issue frequency and then with the discrete measure.  
 
Model 2 shows the same regression as in Model 1, but now limited to the 1162 issues by 
firms with sales below US$ 15 billion. Results are nearly the same as in Model 1, except 
that the debt ratio is no longer significant and that log sales is now significantly negative. 
Thus, within the set of regular firms, size matters and larger firms enjoy a discount. The 
number of issues in the past year remains insignificant and we reject linearity for the 
subsample of regular firms. To test for the possibility of a non-linear relation between 
issue frequency and yields in the regular firm subsample, we run Model 3, which includes 
dummies for 1, 2-5, 6-10 and more than 10 issues respectively. The former two dummies 
turn out to be negative and significant, whereas the latter two are positive and 
insignificant. Regular firms that issued once in the year before the issue enjoy a 19 basis 
points discount, and 2-5 issues previous issues in the past year result in a discount of 26 
basis points versus non-issuers. In contrast, regular firms with more than five issues do 
not enjoy a discount versus non-issuers, which suggests that they have been over-issuing, 
and that there is an optimal issue frequency. Models 4 and 5 repeat Models 2 and 3 for 
large firms. Model 4 shows that the determinants of the yield spread are very different for 
large firms. First, some variables, such as profitability, market-to-book and seniority are 
no longer relevant, and the significance of ratings diminishes. Second, previously 
insignificant variables such as the leverage proxies are now significant. The Bulge 
bracket underwriter dummy also looses its significance. Apparently, a high reputation 
underwriter does not add the kind of value to a large firm that it does to a regular firm. 
Log of sales is now significant with the opposite sign: larger firms pay a premium33. Most 
importantly in our analysis, the number of issues is now found to be highly significant 
and negative. As with the regular sub-sample, we run the model with issue frequency as a 
discrete variable. Model 5 shows that the dummies for issue frequency are increasingly 
negative and significant, ranging from a 35 basis points discount for firms with one 
previous issue to 74 basis points lower yield spreads for firms with over 10 issues. 
  
                                                 
33 This is not due to multicollinearity with issue frequency, since the effect is also present when excluding 
issue frequency from the model. 
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The results so far indicate that the impact of issue frequency is not linear. We will 
therefore explore the effect of issue frequency for various ranges of issue frequency and 
across all windows of past issue frequency. Table 8 (next two pages) shows grids of 
regressions on yield spreads per window (rows) with issue frequency included in a 
discrete way (columns). Apart from issue frequency, the model is the same each time, and 
equals the one used in Table 7. Panel A shows results for the 76 firms with more than 
US$ 15 billion in sales (407 issues). Panel B includes regressions for the 1162 issues by 
the 516 firms with less than US$ 15 billion in sales.  
 
Very distinct patterns emerge from both panels. Panel A shows the grid of regressions for 
the regular firms. Here, the effect of issue frequency is very distinct from the one 
encountered with very large firms. For these smaller firms, very recent issues often result 
in higher rather than lower yield spreads, which suggests they are over-issuing. For 
example, issues by small firms that had an issue in the past week result in statistically 
significant yield spread premiums of 33 basis points. As the window lengthens, this 
premium shifts towards the categories with larger numbers of recent issues. That is, 
premiums are paid for 2-5 issues in the past two weeks (52 basis points), for 6-10 issues 
in the past month (117 basis points) and for more than 10 issues in the past two, three and 
six months (premiums of 111, 73 and 44 basis points). 
 
The premiums increase in the number of issues given the window; they decrease in the 
amount of time given the number of issues. These results are consistent with some firms 
issuing too often in too short a time. From the three month window onward, an issue 
frequency discount starts to emerge. Firms that issued once in the past six months to two 
years enjoy a significant cost advantage over non-issuers of around 20 basis points. 
Similar discounts are reported for firms that issued 2-5 times over all the windows from 
six months to six years. However, apart from the four and six year windows, this discount 
does not extend to firms issuing more than five times, which might be considered to be 
over-issuing. These results suggest that it is not increasing issue frequency per se that 
matters. Rather, it seems optimal: 1) not to have issued too often too recently, and 2) to 
have issued at least once somewhat recently, or, for that matter, not to be a bond IPO for 
that window. This confirms the results from Table 7 that the relation between issue 
frequency and yield spreads is not linearly negative. Instead, the relation between the 
number of issues and yield spreads seems to be a curvilinear one: negative (i.e. an 
increasing discount) for the first issue(s) and then positive (i.e., a decreasing discount or 
increasing premium) for subsequent issues. Moreover, the results indicate that the slope 
and inflection point of this curve vary per window and per firm. Therefore, we do not 
deign it feasible to explicitly model this curvilinear relation in our regressions.  
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Table 8. Grids of OLS results on issue frequency 
 
Panel A. Results for firms with sales below US$ 15 billion 
Period 
  1 issue 2-5 issues
6-10 
issues 
11-30 
issues 
> 30 
issues 
Coefficient 0.331 0.033 NA NA NA 
t-Statistic 2.30 0.15 NA NA NA 1 week 
N 28 4 NA NA NA 
Coefficient -0.038 0.518 NA NA NA 
t-Statistic -0.18 2.26 NA NA NA 2 weeks 
N 17 13 NA NA NA 
Coefficient 0.060 0.255 1.172 NA NA 
t-Statistic 0.50 1.72 9.25 NA NA 1 month 
N 58 33 2 NA NA 
Coefficient -0.060 0.127 -0.066 1.112 NA 
t-Statistic -0.62 1.15 -0.30 10.28 NA 2 months 
N 94 39 9 3 NA 
Coefficient -0.109 -0.215 0.334 0.726 NA 
t-Statistic -1.29 -2.31 1.77 2.68 NA 3 months 
N 137 46 22 5 NA 
Coefficient -0.203 -0.163 -0.121 0.439 NA 
t-Statistic -2.73 -2.14 -0.96 1.99 NA 6 months 
N 212 107 26 16 NA 
Coefficient -0.190 -0.263 -0.148 0.115 NA 
t-Statistic -2.34 -3.48 -1.30 0.78 NA 1 year 
N 269 213 36 35 NA 
Coefficient -0.178 -0.162 -0.119 0.099 -0.030 
t-Statistic -2.03 -1.80 -1.03 0.76 -0.19 2 years 
N 272 331 72 68 5 
Coefficient -0.142 -0.276 -0.157 -0.134 0.264 
t-Statistic -1.47 -2.90 -1.29 -1.08 1.37 3 years 
N 255 370 105 109 11 
Coefficient -0.098 -0.270 -0.259 -0.165 0.185 
t-Statistic -0.93 -2.61 -2.22 -1.25 1.08 4 years 
N 249 398 121 130 33 
Coefficient -0.110 -0.293 -0.177 -0.171 -0.028 
t-Statistic -0.98 -2.63 -1.36 -1.26 -0.17 5 years 
N 222 414 145 139 51 
Coefficient -0.098 -0.266 -0.242 -0.249 -0.086 
t-Statistic -0.82 -2.36 -1.84 -1.90 -0.55 6 years 
N 196 424 150 168 57 
 
Each row shows the coefficients, t-statistics and number of observations for issue frequency dummies used in OLS regressions on the 
yield spread over benchmark. In each case, results are for the regular firm subsample only (1162 observations) and the rest of the 
model equals the basic model mentioned in the methodology section and used in Table 7.  
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Table 8. Grids of OLS results on issue frequency (continued) 
 
Period 
  1 issue 2-5 issues
6-10 
issues 
11-30 
issues 
> 30 
issues 
Coefficient -0.220 -0.124 NA NA NA 
t-Statistic -2.20 -0.87 NA NA NA 1 week 
N 74 42 NA NA NA 
Coefficient -0.454 -0.283 -0.700 NA NA 
t-Statistic -3.14 -2.18 -3.65 NA NA 2 weeks 
N 40 84 11 NA NA 
Coefficient -0.465 -0.458 -0.552 -0.881 NA 
t-Statistic -3.12 -2.95 -3.39 -3.90 NA 1 month 
N 31 82 41 11 NA 
Coefficient -0.125 -0.422 -0.515 -0.670 NA 
t-Statistic -1.09 -2.69 -3.19 -4.06 NA 2 months 
N 57 47 54 49 NA 
Coefficient -0.281 -0.355 -0.298 -0.663 -0.94 
t-Statistic -2.42 -2.67 -1.71 -3.90 -2.82 3 months 
N 55 56 40 81 5 
Coefficient -0.132 -0.263 0.195 -0.582 -0.681 
t-Statistic -0.95 -2.05 0.70 -2.52 -3.06 6 months 
N 76 66 28 86 46 
Coefficient -0.370 -0.407 -0.505 -0.016 -0.961 
t-Statistic -2.38 -3.09 -3.09 -0.06 -4.24 1 year 
N 58 109 28 35 122 
Coefficient 0.156 -0.113 -0.309 -0.095 -0.627 
t-Statistic 0.80 -0.62 -1.53 -0.44 -2.40 2 years 
N 35 106 48 41 155 
Coefficient 0.236 -0.086 -0.321 -0.161 -0.407 
t-Statistic 0.84 -0.34 -1.30 -0.59 -1.31 3 years 
N 21 74 80 53 164 
Coefficient -0.393 -0.270 -0.413 -0.365 -0.493 
t-Statistic -1.02 -0.74 -1.13 -0.97 -1.27 4 years 
N 20 57 71 71 179 
Coefficient -0.466 -0.342 -0.414 -0.543 -0.657 
t-Statistic -0.83 -0.63 -0.76 -0.99 -1.16 5 years 
N 15 51 72 83 181 
Coefficient 0.661 0.607 0.469 0.299 0.449 
t-Statistic 1.35 1.34 1.04 0.67 0.94 6 years 
N 15 42 71 87 189 
 
Each row shows the coefficients, t-statistics and number of observations for issue frequency dummies used in OLS regressions on the 
yield spread over benchmark. In each case, results are for the very large firm subsample only (407 observations) and the rest of the 
model equals the basic model mentioned in the methodology section and used in Table 7.  
 
 
Within the group of large firms (Panel B), we find a strong frequent issuer effect from the 
shortest (one week) window up to and including the one year window. For these 
Panel . Results for firms with sales over US$ 15 billion B
 84
windows, 23 out of 27 issue frequency dummies are significantly negative, i.e. imply a 
cost advantage over non-issuers. At the 1 week window, firms that issued once in the 
preceding week enjoy a statistically significant cost advantage of 22 basis points over 
firms that did not issue. This advantage is reduced to 12 basis points (and no longer 
statistically significant) for firms that issue more than once in the preceding week, 
suggesting that some of these firms have been relatively over-issuing. In the two week, 
one month and three month windows, all frequent issuer dummies are statistically 
significant and generally increasing in the number of issues. In the one month window, 
one previous issue yields a 47 basis point cost advantage; having more than 10 previous 
issues reduces the spread by 88 basis points. In the two year window, the only statistically 
significant cost advantage is for those firms issuing at least 30 times. Still, this result 
might be caused by the more recent issues within the two year window. For longer 
windows, signs generally remain negative but are all insignificant. These results suggest 
that for very large firms, issues beyond the one year window are irrelevant and that issue 
activity in the past year is decisive for cost advantages. This is consistent with benefits 
from market literacy, which are perishable since market conditions are in permanent flux. 
 
4.3.3 Robustness discussion 
In the previous subsection we showed that issue frequency has an impact on yield 
spreads. To see whether our results might be driven by spurious relations, we will now 
discuss some robustness tests.  
 
The market literacy hypothesis says that frequent issuers benefit from superior market 
knowledge to obtain lower yields, for example by better timing. We therefore test 
whether the frequency effect keeps its significance when three timing proxies are added 
to Model 4. The first proxy we employ is the 10 year Treasury rate minus the 3 month 
Treasury rate, which is in effect a proxy for the flatness of the yield curve. This proxy 
turns out to be significantly negative, i.e. yields spreads are higher when the yield curve 
is flatter. Our second proxy is the average of the 3 month rate over the past 6 months 
minus the current 3 month rate. This proxy is significantly positive, which means that 
spreads are higher when interest rates have recently dropped. Perhaps falling interest rates 
tempt firms to over-issue. Our third proxy is the amount of issues in the bond’s maturity 
class in the surrounding 2 weeks relative to the amounts in the maturity class over the 
whole year. This is a proxy for yield curve targeting, i.e. many firms issuing in the same 
maturity class over a short period of time, supposedly because of a window of 
opportunity. The effect turns out to be insignificant, which is not surprising since it could 
have gone either way: positive for firms that are in time to benefit from the window of 
opportunity and negative for firms that are late. These timing proxies seem important to 
control for, but their inclusion hardly changes the frequent issuer effect: the t-value of 
issue frequency goes from -4.50 to -4.24. Thus, they seem to capture only a small 
component of the frequent issuer effect. 
 
The split of our sample by size is an important part of the analysis. So far, we have made 
the split at sales of US$ 15 billion, since it roughly corresponds with the median firm that 
has a previous issue over the 6 month window. Moreover, it conveniently splits the 
sample in large versus regular firms in a ratio of 1:3.5. But alternative cut-off points 
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might also be used, such as (approximate large-to-regular ratios in parentheses): US$ 25 
billion (1:6), US$ 20 billion (1:5), US$ 10 billion (1:3), and US$ 5 billion (1:1). When 
we rerun the large firm OLS with continuous frequency (Model 4 from Table 7) for these 
alternative cut-off points, we obtain similar results, with increasing significance of 
frequency as the cut-off goes up: its t-value is -3.76 at the US$ 5 billion cut-off and -5.20 
at the US$ 25 billion cut-off34. Results are also robust to changing the cut-off points for 
the models with discrete issue frequency and/or for the regular firms. The only surprising 
result appears when running the model with continuous issue frequency for firms with 
sales below US$ 5 billion: issue frequency is now again significantly negative, which is 
probably due to the limited number of observations with issue frequency over five (5% 
versus 16% for the whole sample). In sum, changing the cut-off points hardly affects 
results and confirms the notion that there is a large and smooth continuum between very 
infrequent and very frequent issuers. 
 
The univariate analysis (Table 6) showed that regular and large firms not only differed in 
their issue frequency and yields, but also in other respects. Notably, regular firms did 
almost three times as many private issues. We therefore check whether this affects the 
analysis by running Model 3 of Table 7 both for private issues only and for public issues 
only. The signs stay the same, but significance is lower for the private issues subsample, 
which is probably due to the lower past issue frequency for private issues (0.62 on 
average for regular firms over the past year, versus 2.05 for public issues). We also do 
similar tests for junk bonds and split ratings, but find that the results are not affected. 
 
Reputation acquisition assumes that firms acquire a good reputation, but of course firms 
can also acquire a bad reputation. We cannot really control this possibility (although 
extreme cases are probably captured in ratings), but if bad reputations were prolific, this 
would bias us against finding significant results. 
 
Our sample concerns issues in the 2001-2003 period, which was largely a time of 
recession and low interest rates. One could therefore ask how representative our results 
are for ‘normal’ or booming times. The low interest rates should not be a problem, since 
these actually bias us against finding results as they offer less scope for discounts. Still, 
bond issuers in recessions might differ from the firms that issue bonds in booming times. 
However, the results in Santos (2006) suggest that is not the case. He finds that firms of 
all risk categories placed issues during expansions as well as recessions. Nevertheless, the 
frequency effect might differ across the business cycle. We therefore run separate 
regressions for the first three quarters of 2001 (i.e., before the 911 terrorist attacks) when 
the economy was still booming. We find that t-values are lower now (as well as the 
number of observations) but that the frequency effect remains highly significant. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Non-tabulated results are available from the authors upon request. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
 
Bond issue volumes are so large that even small yield discounts can save millions of 
dollars. This paper examines a potential source of such cost advantage: issue frequency. 
We hypothesize that more frequent bond issuers obtain lower yields for two reasons: 
because they better know the market (market literacy) and because the market knows 
them better (reputation acquisition).  
 
This paper is the first to systematically document bond issue frequency for several 
windows, and relate them to yield spreads. It turns out that the median bond issuing firm 
issues bonds once every three years and that 20% of issuing firms issue a bond every six 
months. We find that there is an economically significant yield spread discount for 
frequent issuers, which can amount to over half of the average yield spread.  
 
However, the impact of issue frequency is not linear. For very large firms, only issues 
during the last year really matter, consistent with the idea that market literacy yields 
transitory discounts to frequent issuers. Since market conditions change, market literacy 
has a short half-life. The frequency effect lasts much longer for regular firms, exactly 
because they do not do that many issues. Here, reputation acquisition weighs more 
heavily and it pays off to be known in the market for a previous issue. 
 
Furthermore, if firms issue too often given their risk or size, they might be considered 
over-issuing. As a result, their discount disappears and may turn into a premium. These 
results suggest that there is in fact a firm-specific optimal issue frequency. 
 
Our results show that issue frequency has a major impact on yield spreads. Still, some 
unsolved issues remain. For example, we do not have a benchmark for over-issuing. And 
it remains to be seen what the impact of issue frequency is in the less developed bond 
markets of Asia and Europe. Finally, it is likely that issue frequency also affects fees paid 
to underwriters. 
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Chapter 5 Who benefits from bond tender 
offers in Europe?∗ 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, many European firms have made tender offers for their bonds. While 
only € 3 billion in bonds were tendered over the 1996-1999 period, the amount tendered 
surpassed € 70 billion over the period from January 2000 to October 2005. The surge in 
bond tender offers raises several questions. Why would firms want to buy their own 
bonds? Who benefits from tender offers: shareholders, bondholders or both? In this paper 
we take a closer look at the recent wave of European bond tender offers and try to 
reconcile them with financial theory.  
 
The contribution of our study is twofold. First, we investigate wealth effects to both 
bondholders and stockholders, while prior research on bond tenders has focused 
exclusively on either shareholders (Wingler and Jud, 1990; Chatterjee et al., 1995; Kruse 
et al., 2005) or bondholders (Mann and Powers, 2005). This is surprising, since both 
groups of financiers are involved in bond tenders, with different interests at stake. While 
bondholders benefit from high premiums for tendering their bonds, shareholders are at 
the paying end and will prefer low premiums. Shareholders may still win if the loss in 
premiums is less than the gains from having a better financial structure. However, the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders is a permanent one and may 
actually be a motivation for the tender offer. When a firm issues long-term debt, it 
effectively starts an ongoing valuation side game between bondholders and shareholders: 
if interest rates fall, bond prices will go up and the bondholders’ stake in the firm will 
rise. Conversely, if interest rates rise, bond prices will go down and shareholders will be 
at the losing side. Managers acting in the interests of shareholders thus have incentives to 
issue at times of low interest rates and they might be tempted to time their tenders 
accordingly (Mauer and Lewellen, 1987). Especially in the past years of low interest 
rates, this might have been appealing. Alternatively, the firm might make a bond tender 
offer to rebalance its capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2005), which should be 
beneficial to both groups of financiers. Thus, these motives could differ in their effects on 
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shareholders and bondholders. By investigating the wealth effects for both bondholders 
and shareholders, we present a more comprehensive overview of the consequences of 
bond tenders.  
 
Second, we are the first to study tenders in a European setting, which is important since 
the motives for European tenders are likely to differ from those in the US. In contrast to 
the US, bond markets in Europe are relatively small and, more specifically, lack a large 
junk segment (e.g., BIS, 2001), which limits bond market access for small firms 
(Schramade, 2006). Thus, European firms that tap the bond market are typically large, 
mature and financially healthy firms. As a result, the most important motive in prior US 
research (distress relief) is less relevant in Europe and tenders are likely to have different 
drivers and consequences. Unlike the previous papers on US offers, we identify three 
distinct types of bond tender offers: (i) debt-reducing tenders, (ii) refinancing tender 
offers, and (iii) tenders triggered by a control change. The first type of tender offers is 
made by firms that aim to reduce their debt ratios, usually after a period of bad 
performance in which their market debt-to-equity ratio has risen. The second type of 
tender offer concerns firms that tender their bonds while at the same time issuing new 
securities. These firms seek to benefit from low interest rates, tax advantages or, in some 
cases, have other reasons to change the structure of their debt. Although other authors 
assume that a bond tender is a debt decreasing event (e.g., Kruse et al., 2005), the amount 
of debt actually increases in the median refinancing tender. The third type of offer 
concerns firms that announce a drastic change in their ownership structure accompanied 
by a tender offer for their bonds. These changes typically include equity IPOs and M&A 
activity, either friendly or hostile in nature. They trigger bond tender offers if covenants 
specify that management needs bondholders’ consent to execute the proposed changes. 
By distinguishing between these three types, we can present a more complete picture of 
the causes and consequences of bond tender offers. 
 
Our sample consists of 109 tender offers made by European firms in the period 1996 to 
2005. The bond tenders are widespread over Europe, although the UK accounts for one 
third of the offers. In addition, most tender offers are made after 1998. We analyze tender 
premiums and abnormal stock price returns as well as the determinants of these wealth 
effects. We find that the firm usually pays a tender premium over the bond’s market price 
to induce bondholders to tender. In our sample, the average tender premium is 3.9%. We 
explain the size of the tender premium by several variables and find significant effects for 
the presence of consent solicitations, takeover activity and the bond’s remaining maturity. 
Because covenants often require the firm to seek consent from bondholders, 27% of the 
cases involve consent solicitation. Our regression results show that this sub-sample has a 
3%-point higher premium. In case the firm is a takeover target, the bondholder receives a 
2.8%-point lower premium, other things equal. Finally, bondholders receive higher 
premiums when remaining maturity is higher. Unlike tender premiums, stock price 
reactions to bond tender offers do not significantly differ from zero and have a high 
standard deviation. Interestingly, we find no relation between the bond premiums and the 
stock price reactions. Thus, in spite of the payment of tender premiums, tender offers do 
not make shareholders worse off. Rather, both types of financiers benefit from higher 
remaining maturities and to the same degree (both see their returns increase by 0.2% per 
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additional year). This finding implies that shareholders benefit from an early termination 
of inefficient financial conditions and that they compensate bondholders accordingly. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature 
and define hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. The results are presented in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
 
In this section we will sketch the theoretical background behind bond tenders, discuss 
alternatives and establish hypotheses regarding bondholder and shareholder wealth 
effects.   
 
5.2.1 Literature review on tender offers 
The existing literature investigates several methods that firms could employ to reduce or 
replace their bonds outstanding as an alternative to bond tender offers. First, companies 
could buy their bonds in the open market, which may save costs, since it does not require 
the assistance of an investment bank. However, open market repurchases are not very 
effective when large amounts are outstanding with many market participants. Moreover, 
if the firm wants to achieve consent from bondholders, an open market repurchase is not 
the way to do it. Consent can be obtained by either mailing a consent solicitation to all 
bondholders or by combining it with an exchange or tender offer (Kahan and Tuckman, 
1993). Second, firms can make an exchange offer, i.e. swap bonds for new bonds, 
convertibles or equity. Of these three types of exchange offers, a debt-for-equity 
exchange is the most drastic way to rebalance the capital structure, since the reduction in 
debt is accompanied by an increase in equity. It can be the only way out for a distressed, 
highly levered firm. Lie et al. (2001) find that exchange offers result in dilution of 
shareholder value and are associated with negative stock price reactions. These exchange 
offers are a means of relief for distressed highly levered firms, but for most firms they are 
not an attractive option. The third alternative to a bond tender offer is calling the bonds. 
A bond’s covenant may give the firm the possibility to call their bonds at a pre-specified 
price. Since Bowlin (1966), several papers have appeared that deal with optimal call 
policy (e.g., King and Mauer, 2000). However, these call provisions, if present at all, are 
only valid at pre-specified times. Moreover, there might be a non-refundability covenant, 
which implies that carrying out the call with funds from newly issued securities with 
lower interest rates is prohibited.  
 
Given the difficulties associated with the three alternative methods, bond tender offers 
may have an appeal to a larger group of firms. However, existing studies have mainly 
examined bond tender offers in specific industries or in the context of highly distressed 
firms. Wingler and Jud (1990) study shareholder wealth effects for 26 US utilities that 
make a tender offer. The average abnormal return is negative, where a significant effect is 
found in case a utility index is used to calculate the normal returns. The authors find that 
these offers enhance shareholder wealth if the firm is able to take advantage of tax-timing 
options. The investment prospects of the firm are found to have a positive effect on the 
 92
announcement return. Chatterjee et al. (1995) study a very specific sample of distressed 
high-yield debt buybacks and compare 16 bond tender offers with 30 exchange offers. 
The results show that tendering firms are less distressed than firms making an exchange 
offer. The authors find that tender offers result in positive stock and bond price reactions. 
Coercion appears to play an important role in the offers in distressed firms, a result that is 
specific to the sample chosen. Dhillon et al. (2001) provide a clinical analysis of 4 cases 
in which firms simultaneously make tender and call offers, i.e. STACs. Kruse et al. 
(2005) investigate a broader sample of 208 US tender offers and find that the most 
common motives are to reduce debt or interest expenses. Their event study yields non-
significant equity returns, except for those offers financed with asset sales. 
 
To our knowledge there is only one paper that examines the premiums paid to 
bondholders. Mann and Powers (2005) investigate and explain the premiums that US 
firms pay on 943 bond tender offers in the period 1997-2003. The total amount tendered 
in these offerings is US$ 155 billion and the average premium is 4.75%. The authors find 
that premiums increase when the firms solicit consent to change restrictive covenants, 
when risk-free yields are low and in the case of flat yield curves. In this paper we extend 
their findings and examine both the bondholder and shareholder wealth effect associated 
with bond tender offers in Europe during the years 1996-2005. In the next sections we 
develop our hypotheses. 
 
5.2.2 Tender premium hypotheses 
Tender premiums are paid to compensate bondholders for giving up their securities at a 
time they did not plan to. As far as we know, Mann and Powers (2005) is the only paper 
that analyzes tender premiums. One of the major factors they find to be affecting the size 
of the tender premium is the consent solicitation. When a firm intends to change its 
covenants, is taken over, or wants to go public, it often needs to seek consent from its 
bondholders. The firm then makes a consent solicitation, either separately or combined 
with a tender, to obtain the required consent (Kahan and Tuckman, 1993). This puts 
bondholders in a strong bargaining position and tender premiums are necessary to induce 
the bondholders to give their consent.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Tender premiums are higher when consent is solicited. 
 
Not all consent solicitations are the same. Unlike Mann and Powers (2005), we explicitly 
control for firms being taken over. In the case of a takeover, or any other control change, 
the tender cannot be seen separately from the change in ownership. The offer is then 
triggered by the need to get consent for the ownership change. Since a takeover of the 
firm strengthens the position of bondholders due to the coinsurance effect35 (Levy and 
Sarnat, 1970), bond prices will already be inflated in expectation of the takeover. Even 
though many bondholders will not be bondholders anymore after a successful tender, they 
still have an interest in giving consent, since they will loose their initial price increase if 
the takeover does not happen after all. Thus, the premium over the current market price 
will be lower. 
                                                 
35 Coinsurance refers to the increased value of bondholder claims because the cash flows of the 
combination are less risky than the cash flows of the individual firms. 
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Hypothesis 2: Compared to other consent solicitations, tender premiums will be lower in 
case the firm is taken over. 
 
Maturity is another factor that might be important in explaining tender premiums. With a 
longer remaining maturity of the bonds, waiting might become a very expensive option 
for the firm. Bondholders know this and will have a stronger bargaining position against 
the rest of the firm. In addition, bondholders will need to be compensated for giving up 
cash flows over a longer planned holding period. We therefore expect tender premiums to 
be higher when the remaining maturity is higher. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Tender premiums increase in the remaining time to maturity. 
 
 
5.2.3 Stock price reaction hypotheses 
High tender premiums are beneficial for bondholders, but they reduce the cash flows 
available to shareholders. Shareholders will react negatively to tender offers if they 
foresee a wealth transfer to bondholders in the form of high tender premiums. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Stockholder wealth effects to tender offers are more negative when tender 
premiums are high. 
 
Shareholders will also react negatively to tender offers if the payment of dividends is 
potentially reduced. In other words, shareholders may anticipate a wealth transfer to 
bondholders, because the offer reduces the firm’s ability to pay future dividends, which is 
most likely when dividends are high. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Stockholder wealth effects to tender offers are more negative when 
dividends are high. 
 
However, a bond refinancing might be a value-enhancing activity because, as Emery and 
Lewellen (1984) show, firm value can rise because of the tax deduction of the bond 
retirement premium. By buying back the bonds above par and issuing new bonds with the 
same future cash flows, they recognize their loss in the valuation side game and receive a 
commensurate tax reduction. Obviously, this tax advantage increases as the gap between 
the tender price and par value widens.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Stockholder wealth effects to tender offers increase in the tender price. 
 
However, it is not clear whether this tax advantage can actually be obtained in all 
European countries, since tax codes are generally silent or ambiguous36 on the matter. 
Still, even if there is a potential tax advantage, its effect might be offset by transaction 
costs, which are incurred in all tender offers. The effect is aggravated in the case of 
                                                 
36 For example, the Dutch tax code (in Note 156 to the 1969 corporate tax law) says that a debt should be 
valued at its present value if there is a significant gap with its book value. However, it is not specified what 
is considered significant. Moreover, it also says that one has to discount at the historical interest rate, i.e. 
the rate at the time of issuing.   
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refinancing offers, since the new issue involves additional transaction costs. Santos and 
Tsatsaronis (2003) find that Eurobond issuers pay on average 0.7% of the principal 
amount in fees. Moreover, fees are relatively high for small issues and the same may 
apply to transaction costs in general.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Stockholder wealth effects to tender offers increase in the offer size. 
 
Regardless of expectations of future interest rates, waiting for the bonds to mature might 
be costly due to the continuation of an inefficient capital structure. The longer the 
remaining maturity of the bonds, the more expensive waiting might become. Therefore, 
shareholders share an interest with bondholders (Hypothesis 3) in being more likely to 
appreciate the tender when the remaining maturity is high. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Stockholder wealth effects to tender offers are more positive when the 
remaining maturity of the bonds is high. 
 
Consent solicitations are generally made to make changes within the firm (covenants, 
ownership structure) to the benefit of shareholders. Therefore, tender offers with consents 
are most likely to be the ones that create value for shareholders. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Stockholder wealth effects to tender offers are more positive when there is 
a consent solicitation. 
 
 
5.3 Data 
 
From Bloomberg we downloaded the bond tender offers for all available European 
countries for the period January 1996 to October 2005. This resulted in a list of 1161 
bonds that were supposedly tendered by European entities. We then excluded all bonds 
by (semi-) governments (309 observations), by financials (416) and by non-European 
firms (20). For the remaining bonds, we searched announcements of the tender offer and 
other relevant information around the time of the offer, in LexisNexis, Factiva and 
Bloomberg. Upon closer inspection, 26 bonds appeared to concern a different kind of 
offer than a tender. And 74 of the offers proved not to concern bonds, but other securities 
like preferred shares, convertibles, or asset-backed securities. We removed all of these 
and double counts (16) to arrive at a sample of 300 tendered corporate bonds. Table 1 
gives an overview of the sample selection process. The 300 bonds were tendered in 109 
separate tender offers, by 96 firms (13 firms made 2 tender offers). On average, 2.75 
bonds were tendered per offer.  
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Table 1. Bond tenders sample selection 
 
Number of tendered bonds reported in Bloomberg 1161 
(Semi-) Government bonds 309 
Financials 416 
Non-European 20 
Double counts 16 
Securities other than straight bonds 74 
Other type of offer than tender 26 
Number of tendered corporate bonds 300 
    
Number of events (tenders made) 109 
Average number of bonds per tender 2.75 
Median number of bonds per tender 2.00 
Number of firms 96 
Average number of tenders per firm 1.15 
 
Bond tender offers made by European entities from January 1996 to October 2005. We exclude (semi-) government bonds and bonds 
issued by financial or non-European firms. Other bonds are excluded because they do not concern non-straight bonds, such as 
mortgage backed securities or convertibles, or because they are not bought back through a tender offer but by other methods. Offers 
for several bonds of the same firm on the same date are considered to be one single event. 
 
 
A close investigation of individual cases reveals that the European bond tender offers are 
a heterogeneous set. The offers differ over various dimensions, such as the extent to 
which they reduce debt, the way they are financed, and the reasons why they are 
executed. On the basis of these differences, we group the offers into three distinct 
categories: (i) tenders triggered by a change in ownership, (ii) refinancing tenders, and 
(iii) debt-reducing tenders. Category (i) consists of 27 offers (25%) that are strongly 
related to a change in ownership structure, such as an equity IPO, or the firm being taken 
over. Such changes typically require bondholder consent, which the firm can solve by 
making a successful tender offer. In these cases the firm does not seem intrinsically 
motivated to adjust the debt structure, but is triggered into doing so by a previous 
decision. Of the remaining offers, 38 are refinancing offers. These are financed from 
issuing new debt, typically bonds, but sometimes bank loans and in four cases 
convertibles. Finally, we find 44 purely debt-reducing offers. These are tenders unrelated 
to control change activity and without immediate external refinancing. Rather, they are 
aimed at reducing the debt burden of the firm and are financed from operating cash flows. 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the offers both over time (Panel A) and geographically 
(Panel B). As Panel A shows, the number of offers grows from only 1 in both 1996 and 
1997 to 7 and 9 in 1999 and 2000, reaching steady double digits for each of the years 
from 2001 onwards. The total amounts tendered are relatively small at first, but after 
2000 they amount to over € 10 billion per year. Average offer sizes follow a similar 
pattern, starting out modestly in the early years and reaching an average size of over € 
700 million in 2001 and later. In total, our 109 offers are for € 73.3 billion in bonds.  
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Table 2. Bond tenders sample distribution 
 
Panel A. Tenders and tender amounts per year 
Year   Debt-reducing tenders 
Refinancing 
tenders 
Ownership 
change tenders Total 
Average offer 
size 
1996 Amount 0 30 0 30 30 
 Number 0 1 0 1  
1997 Amount 0 0 72 72 72 
 Number 0 0 1 1  
1998 Amount 70 1,148 0 1,218 609 
 Number 1 1 0 2  
1999 Amount 100 0 1,589 1,689 241 
 Number 3 0 4 7  
2000 Amount 202 1,998 665 2,865 318 
 Number 2 3 4 9  
2001 Amount 5,973 2,920 3,043 11,935 702 
 Number 9 4 4 17  
2002 Amount 5,652 24 3,659 9,334 718 
 Number 5 2 6 13  
2003 Amount 9,324 5,651 0 14,975 1,152 
 Number 5 8 0 13  
2004 Amount 9,895 4,339 1,812 16,046 698 
 Number 10 9 4 23  
2005 Amount 6,011 4,985 4,094 15,090 656 
 Number 9 10 4 23  
Total Amount 37,227 21,094 14,933 73,254 672 
 Number 44 38 27 109  
 
Panel B. Tenders and tender amounts per country 
Country   Debt-reducing tenders 
Refinancing 
tenders 
Ownership 
change tenders Total 
Average offer 
size 
France Amount 5,560 3,375 330 9,265 1,029 
  Number 4 4 1 9   
Germany Amount 5,219 3,124 2,427 10,770 769 
  Number 6 5 3 14   
The  Amount 10,953 1,483 450 12,887 1,611 
 Netherlands Number 5 2 1 8   
Nordic  Amount 1,485 1,732 1,445 4,662 245 
 countries Number 8 7 4 19   
Switzerland Amount 122 1,720 387 2,229 371 
  Number 1 3 2 6   
UK Amount 12,542 3,824 6,676 23,042 678 
  Number 13 8 13 34   
Other  Amount 1,345 5,836 3,219 10,400 547 
 Countries Number 7 9 3 19   
Total Amount 37,227 21,094 14,933 73,254 672 
  Number 44 38 27 109   
 
Amounts are in € millions. Debt-reducing offers are those offers without simultaneous issue of new securities or a change in 
ownership. Refinancing tenders are those where the tenderer simultaneously made a new debt issue. Ownership change tenders are 
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those tenders where there was simultaneously an equity IPO or a takeover of the firm that originally issued the bonds. The Nordic 
countries are Denmark (2 offers), Finland (1), Norway (6) and Sweden (10). The other countries include Austria (2 bond tender 
offers), Czech Republic (1), Greece (2), Italy (2), Luxemburg (3), Poland (2), Portugal (2) and Spain (2). 
 
 
Debt-reducing tenders account for just over half of that amount, reflecting their larger 
average size (at € 846 million) versus both other types of tenders (at around € 550 
million). Still, all three types are much larger than the average of US$ 287 million that 
Kruse et al. (2005) find for the US. The geographical distribution of the numbers and 
sizes of offers are given in Panel B of Table 2. Offers by British firms account for almost 
a third of all bond tenders, both in value and in numbers. This reflects the importance of 
UK capital markets within Europe. At a distance follow The Netherlands (€ 12.9 billion 
in offer value), Germany (€ 10.8 billion) and France (€ 9.3 billion). The surprisingly large 
value of Dutch bonds tendered is reached in the course of only 8 deals by large firms with 
an average offer size of € 1.6 billion. French, German and UK deals are smaller, but still 
larger than those from the other countries included37. The Nordic countries (mainly 
Sweden) account for 19 relatively small deals. 
 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows offer characteristics (Panel A) and firm characteristics for the three types 
of offers. The average size of the debt-reducing offers is € 846 million, but its median is 
much lower at € 320 million. The offers generally concern a large part of the firm’s debt. 
Offer sizes as a percentage of total debt are largest for ownership change tenders (mean 
and median around 60%). A plausible explanation is that this type of offer more often 
requires consent. For debt-reducing tenders, the mean (22%) is again much higher than 
the median (11%). Refinancing offers concern on average 30% of total debt (median 
21%). The offers affect firms’ debt loads to varying degrees. For debt-reducing tenders, 
the amount of debt generally decreases substantially. In contrast, the amount of debt 
increases on average for refinancing offers, which indicates that the size of the new issue 
is often larger than the amount tendered. The remaining maturity of bonds tendered is 
lowest for refinancing offers. For debt-reducing and refinancing offers, average tender 
prices are hardly above par, which is due to some bonds that trade well below par due to 
reduced ability to pay. In contrast, control change offers are generally well above par, 
which might reflect both the low level of interest rates and the absence of a need for 
restructuring. As expected, consent solicitations are much more prevalent for control 
change offers (in 52% of offers) than for the other types (around 20%). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 These other countries (number of offers per country in parentheses) are Austria (2), Czech Republic (1), Greece (2), Italy (2), 
Luxemburg (3), Poland (2), Portugal (2) and Spain (2). In three cases, we cannot specify the country because the parent is from a 
different country than the subsidiary. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Offer characteristics 
    
Debt-
reducing Refinancing 
Ownership 
change 
Offer size Mean 846 542 553 
 Median 320 403 382 
  Number of observations 44 39 27 
Offer size/debt Mean 22.2% 30.4% 55.7% 
 Median 11.1% 20.8% 61.1% 
 Number of observations 26 26 14 
At offer change in debt Mean -22.2% 2.1%  NA 
 Median -11.1% 0.4%  NA 
  Number of observations 26 28  NA 
At offer change in debt- Mean -13.2% -12.2%  NA 
to-total assets Median -4.5% 0.2%  NA 
  Number of observations 26 28  NA 
At offer change in debt- Mean -31.0% -14.3%  NA 
to-market value Median -9.3% 0.2%  NA 
  Number of observations 26 24  NA 
Remaining maturity of Mean 5.6 4.2 6.5 
the bonds tendered Median 4.0 3.0 7.1 
 Number of observations 38 29 24 
Tender price Mean 100.8 100.4 108.5 
 Median 106.5 103.5 108.9 
  Number of observations 34 28 23 
Tender premium Mean 5.4% 3.2% 2.6% 
 Median 1.5% 0.7% 4.0% 
  Number of observations 31 27 19 
Percentage with consent Mean 20.5% 18.4% 51.9% 
solicitation Number of observations 44 38 27 
Target Mean 20% 8% 74% 
 Number of observations 44 38 27 
Motives mentioned     
- Lengthen maturity Mean 0% 32% 0% 
- Reduce interest burden Mean 23% 21% 0% 
- Centralize debt Mean 9% 0% 0% 
- Restructuring program Mean 5% 5% 7% 
- Other motives Mean 9% 21% 15% 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B. Firm characteristics 
    Debt-reducing Refinancing Ownership change 
Market value Mean 23039 4627 6694 
 Median 7811 2056 1176 
 Number of observations 24 25 5 
Total assets Mean 44818 8934 1685 
 Median 12993 5665 944 
  Number of observations 26 26 14 
Sales Mean 20884 8601 1523 
 Median 11734 3979 689 
 Number of observations 26 26 14 
Debt-to-assets Mean 32.6% 41.1% 68.0% 
 Median 29.1% 42.4% 54.8% 
  Number of observations 26 26 14 
Short term debt- Mean 17.7% 19.3% 10.9% 
to-total debt Median 15.9% 17.4% 5.7% 
  Number of observations 26 26 14 
Current ratio Mean 1.34 1.25 1.07 
 Median 1.21 1.12 0.89 
 Number of observations 25 30 14 
Return on assets Mean -0.6% 1.6% 1.3% 
 Median 3.2% 2.4% 3.4% 
  Number of observations 26 26 10 
Market-to-book Mean 1.77 2.11 11.46 
 Median 1.30 1.36 1.60 
 Number of observations 24 25 5 
Dividend payout Mean 24.4% 20.7% 11.0% 
 Median 24.6% 4.3% 0.0% 
  Number of observations 19 21 13 
 
Panel C. CARs 
Window (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-10,-3) (+3,+10) (-30,+30) 
 Mean -0.61% -0.37% -0.64% -0.45% -0.50% 2.52% 
 Median -0.39% -0.27% -0.17% -0.09% -0.51% -1.08% 
 Maximum 13.57% 10.38% 13.21% 16.44% 10.36% 97.99% 
 Minimum -15.58% -10.34% -16.23% -15.64% -17.88% -47.92% 
 Std. Dev. 3.67% 3.31% 4.94% 4.97% 4.79% 24.08% 
 Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 
 
Amounts are in € millions. Debt-reducing offers are those offers without simultaneous issue of new securities or a change in 
ownership. Refinancing tenders are those where the tenderer simultaneously made a new debt issue. Ownership change tenders are 
those tenders where there was simultaneously an equity IPO or a takeover of the firm that originally issued the bonds. Offer size is 
the total amount of bonds tendered for in the event. The at offer change in debt equals (size of the new issue replacing the tendered 
bonds -/- offer)/beginning of year debt. Remaining maturity of the bonds tendered is the weighted-average time until maturity of the 
bonds tendered at the time of the offering. Tender price is the weighted average of the prices paid for the tendered bonds and is 
expressed as a percentage of the par value. Tender premium is the tender price minus market price as a percentage of the market 
price of the bond one day before the announcement of the tender offer. Percentage with consent solicitation is the percentage of 
offers in which a consent solicitation is part of the offer. Motives mentioned are motives for the offers retrieved from press releases 
and news messages. Centralize debt means that the firm wants to reduce the number of names under which it has bonds outstanding 
(for example due to name changes and past M&A activity). Other motives that were found less than four times include: to improve 
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the firm’s rating, increase financial flexibility, to facilitate a hostile bid, current market conditions, not wanting to have junk bonds 
outstanding, asset sales, excess cash and to avoid ceding control to bondholders. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are 
measured by estimating the market model during an estimation period beginning 250 trading days before and ending 5 trading days 
before the announcement of the bond tender offer.  
 
 
Tender premiums are calculated by taking the difference between the tender price and the 
bond’s price on the day before the announcement, as a percentage of the latter. Tender 
premiums amount to 3.9% on average. Three firms have very high tender premiums of 
over 20%. All three concern offers on bonds that trade at less than half of par value. 
However, the fact that we have only three such observations probably explains why we 
find lower tender premiums than Mann and Powers (2005), who report a 4.8% average 
tender premium. For some firms we report negative tender premiums, which might be 
due to unreliable bond prices (infrequent trading) or tender price setting well beyond the 
announcement date of the tender. Due to the three outliers, means are less telling than 
medians. Median tender premiums are highest for control change tenders, which might be 
due to the higher proportion of consent solicitations in that group. We explore this further 
in the next sub-section. 
 
For half of the tender offers we are able to find motives explicitly mentioned by the firm 
in press releases or news messages. These motives are presented in the bottom lines of 
Panel A of Table 3. The most frequently mentioned motives are to lengthen maturity (12 
times) and to reduce the interest burden (18 times). Lengthening maturity is the most 
important motive for refinancing tenders, but is not found for the other two types. 
Reducing the interest burden is frequently found both in debt-reducing offers and in 
refinancing offers. In four cases, the firm aims to centralize its debt, i.e. to have bonds 
outstanding under a reduced number of names. For example, Vodafone buys the bonds it 
has still outstanding under the Mannesmann name. Six times it is said that the tender is 
part of a restructuring program. Other motives that are found less than four times are: to 
improve the firm’s rating, increase financial flexibility, making a hostile bid, current 
market conditions, not wanting to have junk bonds outstanding, asset sales, excess cash, 
and avoid ceding control to bondholders. As expected, the stated motives in debt-
reducing tenders are often consistent with active rebalancing as in Leary and Roberts 
(2005). For example, Independent News & Media states that “the tender offer is being 
made as part of the issuer's commitment to active management of its balance sheet and to 
assist it in meeting its objective to reduce current debt liabilities and net interest expense” 
(press release, 18 November 2004). Vivendi claims that its tender “demonstrates Vivendi 
Universal's continued commitment toward the efficient use of funding sources and active 
debt management. It is a further step in Vivendi Universal's financial restructuring that 
substantially lowers the future cost of its debt“ (Business Wire, 25 May 2004).  
 
For several reasons, the above mentioned motives have become increasingly relevant 
over the past decade. First of all, the amount of European bonds outstanding is larger than 
ever before. Especially since the introduction of the Euro, there has been an impressive 
growth in the amount of bonds outstanding: the amount of debt securities outstanding by 
European non-financial corporations almost doubled from € 319 billion in December 
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1999 to € 612 billion in December 2005.38 Second, there are explanations that seem a 
priori specific to the three types of tender offers. Low interest rates have made 
refinancing tenders especially appealing. Increased M&A activity has contributed to the 
number of control change tenders. Perhaps most importantly, the economic recession has 
resulted in lower equity market valuations and hence higher debt ratios, raising firms’ 
incentives to rebalance their balance sheets by means of a debt-reducing tender offer. It is 
thus hardly surprising that this type of offer accounts for half of the total amount 
tendered. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 provides firm characteristics for the sample. Firms engaging in debt-
reducing offers are much larger than both other types of tenderers, in terms of market 
value, sales, and total assets. Debt-reducing tenderers have lower book value debt ratios 
than refinancing tenderers. However, market value debt ratios are much closer to each 
other, due to the slightly lower market-to-book ratios for debt-reducing firms. Still, mean 
and median market-to-book ratios are well over 1 for all types of firms, indicating that 
these are not typically distressed firms. Again, this confirms the impression that active 
balance sheet management, rather than distress relief is the main reason for European 
bond tenders. Profitability is relatively low for the firms in our sample, with Return on 
Assets (ROA, defined as EBIT/Total Assets) in the low single digits. Debt-reducing 
tenderers pay slightly higher dividends than refinancing tenderers and have more cash on 
hand (10.7% of total assets versus 10.0% for debt reducing tenderers), indicating that 
they have both the incentives and the means to reduce debt. However, these differences 
are not significant.  
 
To assess the shareholder wealth effects of bond tender offers, we conduct an event study 
on the announcement of debt-reducing and refinancing tender offers. The estimation 
period runs from 250 to 50 days before the announcement. Ownership change offers are 
excluded because of contamination by the concurrent ownership change. Refinancing 
tenders where the straight bonds were replaced with convertibles are also excluded 
because of their equity issue component. This leaves us with 30 debt-reducing offers and 
26 refinancing offers. Panel C of Table 3 shows event study results per window for the 
total of both types of offers. Average cumulative abnormal returns over the (-1,+1) are 
negative but not significant, at -0.61%. This result mirrors previous research (e.g. Eckbo, 
1986) that finds insignificant stock price reactions to bond issues. The CARs we find for 
larger windows are even less different from zero, although they turn positive for the (-
30,+30) window. There is no clear pattern in the daily returns either (not reported in 
tables). We also check whether debt-reducing tenders and refinancing tenders differ in 
their abnormal returns. If debt-reducing offers were indeed conducted to avoid distress 
relief, higher abnormal returns as in Chatterjee et al. (1995) would be expected. For the (-
1,+1) window we find that mean abnormal returns are slightly (and not significantly) 
lower for debt-reducing offers (-0.68%) than for refinancing offers (-0.51%). For 
medians, it is the other way around: +0.20% for debt-reducing offers and -0.97% for 
refinancing offers, but the difference is not significant. These results again suggest that 
even the debt-reducing offers are seldom conducted to avoid distress.  
 
                                                 
38 Euro Area Securities Issues Statistics, ECB (December 2000, December 2005). 
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5.4.2 Determinants of tender premiums 
Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions on tender premiums. Models 1 and 2 show 
results for the 72 offers for which we have all offer information. Model 1 includes the log 
of offer size, remaining maturity, and dummies for consent solicitation and the firm being 
a takeover target. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that tender premiums are 
significantly higher (at 1% significance level) in case of consent solicitations. Tenders 
with consent solicitation have a 3%-points higher tender premium than tenders without 
consent solicitation39. We also find that firms that are taken over have a 2.8%-points 
lower tender premium, which is in line with Hypothesis 2. This coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level.  
 
 
Table 4. OLS on tender premiums 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Consent solicitation 0.0303*** 0.0275*** 0.0361*** 0.0344** 
  (3.07) (2.82) (2.80) (2.61) 
Target -0.0282*** -0.0311*** -0.0404** -0.0404*** 
  (-2.73) (-2.95) (-2.64) (-2.61) 
Remaining maturity 0.0023** 0.0022** 0.0025** 0.0024* 
  (2.36) (2.36) (1.93) (1.76) 
Log Offer size -0.0043 -0.0040 -0.0029 0.0012 
  (0.91) (0.83) (0.44) (0.17) 
UK   0.0199* 0.0154 0.0175 
    (1.87) (1.00) (1.10) 
France   -0.0024 0.0033 0.0069 
    (-0.16) (0.17) (0.33) 
Germany   -0.0022 0.0041 0.0008 
    (-0.17) (0.25) (0.04) 
Netherlands   0.0252 0.0270 0.0306 
    (1.39) (1.34) (1.48) 
Debt ratio       -0.0219 
        (-0.66) 
Return on assets       0.0004 
        (0.54) 
Constant 0.0339 0.0251 -0.0264 -0.0074 
  (1.15) (0.83) (-0.69) (-0.16) 
R-squared 0.19 0.27 0.30 0.32 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.11 
N 72 72 44 44 
 
Dependent variable is the tender premium as a percentage of the market price of the bond. Consent solicitation is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the offer includes a consent solicitation, 0 otherwise. Target is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is taken over. 
Remaining maturity is the number of years until final maturity at the time of the tender offer. Log offer size is the natural logarithm 
of the tender amount in €. Debt ratio and Return on assets are for the book year preceding the tender offer. ***=significant at the 
1% level of significance. **=significant at the 5% level of significance. *=significant at the 10% level of significance. 
                                                 
39 Since takeovers may require consent, this raises the question to what extent the consent dummy and the 
target dummy are related. In fact, in 14 cases both dummies score 1, and in 52 cases both score 0. A score 
of 1 for the consent dummy and 0 for the target dummy is found 9 times, while the reverse (consent=0 and 
target=1) is also found 9 times. 
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The remaining maturity of the bond has a significantly (at 5% level) positive impact on 
tender premiums, which corroborates Hypothesis 3. For every extra year of remaining 
maturity, the tender premium is 0.2% points higher. We find no significant effect of offer 
size on the tender premium. 
 
In Model 2 we add country dummies to Model 1. The country dummies in Model 2 reveal 
that UK firms pay higher tender premiums than other firms. In Model 4 we add the debt 
ratio and return on assets. For these variables we have only 44 instead of 72 observations. 
We therefore include Model 3, which replicates Model 2 with the 44 observations for 
which we have the debt ratio and return on assets. The effect for UK firms disappears in 
Model 3. While all other coefficients keep the same levels of significance, the debt ratio 
and return on assets do not yield significant effects. To their own surprise, Mann and 
Powers (2005) find a significantly negative relation between tender premiums and return 
on assets. They do not offer an explanation for this result. 
 
We also check whether debt-reducing or refinancing offers differ in the tender premiums 
they command (not in Table 4), but this proves not to be the case. The refinancing 
dummy takes a coefficient of -0.005 and has a p-value of 0.64, while R2 is unaffected and 
adjusted R2 falls. Similar insignificant results are found for issue motives and the change 
in debt caused by the tender.  
 
5.4.3 Determinants of abnormal announcement returns 
Table 5 shows the results of OLS regressions on abnormal stock returns. The number of 
observations is limited since we cannot include control change tenders because of 
contamination issues. Moreover, for quite some firms we either do not have stock data or 
tender premiums, which are essential in ascertaining whether wealth transfers occur. 
Model 1 includes tender premiums only, while we add other explanatory variables in 
Models 2 and 3. The most important result is that tender premiums do not negatively 
affect abnormal returns40. We therefore find no support for Hypothesis 4. Thus, tender 
premiums do not seem to be at the expense of shareholders. 
 
Emery and Lewellen (1984) argue that a bond refinancing might be value enhancing 
because of the tax deductibility of the difference between tender price and par. However, 
we do not find a positive relation between the tender price (measured as a percentage of 
the par value of the bond) and abnormal returns. Our results stand in contrast to 
Hypothesis 6 and earlier findings by Wingler and Jud (1990) for a 1980s sample of tender 
offers by US utilities. This is not really surprising given the ambiguity of European tax 
code on this matter. There is no effect from offer size either (Hypothesis 7). We do find a 
significantly positive relation between remaining maturity and abnormal returns in all 
models. This is consistent with Hypothesis 8. For every extra year of remaining maturity, 
the abnormal return is 0.2% points higher. The longer the firm has to wait for the bonds 
                                                 
40 From a shareholder’s perspective, tender premiums are probably most relevant in relation to shareholder 
cash flows, rather than in relation to the tender offer (which is most relevant to bondholders). We therefore 
also calculate tender premiums as a percentage of equity value, instead of as a percentage of tender offer 
size. However, the tender premium as a percentage of equity value also fails to be a significant variable in 
regressions on CARs. 
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to mature, and for the inefficient current situation to endure, the more beneficial it 
appears for shareholders to tender. Moreover, since bondholder premiums also increase 
by 0.2%- points for each additional year, the benefits of fixing the inefficient situation are 
shared evenly over both types of financiers. This is consistent with valuable balance sheet 
management.  
 
 
Table 5. OLS on abnormal returns 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Tender premium 0.1497 0.1100 0.0330       
  (0.94) (0.54) (0.16)       
Tender price   -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 
    (-1.16) (-1.27) (-1.49) (-1.42) (-1.32) 
Log Offer size   -0.0024 -0.0013       
    (-0.34) (-0.17)       
Remaining    0.0015* 0.0022* 0.0021* 0.0025** 0.0024** 
maturity   (1.88) (1.95) (2.11) (2.37) (2.00) 
Consent    -0.0045 -0.0044       
solicitation   (-0.44) (-0.44)       
Debt ratio     0.0022       
      (0.09)       
Return on assets     -0.0018** -0.0019** -0.0037** -0.0035** 
      (-2.36) (-2.54) (-2.40) (-2.19) 
Dividends           -0.0001 
            (-0.37) 
Constant -0.1529 0.0940 0.0914 0.0855 0.0916 0.0891 
  (-0.15) (1.36) (1.38) (1.41) (1.40) (1.36) 
R-squared 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.30 
Adjusted R-squared -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.21 0.18 
N 39 38 36 36 29 29 
 
Dependent variable is the abnormal announcement return over the (-1,+1) window. Tender premium is tender price minus market 
price as a percentage of the market price of the bond one day before the announcement of the bond tender offer. Tender price is the 
price paid relative to par value. Consent solicitation is a dummy that equals 1 if the offer includes a consent solicitation, 0 
otherwise. Target is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is taken over. Remaining maturity is the number of years until final maturity. 
Log offer size is the natural logarithm of the tender amount in €. Debt ratio, Return on assets, and Dividends are for the book year 
preceding the tender offer. ***=significant at the 1% level of significance. **=significant at the 5% level of significance. 
*=significant at the 10% level of significance. 
 
 
Consent solicitations do not affect abnormal returns, so our data does not support 
Hypothesis 9. Nor do we find a relation between abnormal returns and debt levels. The 
other proxy for the firm’s financial health, profitability, does turn out to be significantly 
negative. Thus, bond tenders are good news for less profitable firms. A potential 
explanation is that a bond tender shows that the firm is actually in better financial health 
than hitherto perceived by the market. It that case, the profitability is likely to be driven 
mainly by firms with low or even negative profitability. To test this, we split the sample 
by median ROA and run separate regressions (not reported in tables). Not surprisingly, 
these regressions on only 18 observations result in losses of statistical significance. Still, 
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the higher (i.e., more negative) t-values for the sub-sample with low profitability do 
suggest that bond tenders are good news for troubled firms. 
 
In Model 4 we only include those variables that had t-values greater than 1 in the 
previous models. In Model 5 we run the variables from Model 4 for the fewer 
observations for which we have dividend data. Finally, we add dividends in Model 6. 
Remaining maturity and profitability keep their significance, but we do not find a relation 
between abnormal stock returns and dividends (Hypothesis 5). In unreported regressions 
we also check for changes in debt, offer motives, investor protection, and the type of 
offer, but their coefficients are not significant. Nor do we find a significant coefficient for 
firm size, which stands in contrast to Kruse et al. (2005), who find a negative relation 
between firm size and announcement returns, which they cannot explain. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
This paper examines recent bond tender activity by European firms, amounting to over € 
70 billion in 10 years. In contrast to earlier US evidence, European tenders seem part of 
active balance sheet management and are rarely aimed at distress relief. We identify three 
distinct types of bond tender offers: (i) refinancing tender offers (ii) debt-reducing 
tenders, and (iii) tenders triggered by a control change. The most frequent motives for a 
bond tender offer are: reducing the firm’s interest burden, lengthening maturity, and 
takeover activity. 
 
Bondholders benefit from the tender offer as firms pay substantial premiums on the 
tendered bonds. The average tender price is 3.9% over the market price one day before 
the announcement of the tender offer. Premiums are even higher when a consent 
solicitation is made and for longer remaining maturities. They are lower when the firm is 
taken over. Tender premiums are not affected by offer size, profitability, debt ratio levels 
or country of the firm.  
 
Stock price reactions to bond tender offers are not significantly different from zero, 
which mirrors previous findings on bond issues (e.g. Eckbo, 1986). In spite of the 
substantial size of tender premiums, which go at the expense of shareholders, tender 
premiums do not negatively affect abnormal stock returns. Thus, on a net basis the 
premiums paid to bondholders seem to be offset by the benefits to shareholders. We find 
that less profitable firms have higher abnormal announcement returns. Moreover, 
abnormal announcement returns increase in the bond’s remaining maturity. 
  
Since bondholders obtain a premium on tender offers without adversely affecting share 
prices, bond tender offers seem to be beneficial for the firm. Apparently, the firm creates 
value by reducing its amount of bonds outstanding. This especially applies to long 
maturity bonds. For each additional year of remaining maturity, both bondholders and 
shareholders enjoy 0.2%-point higher returns. Shareholders benefit from an early end to 
an inefficient situation and they share these benefits with bondholders by paying a higher 
premium. Bond tender offers are not a zero-sum-game.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
 
 
Bond finance by corporations is the thread of this thesis. We follow the lifecycle of bond 
issuing firms. The lifecycle usually starts when the firm is ready to partly shed its bank 
ties and large enough to warrant the issue costs (fees paid to underwriters). As the firm 
starts issuing more often, its reputation strengthens and its dependence on banks further 
diminishes, unless banks are also shareholders in the firm. Moreover, when the firm 
issues even more frequently, it learns to spot opportunities in the market and obtains 
better pricing in the form of lower yields. At some stage however, the market may 
consider the firm to be over-issuing and will adapt pricing to reflect increased risk. 
Finally, firm management might think for some reason that the firm’s mix of outstanding 
bonds is suboptimal and may therefore engage in buying back its bonds. Still, as long as 
there are bonds outstanding, conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders 
lie at bay. In Chapter 1 we start by briefly discussing previous research on the role of 
bonds in financing corporations, as well as identifying some research gaps, such as the 
disciplining role of bonds and the relation between bond issue frequency and yield 
spreads. Chapters 2 through 5 present the four research projects. 
 
Chapter 2 examines bond market entry (bond IPOs) to ascertain whether bonds discipline 
managers. Previous research on bond IPOs has focused on underpricing (e.g., Cai et al., 
2005, Datta et al., 1997, Helwege and Kleiman, 1998) and the role of banks (Datta et al., 
2000), exclusively for US firms. However, bond market entry provides an excellent 
setting for studying the impact of public debt on agency costs, since the firm introduces a 
new and large class of debtholders into its capital structure. Furthermore, this impact may 
differ across countries due to institutional variation. Thus, for a sample of 225 firms from 
37 countries, we relate stock price reactions to agency cost proxies, to test whether bonds 
discipline management. We find evidence both of increased discipline and of discipline 
avoidance, depending on the firm’s characteristics. That is, bond market entry is received 
unfavorably when the debt issue is motivated by keeping a lock on control (discipline 
avoidance). In contrast, when pre-IPO managerial discretion is high (high free cash flow 
and low dividends), discipline is expected to increase due to bond market entry, and stock 
price reactions are more positive. Moreover, the strength of these relations is found to be 
affected by worldwide differences in shareholder protection. The impact of free cash flow 
is larger when investor protection is stronger, whereas dividends and control locks play a 
more important role in countries with weaker shareholder protection. Furthermore, firms 
in countries with weaker shareholder protection stay longer in the bank phase and are 
thus typically much larger when (and if) they enter the bond market than US firms.  
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In Chapter 3, we focus on firms that have already entered the bond market, but have to 
adapt to a changing environment in terms of bond market access and bank ties. Yasuda 
(2005) documents underwriting fee discounts for bond issuers with bank ties. In contrast, 
we consider the possibility of the opposite to happen: higher fees for firms with bank ties 
if banks are weak. Our sample consists of bonds issued by Japanese corporations in the 
years 1994-2002, a period of deregulation beneficial to bond markets and detrimental to 
banks. We find a trend of falling fees for firms that do not belong to keiretsu, as these 
firms benefited from increased underwriter competition. In contrast, for firms with equity 
links to bank-led (financial) keiretsu, fees are found to have been rising over time, in 
parallel movement to the weakening of the core banks. In addition, we find that the 
higher fees for keiretsu firms were not offset by lower yields. Thus, the problems of the 
banks spilled over to the firms in their corporate group, which was priced in higher fees. 
Apparently, even firms that are at a stage in their lifecycle where they issue regularly can 
face restraints from bank ties. It remains to be seen however, if this could also happen in 
the absence of equity links.  
 
Chapter 4 asks whether firms obtain better pricing when they reach a stage where they 
issue bonds more often. Anecdotal evidence from practitioners suggests this is the case, 
but academically this is unexplored territory. We hypothesize that firms could reap 
benefits from reputation acquisition (being known in the market) and from increased 
market literacy (knowing the market well). To test this, we first document bond issue 
frequency for windows from one week to six years for a sample of US issuers. We then 
investigate whether firms with higher issue frequencies also obtain lower yield spreads 
than infrequent issuers. We find that frequent issuers do indeed get economically 
significant discounts ranging from 20 to 117 basis points. Furthermore, we find that it is 
important to distinguish between regular (less than US$ 15 billion in sales) and very large 
firms, since issue frequency reflects different potential gains. For large firms, issue 
frequency in windows up to one year matter most, which is consistent with benefits 
through increasing market literacy. That is, as firms issue more often, they benefit from 
being better informed about market participants and market opportunities. Since this kind 
of knowledge is soon obsolete if not maintained, its benefits are also transitory. For 
regular firms that are smaller and less advanced in the bond issuing firm lifecycle, much 
longer frequency windows matter, which indicates that gaining a reputation is more 
relevant here than market literacy. For these firms, it is beneficial to be known as a recent 
issuer so as to avoid paying significant premiums. However, firms that issue too often 
given their size are punished with higher premiums. These results suggest that there is a 
firm-specific optimal issue frequency that depends on the stage of the bond issuing firm 
lifecycle. 
 
Chapter 5 considers stockholder-bondholder conflict at the stage where firms want to 
reduce or even terminate the amount of bonds they have outstanding. The few previous 
studies on bond tender offers are limited in their scope in the sense that they investigate 
either tender premiums (gains to bondholders) or stock price reactions, but not both. 
Moreover, they only consider US tenders, which are largely done by distressed firms. 
Alternatively, we study European tender offers and investigate both bond premiums and 
stock price reactions. Our sample consists of the € 73 billion in bond tender offers by 
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European firms over the period 1996 to 2005. In contrast to the US, European tenders are 
made by larger, more mature firms and the offers seem aimed at active balance sheet 
management rather than distress relief. Bondholders receive on average a 3.9% premium 
over the bond’s market price. Still, we find no evidence of wealth transfers from 
stockholders, since the average shareholder wealth effect does not differ significantly 
from zero and is not affected by tender premiums. Moreover, wealth effects for both 
bondholders and shareholders increase in the remaining time to maturity. Tendering the 
bonds, rather than waiting for them to mature, appears to be a valuable option for both 
types of financiers of the firm.  
 
A recurring theme in this thesis concerns the relations between the various stakeholders 
in the firm. These relations typically change during the bond issuing firm lifecycle, since 
both the presence of bonds and changes in amounts of bonds affect relations between 
bondholders, shareholders, banks and managers (Chapters 2 and 5). Conversely, these 
relations affect the direct costs of bond finance, their yields and fees, as shown in 
Chapters 3 and 4. As expected, both yields and fees are found to increase in risk. We 
empirically identify additional sources of risk priced in bond issues: dependence on weak 
banks and suboptimal amounts of recent issues (i.e., none or too many). Moreover, 
Chapter 3 shows that the determinants of yield spreads are largely the same as the 
determinants of fees. This suggests that issue frequency might also affect fees. However, 
we leave that for future research. 
 
Bond market development is also a factor in the interplay between bonds and intra-firm 
relations. Chapter 2 shows that bond market access is limited in most countries outside 
the US. That is, firms that could have entered the bond market in the US often do not do 
so outside the US; and the firms that do enter are larger and more mature. Thus, bank 
finance plays an even more important role than in the US and also continues to play a 
more important role during a longer part of the lifecycle of a bond issuer. In addition, the 
nature of agency problems is often different outside the US, with usually less investor 
protection, and a different impact of disciplining mechanisms. This is reflected by the 
finding in Chapter 3 that banks can both mitigate monitoring problems for bondholders 
and aggravate them, especially in case banks have equity stakes in the firm, which is 
common in Japan, Germany and several other countries. 
 
Event study methodology is used in Chapters 2 and 5 to measure stockholder wealth 
effects from changes in the amount of bonds outstanding. In both cases, the average stock 
price reaction is close to zero, but with a large variation due to firm and bond 
characteristics. In both chapters, we find that stock price reactions are more favorable 
when the new situation is closer to optimal contracting. Hence, the mere fact of changing 
the amount of bonds matters less than the conditions in which this happens. Moreover, as 
Chapter 4 shows, some firms issue very often and account for a large amount of bonds 
while their individual bonds have little weight in firm value. Thus, doing an event study 
on large amounts of bond issues seems likely to yield insignificant results, unless it 
mainly concerns bond issuers in the early stage of the bond issuing firm lifecycle. This 
insignificant impact is in fact what early studies find (Eckbo, 1986; Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986). Event studies on bond issues seem only interesting in those cases (such as 
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bond market entry, Chapter 2) where the impact of a single bond issue is likely to be big. 
Other such cases include emerging market bonds (where the impact of agency costs is 
likely to be larger, see Chapter 2) and the very large so-called ‘milestone’ bonds. For 
example, the US$ 2 billion bond by Hutchinson Whampoa was hailed as being “the 
largest ever by a non-US issuer in any currency”, and providing “an overwhelming vote 
of confidence in Hong Kong’s future under mainland China”41. It is not clear, however, 
how bonds become milestone bonds, and what their consequences are. 
 
More questions remain. The results in Chapter 4 suggest that there is a firm-specific 
optimal amount of issues, which should be related to firm risk. That is, issuing more will 
result in better pricing through reputation acquisition and market literacy. But at some 
point, this advantage disappears as the firm issues too much given its ability to pay. Thus, 
the firm has an optimal issue amount that increases in the amount and safety of its cash 
flows. However, we do not have a benchmark for a ‘normal’ issue amount, which 
probably not only depends on the firm but also on market conditions.  
 
The impact of market conditions also requires further research. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that firms sometimes benefit from favorable market conditions. Conversely, 
issues are sometimes pulled as market sentiment turns against them. More specifically, 
firms can be criticized for targeting a specific part of the yield curve too heavily42. In 
addition, market conditions may be particularly harsh or favorable for specific industries. 
In emerging markets, corporate bonds sometimes replace sovereigns as benchmarks43, 
which raises at least two more questions. First, what impact does such a benchmark role 
have on the firm itself? Second, will this happen in developed countries as well? Given 
the decline in sovereign borrowing (e.g., BIS, 2001), this is not unlikely. In fact, it has 
been suggested that the market might begin using the yield curves created by the biggest 
corporate borrowers as benchmarks44. Liquidity is not always an advantage, however. A 
Euroweek article45 reports that the automobile and telecom industries have been pointed 
out as cyclical sectors with an abundance of highly liquid bonds, which make them 
investor favorites for shorting the corporate bond market as a whole. This is likely to 
affect the cost of finance of firms within that industry and the choices they have regarding 
their sources of finance. It might also affect their bond issuing strategies. 
 
Both Chapters 4 and 5 point to the existence of distinct bond issuing strategies, which 
reflect both firms’ views on the market and the way they prefer to be seen by the market. 
For example, in Chapter 5 we find that some firms bought back their own bonds because 
they did not want to have junk outstanding or preferred not to have bonds in subsidiaries’ 
names. Visibility seems key, but more issues need not always be better. Especially among 
firms that are very advanced in the bond issuing lifecycle, issuing strategies seem to 
differ markedly. Consider the contrast between GM’s strategy of issuing many relatively 
                                                 
41 “An amazing debut by Hutchison”, Corporate Finance, December 1997, Issue 157, p.42 
42 “Corporates suffer equity woes but bond pipeline builds”, Euroweek, 27 September 2002. 
43 “Petrobras redefines the yield curve”, Corporate Finance, December 1996, Issue 145, p.68; “Reliance 
creates a yield curve”, Corporate Finance, September 1996, Issue 142, p.35. 
44 “Long-dated bonds: not dead yet”, The Financial Times, 2 April 2005. 
45 “Big three adapt to brave new world”, Euroweek, 20 September 2002. 
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small bonds (“tailoring bond issuance to hit pockets of investor demand as they arise”) 
and Ford’s GloBLS programme (Global Landmark Benchmark Securities) for issuing 
few but very large and liquid bonds that are meant to be benchmarks46. It is hard to say a 
priori which one is better. The results from Chapter 4 suggest that Ford may trade-off 
increased liquidity and reputation against a reduction in benefits from smartly playing the 
market with smaller well-placed issues. Thus, the question remains: is big better? Or is 
small beautiful? 
                                                 
46 “Big three adapt to brave new world”, Euroweek, 20 September 2002. 

 
 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
 
De hoeveelheid uitstaande bedrijfsobligaties is het afgelopen decennium spectaculair 
gegroeid. Weinigen beseffen dat er jaarlijks vele malen meer obligaties worden 
uitgegeven dan aandelen. Het belang van obligatiefinanciering voor ondernemingen kan 
dan ook nauwelijks onderschat worden. Toch krijgen obligaties traditioneel veel minder 
aandacht dan aandelen. Daar begint langzaam verandering in te komen. Dit proefschrift 
draagt daaraan bij door ondernemingsfinanciering met obligaties centraal te stellen. In 
vier achtereenvolgende onderzoeksprojecten volgen we de levenscyclus van bedrijven die 
obligaties emitteren. We onderzoeken hoe de aanwezigheid van obligaties de waarde van 
de onderneming beïnvloedt en welke factoren van belang zijn voor de kosten van 
obligatiefinanciering. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat over ondernemingen die voor de eerste keer de obligatiemarkt betreden. 
De centrale vraag is of obligaties een disciplinerende werking hebben op het management 
van de onderneming. Voor een dataset van 225 ondernemingen uit 37 landen meten we 
de aandelenkoersreacties op de aankondiging van hun eerste obligatie. Deze koersreacties 
zijn een indicatie van de waardecreatie voor aandeelhouders. Vervolgens onderzoeken we 
in hoeverre die koersreacties afhangen van de kenmerken van de obligatie, de uitgevende 
onderneming en het land waar de onderneming actief is. Uit die analyse blijkt dat 
koersreacties negatiever zijn als de emissie gemotiveerd wordt door het vasthouden aan 
een controlerend belang binnen de onderneming, waardoor disciplinering vermeden kan 
worden. Koersreacties zijn daarentegen positiever als de obligatie resulteert in meer 
disciplinering, omdat de obligatie de voorheen hoge vrije kasstromen vermindert. Ook 
landenverschillen doen ertoe. Zo is de rol van vrije kasstromen belangrijker in landen met 
goede bescherming van investeerders, terwijl controlerende belangen meer van invloed 
zijn in landen met weinig bescherming. In laatstgenoemde landen blijven ondernemingen 
doorgaans ook langer in de bankfase en zijn ze groter op het moment dat ze alsnog de 
obligatiemarkt betreden. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken we hoe Japanse ondernemingen, hoewel ze al wel toegang 
hebben tot obligatiemarkten, last kunnen hebben van al te nauwe banden met banken die 
in problemen verkeren. In Japan behoort een groot aantal bedrijven tot zogenaamde 
keiretsu (ondernemingsgroepen), wat inhoudt dat banken (en in minder mate andere 
groepsondernemingen) aandelenpakketten in deze ondernemingen bezitten en er 
bestuursleden kunnen benoemen. Onze dataset beslaat emissies in de jaren 1994-2002, 
een periode van zowel deregulering van obligatiemarkten als toenemende problemen bij 
banken. We constateren dat de commissies voor emissiebegeleiding over deze periode 
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daalden voor onafhankelijke bedrijven, omdat ze profiteerden van toenemende 
concurrentie in de markt voor emissiebegeleiding. Maar tegelijkertijd stegen deze 
commissies voor bedrijven die lid waren van de keiretsu. Blijkbaar misbruikten de 
banken hun macht om hun problemen deels over te hevelen naar de aan hen verbonden 
ondernemingen. 
 
Verkrijgen ondernemingen gunstigere financieringsvoorwaarden naarmate ze vaker 
obligaties emitteren? Die vraag staat centraal in hoofdstuk 4. We hypothetiseren dat 
frequente emittenten zullen profiteren van een betere reputatie (de markt kent hen beter) 
en van betere marktkennis (zij kennen de markt beter en zijn in staat marktkansen te 
herkennen en te benutten). Daarom documenteren we de frequentie waarmee 
ondernemingen emitteren over verschillende periodes, variërend van 1 week tot 6 jaar. 
Vervolgens onderzoeken we of ondernemingen met hogere emissiefrequenties ook lagere 
interestkosten weten te verkrijgen. Dat blijkt inderdaad het geval te zijn. Bovendien blijkt 
het belangrijk om te een onderscheid te maken tussen normale en erg grote 
ondernemingen. Voor erg grote ondernemingen zijn vooral de frequenties in periodes tot 
1 jaar van belang, wat duidt op het belang van marktkennis, die immers maar kort haar 
waarde behoudt. Voor kleine ondernemingen doet de frequentie over veel langere 
periodes ertoe, omdat het verkrijgen van een reputatie voor hen van groter belang is dan 
marktkennis, die pas echt goed opgedaan wordt als er zeer regelmatig geëmitteerd wordt. 
Meer is overigens niet altijd beter: ondernemingen die teveel obligaties uitgeven worden 
bestraft met hogere interestkosten. De resultaten suggereren dat er een optimale 
emissiefrequentie is, die ondernemingsspecifiek is.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 beschouwt de inkoop door ondernemingen van hun eigen obligaties. 
Ondernemingen gaan hiertoe over om hun vermogensstructuur aan te passen aan 
gewijzigde omstandigheden, of bijvoorbeeld om toestemming van de obligatiehouders te 
krijgen voor bepaalde activiteiten. De belangen van aandeelhouders en obligatiehouders 
kunnen hierbij strijdig zijn. Wij onderzoeken daarom de waarde-effecten van 
inkoopacties voor beide groepen, maar vinden geen bewijs voor waardeverschuivingen 
tussen beide groepen. Obligatiehouders ontvangen weliswaar een premie van 3,9% 
bovenop de waarde van hun obligaties, maar dit blijkt niet ten koste te gaan van 
aandeelhouders. Blijkbaar hebben aandeelhouders baat bij de nieuwe financiële structuur. 
Sterker nog, beide partijen gaan er meer op vooruit naarmate de ingekochte obligaties een 
langere looptijd voor de boeg hadden. Het is in beider voordeel om de obligaties in te 
kopen en de inefficiënte situatie te beëindigen, in plaats van te wachten totdat ze aflopen. 
 
Een terugkerend thema in dit proefschrift is de relatie tussen de verschillende 
belanghebbenden in de onderneming. Deze relaties veranderen gedurende de 
levenscyclus van de onderneming, waarbij bijvoorbeeld het belang van banken doorgaans 
afneemt. Bovendien beïnvloeden die relaties de kosten van obligatiefinanciering in de 
vorm van interestkosten en emissiebegeleidingscommissies (hoofdstuk 3 en 4). Ook is 
opgevallen dat deze relaties variëren met de institutionele omgeving (hoofdstuk 2). In 
veel landen is de toegang tot obligatiemarkten beperkt en treden alleen erg grote 
bedrijven toe. Banken blijven dan een belangrijkere rol spelen in latere stadia, zoals we in 
het Japanse geval (hoofdstuk 3) gezien hebben. 
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De onderzoeken in dit proefschrift roepen ook allerlei vragen op. Zo suggereren de 
resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 dat er een ondernemingsspecifieke optimale emissiefrequentie 
bestaat. We hebben hier echter nog geen concrete maatstaf voor. Ook het belang van 
marktomstandigheden vraagt om vervolgonderzoek. Zo lijkt het erop dat ondernemingen 
kunnen profiteren van gunstige omstandigheden, maar ook het slachtoffer kunnen worden 
van marktsentimenten tegen hun bedrijfstak. De hoofdstukken 4 en 5 wijzen daarnaast op 
het bestaan van emissiestrategieën. Zo geven sommige ondernemingen, zoals GM, veel 
relatief kleine obligaties uit om te snel te kunnen profiteren van opkomende marktkansen. 
Terwijl anderen, zoals concurrent Ford, ervoor kiezen om erg grote en liquide emissies te 
doen die als maatstaf voor de markt kunnen dienen. Wat is wijs? 
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Corporate Bond Issuers
What are the mechanisms behind corporate bond finance? Whereas a
lot of corporate finance research is focused on stocks, corporate bond
finance is relatively unknown territory. In this thesis, we present four
articles in which we study the costs and effects of financing with
bonds. We follow corporate bond issuers from market entry, through
subsequent issues to the stage where they repurchase their bonds. In
addition to the firms themselves, important players are bondholders,
shareholders, management and intermediaries (banks). In the first
paper, bond market entry is studied and related to agency costs of
equity. Central is the question whether shareholders benefit from the
presence of bonds in the firm’s capital structure. The second paper
investigates the costs of issuing bonds (in terms of yields to maturity
and fees paid to underwriters) in a bank-oriented system faced with
deregulation. Are bond issues by firms with strong bank ties affected
differently by regulation than those by independent firms? Whether
frequent bond issuers enjoy lower yields is the subject of the third
paper. Do firms benefit from enhanced reputations and better market
literacy when doing repeat issues? Finally, the fourth article studies
firms that repurchase their bonds, with a special focus on possible
wealth transfers between bondholders and shareholders. 
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